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Significance of the Movement 
Traditional courses In both public address and Intel­
lectual history devote considerable time to a discussion of 
nineteenth-century opposition to religious orthodoxy— agnos­
ticism, free thought, Unltarlanlsm, Modernism, etc. However, 
these extremities of religious thought as they persist In the 
twentieth century are often Ignored or dismissed as Insignif­
icant; the presumption left Is that agnosticism, for example, 
died with Ingersoll at the dawn of this century. Nevertheless, 
considerable evidence Indicates that one form of ultra-liberal 
religious thought has become strongly organized In the twen­
tieth century and today represents a growing and significant 
movement. This Ideology has adopted the name "Humanism"^ even
^The specific movement of Human1mm discussed in this 
study should not be confused with the literary humanism of Pail 
Elmer More and Irving Babbitt, nor should It be thought of as 
the humanism of the Italian Renaissance In the sense of a "re­
turn to the classics." The two senses In which the word will 
be used here are (1) the traditional historic usage, that of an 
attitude of mind which assigns primary value to man, and (2) as 
a reference to the specific twentieth-century religious movanent 
represented by the American Humanist Association. In this sec­
ond sense, Humanlsm will be capitalized, even though the prac­
tice is not universally observed by all authors. Historical 
humanism will be discussed In Chapter II.
though It has sometimes been called "New Humanism," "Sci­
entific Humanism," "Atheistic Humanism," "Religious Humanism," 
and "Naturalistic Humanism.
This study will be devoted to an analysis of the 
ideas flwH the arguments found in the twentieth-century Human­
ist movement. That the movement is, in fact, significant 
and worthy of analysis may be illustrated by citing some 
statements of noted authors from the fields of philosophy 
and religion. Today "almost every college textbook in basic 
philosophy" allocates space for a discussion of Humanism as a 
modern anrf respectable way of life.3 Such was not the case 
some years earlier. By numerical standards Humanl am is still 
a minor movement, but it has come increasingly to have a 
place in American philosophic and religious thought.
In a survey of religion in this century, Professor 
Herbert Schneider of Columbia University devotes a chapter to 
Humanism and therein asserts that "a fourth faith is in the 
making" (the other three being Jewish, Protestant and
^Some differences in emphasis do exist between such 
labels as naturalistic and scientific humanism; however, these 
distinctions will not be important in this study. The sig­
nificant criterion determining whether or not a given indi­
vidual will be included here will be his rhetorical and or­
ganizational involvement in Religious Humanism as a move­
ment.
^"Pive Years of Achievement— 19^9-1955»" The Human­
ist. XV (March-April, 1955)» Hereafter, all references in 
footnotes to Humanist journals will be abbreviated as follows: 
TH for The Humanist. TNH for The New Humanist, and THE for 
95e Humanist Bulletin.
3
Catholic).^ He further has this to say of Humanism;
The humanist societies have been successful in bringing 
these various nri« of liberals, freethinkers, rational­
ists, Unitarians, Ethical Culturalists, etc. together for 
fellowship. Instruction, publication, and promotion of 
their common Interests. The reappearance of humanism as 
an Independent religious movement Is sigAfleant In spite 
of Its small numbers. It gives proof through the night 
that Hod.emlst Liberalism still lives as a positive reli­
gious faith, that the demand for religious expression 
exceedsthe supply offered by conventional religious 
bodies.^
Schneider Is not only pointing to the Importance of Humanism 
as an Independent movement, but he Is also explaining some 
of the characteristics of the modem religious situation 
which contribute to the movement * s success.^
John Hutchinson and James Martin, Jr., In an analysis 
of many religious faiths, contrast the movement with tradi­
tional religion and go on, like Schneider, to argue that 
Humanl sm is important enough that It may well be called "the 
fourth main religious option, along with Judaism, Homan Cathol­
icism, and Protestantism, for thoughtful men In the contem­
porary Western World."?
Professor of Philosophy Harold Titus of Denison
Herbert Wallace Schneider, Religion In 20th Century 
America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1952), p. 141.
5lbld.. p. 142.
^Aspects of the context surrounding the growth of 
the movement will be discussed In Chapter II.
7John A. Hutchinson and James Alfred Martin, Jr.,
Ways of Faith (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1953), p. 445.
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University also devotes a chapter to Humanism, and while he 
has some critical comments regarding the movement's Ideology, 
he admits that It has a rather natural appeal for many scien­
tifically oriented people In modem society.® Likewise, 
Charles S. Braden, In an examination of minority beliefs, 
writes that the movement Is more than "just an organization" 
and Its point of view Is shared by "a large number of people," 
many of whom as yet have nothing at all to do with Humanlsm.^
The noted religious critics, Henry Wleman and Walter 
Horton, writing several years ago, stated that "tv̂  ̂most re­
cent of the humanitarian cults Is that very considerable 
movement . . , which Is known as the 'new humanism.'"10 And 
Willard Sperry of Harvard points to the Humanist's goal of 
becoming a "powerful denomination"; while he Is none too opti­
mistic about the movement's chances of achieving Its goal, he 
does concede that Humanism has "many of the best brains and 
the most disciplined characters among us."11
Whether or not Humanism Is or will become a "fourth
^Harold H. Titus, Living Issues In Philosophy (3rd 
ed.; New York: American Book Co., 1959)» p. É21.
^Charles Samuel Braden, These Also Believe (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1949)» p. 468,
l^Henry N. Wleman and Walter M. Horton, The Growth 
of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark, and Co., 1938)» P» 191.
llWlllard Sperry, Religion In America (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1948), p. 256.
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faith” or a strong denomination, it clearly represents a 
segment of modern religious and philosophic thought signifi­
cant enough to provide a meaningful basis for an ideological 
and rhetorical analysis. Whereas the historical perspective 
may be hampered by the movement's youth,12 a rhetorical anal­
ysis may be enhanced by it; that is, one is free to examine 
the argumentation of Humanism from its earliest beginnings to 
the present.
Scope of the Study
An examination of any social movement necessarily 
presupposes the establishment of some rather definite limita­
tions, and there are several imposed in this study. For 
Humanism, the time period to be studied will be the least 
restrictive; the boundaries will simply encompass the total 
organized existence of the movement— 1928 to the present. Of 
course, this restriction does not apply to the historical 
background which will be included.
The discourse to be examined herein will be taken al­
most exclusively from the movement's publications, for since 
Humanism was officially organized it has almost continuously 
published a journ a l .^3 other Humanist rhetorical activities
1 2The movement was officially organized in 1928.
13The movement's publications will be discussed in 
Chapter III.
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such as speeches, discussions, and workshops^^ will be exam­
ined when they are properly within the Internal structure 
of Humanism and represent, largely, communication among mem­
bers.
Another major limitation Involves the selection of 
subject matter or Ideas. The most persistent and consistent 
stream of Ideas within Humanism, permeating all of Its liter­
ature, Involves a statement or an argument of the Humanist 
religious and philosophic position. This discourse may be 
referred, to as the fundamental "Ideology" of the movement and 
Involves two broad spheres ; (1) the value and meaning of
Humanist tenets and (2) the relationship of Humanist Ideas to 
those of other Ideologies or religions. This study will be 
restricted to an analysis of the patterns of argument with 
which Humanists defend thmlr ideology and attack opposing 
Ideologies. Some of the rhetorical arguments are "defensive". 
In nature; that Is they Involve attempts to justify or pro­
vide a rationale for the movement's position. Other arguments 
may be classified as "offensive,” meaning that they represent 
efforts to attack or refute other ideological positions which 
are in fundamental conflict with Humanist ideas. Thus, the 
defensive and offensive aspects of Humanist argumentation 
will represent the scope of this study. Consideration of the
^^hese and other channels of communication will be 
examined In Chapter III.
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Humanist dlsouaslon of such Issues as civil rights, birth 
control, and separation of church and state will, reluctantly, 
be omitted.
Emphasis will also be placed upon the specific Human­
ist figures who are most representative of the movement.
This study will be focused on those men who have been the 
active leaders, "active" being defined as (1) frequency of 
contribution to Humanist publications, (2) degree of involve­
ment in ideological discussions, and (3) activity in the or­
ganisational structure of Humanism. Approximately thirty indi­
viduals are the "active" leaders; their argumentation is the 
primary material for this study.
The ProbJ.em of Audience
Efforts to analyze the Humanist movement in regard to 
the relation of speaker and writer to audience present some 
unusually complex problems; and to assert simply that the 
speakers involved have many audiences and multiple purposes 
does not resolve the difficulty. The picture is complicated 
by the fact that social movements, according to Sherif and 
Sherif, are always possessed by a "sense of mission, "^5 and 
this traditional zeal of evangelism has not by-passed Human­
ism. Professor Schneider observes, for example, that the
^^Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, ^  Outline of 
Social Psychology (New York: Hamer and Brothers. Publishers.
pT 722.
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Humanists "are inevitably becoming militant and are organiz­
ing for missionary a c t i v i t y . I n d e e d ,  official Humanists 
have been open and frank about their desire to create grcwth 
(some Humanists even talk of their hope of establishing a mass 
movement), and their literature is replete with talk of expan­
sion.1? Thus, one purpose in the minds of many Humanist 
speakers and writers is the possible proselytizing of new 
members; at least one broad audience could be called the 
"outsider" or the non-Humanist.
Yet, perhaps the most vital Humanist audience has al­
ways been composed of sympathetic listeners. What Humanists 
write or say is attended, for the most part, by other Human­
ists or near-Humanists, and Chapter III will illustrate how 
the "need to belong" and to communicate within the framework 
of an organization have been important uniting forces for 
this cluster of liberals. Actually, the open lines of oom?is®l- 
cation which have allowed for membership interaction may 
well have meant the very survival of the organization. The 
rhetoric presented within the movement, then, is of primal 
importance, and for that reason will be the focus of this 
study. That outside audiences have been involved cannot be 
ignored, but will be de-emphasized here.
^^Schneider, p. I4l.
17Chapter III discusses the movement’s channels of 
communication and that part of their function related to 
seeking new members.
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A most vital observation regarding Humanist rhetoric 
is. that those writing and, those reading are essentially the 
same people; that which is a characteristic of one group is a 
characteristic of the other. Important writers of the move­
ment fall into three major categories; so also, of course, do 
the readers,
The first category consists of liberal clergymen, 
primarily Unitarians and Ethical Culture leaders. Among those 
who have contributed to the movement as ministers,several 
deserve special mention. Five Unitarian ministers who might 
be considered "pioneers" of early Humanism are the following: 
John H. Dietrich of Minne^olis, who was preaphlng a strict 
Humanism as early as 1915» Curtis W. Reese of Chicago, tdio 
for many years was dean of the Ahyaham Lincoln Center in 
Chlcagp; Albert Eustace Haydon, also from Chicago, author, 
minister, and professor (most distinguished for his twenty-six 
years -as Professor of Comparative Religion at the University 
of Chicago); the noted author and Humanist spokesman Charles 
Francis Potter of New York; and Edwin H. Wilson, for many 
years Unitarian minister of Salt Lake City, who eventually 
left the pulnit to devote full time to Humanist organizational 
work.^^
^®Unitarians who have become strict Humanists have 
sometimes been referred to as "Unitarian Humanists." Not all 
Unitarians are willing to accept certain aspects of Humanism 
as it has developed.
19ihese five men have now either retired or died.
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2nOther Unitarian ministers who have espoused Humanism 
are Kenneth Patton, R. Lester Mondaie, Harold P. Marley, John 
Morris, and Harold Scott. J. Hutton Hynd is an Ethical 
Society leader who must be mentioned for his considerable 
contribution to the Humanist movement.
The second group of Humanists may be found in depart­
ments of philosophy and religion scattered throughout the 
country. Early Humanist thought came out of th.e University 
of Chicago where, in addition to Professor Haydon, mentioned 
above, was Professor Edward Scribner Ames. Columbia Univer­
sity was also an early Humanist stronghold;, noted philosophy 
professors at Columbia, include John Dewey, John Herman 
Randall, Jr., Herbert W. Schneider, and Corliss Lamont (a lec­
turer in philosophy).
Other important Humanist philosophers or theologians 
include Professor J. A. C. Fagginger Auer of Harvard Divinity 
School, Professors Maz C. Otto and Horace Fries of the Univer­
sity of Wisconsin, Professor Roy Wood Sellars of the University 
of Michigan, Professor Van Meter Ames (son of Edward Scribner 
Ames) of the University of Cincinnati, Professor Harold 
Larrabee of the University of Utah, and Professor Oliver L. 
Reiser, chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the Uni­
versity of Pittsburg. Other professors of philosophy and 
religion will be cited throughout this study, but the above
20The degree to which Humanism is indebted to Unitar- 
ianism is discussed in Chapter II,
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list includes some of the most distinguished— distinguished 
not only for their work in education but also as authors.
A third group of Humanists is less easily classified; 
they include educators (primarily college professors) from 
various fields, scientists, authors, and others. Some of the 
more prominent figures in this list are Hermann J. Muller, 
Distinguished Service Professor of Zoology, Indiana Univer­
sity, Nobel Prize winner, 1946; Maurice Visscher, Distin­
guished Service Professor of Physiology, University of Minne­
sota Medical School; Rudolf Dreikurs, Professor of Psychiatry, 
Chicago Medical School; Harry Elmer Bames, noted historian, 
author, eind lecturer; Brock Chisholm, M. D., former head of 
World Health Organization and president of World Federation 
for Mental Health; Lloyd Morain, business consultant and past 
president of International Society for General Semantics; 
Anatol Rapoport, well-known author on general semantics, a 
member of the research staff on mental health at the Univer­
sity of Michigan Medical School; Gerald Wendt, author, lec­
turer, scientist, publisher of material for science education; 
William Floyd, editor and author; George Axtelle, Chairman of 
the Department of History and Philosophy of Education, New 
York University and later Professor of Education at Southern 
Illinois University; and Arthur E. Morgan, former president 
of Antioch College.
These three lists of Humanist leaders, while in no way
12
exhaustive, are nevertheless representative of the Human­
ist. Perhaps the most important common characteristics of 
the modem Humanist are that he has a high degree of formal 
education, most frequently is trained in philosophy or theol­
ogy, and sometimes plays the dual role of minister-professor. 
Professors of the physical and social sciences also have been 
strongly attracted to the movement, as have many authors from 
various fields. The Humanist, then, is most likely to be one 
affiliated, directly or indirectly, with a college or univer­
sity; and, almost without exception. Humanist chapters have 
been formed in communities in which an institution of higher 
learning is located.
Purpose AMii Structure of the Study
Leland Griffin argues that a rhetoric student's pur­
pose in any movement study should be to "isolate the rhetori­
cal movement within the matrix of the historical movement.
The purpose of this study will be to discover and evaluate
2lThe brief biographical data about individual Human­
ists presented here as well as elsewhere in this study is not 
intended to be comprehensive or necessarily current. For 
example, many important Humanists who Joined the movement 
very early have since then died or retired; others who Joined 
the movement later may have changed professional positions or 
residences many times. The figures are identified here only 
.in a general way in order that the composition of the Humanist 
movement may be better understood.
^^Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Move­
ments," Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXVIII (April, 1952), 
184.
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the patterns of argument which have emerged from Religious 
Humanism. The historical context surrounding this heterodox 
groi^)ing will be examined in an effort to understand better 
its ideas, its leaders, and its goals.
This study will examine Humanist arguments as a part 
of the general history of ideas. A rhetorical analysis of 
the ideas involved should result in a better historical in­
terpretation of this specific ideological tendency in American 
thought, and may also create some insights into other minority 
group efforts to organize.
A further purpose is to show that interaction among 
the members of the Humanist movement through several channels 
of communication produces a common rhetorical approach to 
ideological questions. A number of rhetorical patterns have 
emerged through the years of Humanist writing and speaking. 
Rhetorical "patterns," as used in this study, will refer to 
the nature of the arguments with which a Humanist seeks to 
defend his own ideology or to attack the position of a hostile 
ideology. Chapter II presents an exposition of the major 
Humanist tenets; Ch^ters IV, V, ajid VI are devoted to an 
analysis of the arguments Humanists employ.
The first task of this study will be to place mm
into historical perspective, to make clear how it emerged as 
a significant Ideological current, and to clarify its rela­
tion to other religious and philosophic tendencies. Next,
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the role played by communication within the structure of the 
organization will be examined. The functions and strengths 
of each of Humanism’s channels of communication will also be 
described.
The rest of the study will be devoted to an examina­
tion of the movement’s three rhetorical patterns, patterns 
which have emerged as a result of communication within the 
structure of the group. The first will include an analysis 
of a fundamental Humanist ideological defense, the rhetorical 
identification of Humanism with science and the scientific 
method. The second division includes a description of the 
Humanist’s offensive position, a refutation of religious 
orthodoxy. And the third contains an analysis of another 
pattern regarded as defensive in nature, Humanist’s attempts 
to identify their movement with several commonly accepted 
ideals. The patterns of argument discussed in this study 
seem to be the major rhetorical product of the more than 
thirty years of Humanist argumentation.
CHAPTER II 
HUMANIST FOUNDATIONS
Although organized Humanism has only recently ap­
peared on the religious scene, the movement was in the proc­
ess of evolving long before the twentieth century. A social 
movement, according to Sherif and Sherif, does not take place 
in a short time, but rather "it simmers, it seeks expression 
and fulfillment over wide areas of human congregation and 
through years of ebbing and flowing tide."^ And correspond­
ingly, Humanism has emerged out of a complex and long-ferment­
ing social, cultural, and religious milieu. The purposes of 
this chapter are (1) to examine some of the humanistic ten­
dencies in history, (2) to investigate the organizational 
forerunners of the Humanist movement, (3) to discuss the be­
ginning of organized Humanism, and (4) to outline the formu­
lation of the Humanist ideology.
Humanistic Tendencies in History
Much of what historians have traditionally identified
^Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of 




as being "humanism’* is relevant to the present movement, 
despite the fact that the word humanism is notoriously ambig­
uous and has been subjected to a. myriad of meanings and inter­
pretations. In at least one broad sense, humanism has meant 
and means a point of view which considers the affairs of man 
to be central to life, which emphasizes reason, science, human 
nature, and natural law, or which places a concern for human 
welfare on earth above other considerations. In such a con­
text, countless philosophies and religions have at least some
"humanistic" characteristics, and few philosophic positions
2indeed can be completely excluded.
Nevertheless, the notion of a central emphasis on man 
has its own general place in history. The idea has some foun­
dation even in Eastern cultures, especially with certain as­
pects of Buddhism and Confucianism. For example, Abraham 
Kaplan, Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
California, refers to Buddhism as "one of those philosophies 
that is centered on man," and what the Buddhist wants "to 
understand is man, and what he seeks knowledge of is how to 
live so as to achieve the supreme value that life a f f o r d s . "3
2lt is for this reason that no effort will be made 
here to write a history of humanistic thought; rather, the in­
tent is to point to some general tendencies in history which 
may have a relation to modem Humanism. The late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, as a period, will be treated 
with greater specificity.
3Abraham Kaplan, The New World of Philosophy (New 
York: Random House, Inc., 1961), pp. È42-43.
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About Confucianism, Professor Kaplan says it is a philosophy 
which "is, above all, a humanistic one." He points out that 
morality "based squarely on the conception of a common human 
nature" is the major "preoccupation of Confucian thought. 
Obviously, these two great world religions contain many other 
complexities; they are cited here only to illustrate the 
humanistic current found in Eastern culture.
But the roots of humanism are more often located in 
Western culture.^ Actually, the word was first used by his­
torical scholars of the nineteenth century when referring to 
those men of the Eenai ssance who were seeking to revitalize 
the rediscovered culture and literature of ancient Greece and 
Rome.^ Likely, the word humanism may be traced to the word 
humanitas as used by Cicero.7
Most modem Religious Humanists believe that their 
movement has rather definite ties with the ancient Greek cul­
ture, and they often claim to be descendants of the fifth 
century Sophist Protagoras; his statement, "Man is the measure
4lbid.. p. 273.
5r, j. Blackham, "Modem Humanism," Journal of World 
History, Published..for the International Commission for a 
riistory of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Man­
kind, with the financial support of UNESCO, VIII, No. 1 (1964)̂  101.
^Wemer Jaeger, Humanism and Theology (Milwaukee: 
Marquette University Press, 19^3)» P* 20.
7lbid.
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of all things," Is frequently quoted as support for that 
claim. ̂  The modem English philosopher H. J. Blackham refers 
to this anthropocentric tendency of Protagoras as a "char­
acteristic Greek Idea," furthered by many other natural 
philosophers of the ancient culture.^ In at least a general 
way, human nature and reason were given a  prnmi^ent place 
throughout ancient Greece;their degree cf prominence, how­
ever, Is sometimes debated. Furthermore, one need not con­
clude that humanistic and theological Ideas have always been 
In fundamental opposition to p-acb o t h e r . t h e o l o g y  
Is »<•> a "Greek Invention" Its roots go Aaap intn the 
culture of that ancient d e m o c r a c y . O f  course a strict 
theacentrlc view may be contrasted to an anthropoeentrlo
Q® Ci ted in Lloyd Morain and Mary Morain, Humanism as 
the Next Step (Boston: Beacon Press,. 195^), p. 19.
^Blackham, Journal of World Humanism. VIII, 102,
^^Jaeger, p. 20.
llsee especial 1 yihld., pp. 39-64. Jaeger here ad­
vances the argument that the anthropocentrlc phi loHnphy of 
Protagc.vas and others of his day was not the central essence 
of Greek thought, but rather, represented a  decay of philo­
sophic advance. He argues that theology and the search for 
God were more truly symbolic of the Greek contribution. The 
historical point helng mad* In this study Is that a.t least 
one Important phase of Greek thought was man-centered and 
that modem Humanists that ancient land as the birth­
place for their movement. For a discussion of humanism In 
ancient times idilch may be contrasted to Jaeger's Interpreta­
tion, see Corliss Lamont, "The Humanist Tradition: Fore­
runners," ra, IV (Summer, 1944), 62-69.
^^lackham. Journal of World History. VIII, 102.
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position, but the broader "humanistic” need not be thought of 
as inherently in conflict with the theological,13
The Renaissance has already been mentioned as a 
period during which classical ideas from Greece and Rome were 
rediscovered and revived. The humanism of the Renaissance 
was, in part, a revolt against the theological scholasticism 
of the Middle Ages and a return to a concern for man;^^ but
again, most of the humanists of that period were not actually
hostile toward Christianity.^^ Nevertheless, the period did 
represent a move toward a new emphasis upon man and human na­
ture to the extent that Professor Oliver Reiser has been led 
to say that today's Religious Humanism "is simply Renaissance 
humanism modernized.
Thus, in a very general way, a humanistic emphasis
can be said to have foundations in a limited way in Eastern
cultures, but in a more direct way in the ancient Greek and 
Roman clôtures, being revived during the Renaissance. Un­
doubtedly, a humanistic tendency might be found to exist in 
almost any period of human history and, to a degree, has been 
mingled with the history of theology. St. Thomas, for example,
^3ihat is in the historic sense, it is modern Human­
ism which has taken a position in opposition to theology.
^^hDouglas Macintosh, "Contemporary Humanism, " Human­
ism Another Battleline. ed. William Peter King (Nashville, 
ïennessëëï Cokesbury Press, 1931)» P» 4l.
Jaeger, p. 2.
l^Oliver L. Reiser, A New Earth and a New Humanity 
(New York: Creative Age Press, Inc., 1942), p. 53.
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a pre-Renaissance figure, attempting to give new life to the 
recently diacovered writings of Aristotle, was himsgif fur­
thering the humanistic tradition, and it would not be inappro­
priate to label him a humanist of his day.^7 Historical hu­
manism, then, has conflicted with religion and theology only 
in matters of degree or emphasis, even though at points this 
conflict has been definite anri real.^®
But the broad and central emphajgi g on man anH reason 
came into a sharper conflict with certain religious views in 
the seventeenth ("Age of Reason") and eighteenth ("The En­
lightenment") centuries. The clash was particularly evident 
wherever the "eccQesiasticism of medieval Christendom survived 
and blocked the way to new knowledge and ««niai change.
With the rise of European rationalism (both religious 
and secular) of the seventeenth century came an important 
movement toward a general "humanistic morality."^0 This tend­
ency in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries pointed
toward an ever-widening interest in "purely human problems" and 
toward a "science of man," mem. shorn of his ultimate possibil­
ities and restricted to success or failure on earth.21
Jaeger, p. 19.
18The earlier mentioned Sophists of ancient Greece 
are good examples.
^^Blackham, Journal of World History. VIII, 104.
^Ogtow Persons, Evolutionary Thought In j^erdca (Hew 
Haven, Connecticut; Yale University Press, 19^0), p. 423.
Zllbld.
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This new humanistic trend in Europe soon spread to 
America where its impact was to be violent.^2 But American 
religion, at least, was not immediately affected, for during 
the eighteenth century the church was little involved or con­
cerned with the new morality and those who sought to Initiate 
such humanistic ideas were a few "freethinkers** and "infi­
dels,"^3 But the nineteenth century was to see humanistic 
ideas cause a revolution in both religious and secular 
thought.
Very early in the nineteenth century the spread of 
seventeenth and eighteenth-century European rationalism to 
America began to permeate American culture, causing an upheaial 
in religious thought. The new humanistic orientation soon 
began to "undermine" traditional theology, creating a need 
for rapid readjustment.
Accompanying the new humanistic morality came an 
abiding faith in reason and especially science and the scien­
tific method.25 However important science was before Charles 
Darwin wrote about evolution, the interest in science
22lbid.
^3Henry N. Wieman and Walter M. Horton, The Growth 
of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1938), p. I83.
24persons, Evolutionary Thought in AmA-rica. p. 424.
25stow Persons, Free Beligion An American Faith 
(New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1947),
p. 105.
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following the Civil War beoame intense. Science found its 
"devil in the Irrational dogma of traditional religion, " and, 
its "d.emi-gods" in great scientists like D a r w i n . T h e  "Cult 
of Science" found its popularizers in men like John Draper, 
Edward Youmans, and Robert Ingersoll, and had its popular 
magazines, its Herbert Spencer clubs, and Ita powerful press—  
The Appleton Scientific Series. T h u s ,  the new humanistic 
emphasis and especially the interest in science were penetrat­
ing American culture and the resulting impact on theology, ac­
cording t o  Henry Steele Commager, was " v i o l e n t . "^8
Traditional religion answered the humanistic challenge 
in the last half of the century by an "adiustment" which has 
come to be called the "Social Gospel." Professor Herbert 
Schneider argues that the Social Gospel movement was "the most 
far-reaching and apparently permanent moral reconstruction in 
American religion."^9 The Social Gospel sought "to save hnmAn 
beings from a tes^oral distress," and might be called a brand 
of "social mysticism."30 This movement, which substituted the
2 6 l b i d . 2 7 i b i d .
20Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind (New 
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 195QT7 P* 166.
29Herhert Wallace Schneider, Religion in 20th Century 
America (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1942), p. 72.
30Morris E. Cohen, American Thought (Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 195^)» P* 193.
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saving of man on earth for the "saving of souls," cut across 
denominational lines and found its most articulate spokesmen 
in figures such as Washington Gladden, Walter Hauschenbusch, 
Henry Potter, Francis McConnel, and George Davis Herron.31
The church, then, was deeply influenced by the new 
morality, bit so also was the general religious outlook of 
the country.32 one example of the changing religious atmos­
phere throughout the nation in the last half of the nineteenth 
century was the "amazing popularity" of the agnostic Robert 
Ingersoll, whose vigorous attacks on religious orthodoxy 
some years earlier would probably not have been tolerated.33
The humanistic trend in the nineteenth century, how­
ever, went a step beyond producing tolerance for a few scat­
tered agnostics and influencing the church for social action. 
The century has been called a "great experiment" in which 
there was a search for a new religious attitude free from 
dogma.3^ This search led to attempts to organize humanistic 
thought and extremist religious ideas into a separate move­
ment.
3lEdwin T. Buehrer, "Retracing the Liberal Tradition," 
TH, XX (May-June, I96O), 133.
32wieman and Horton, The Growth of Religion, p. 133*
33Harvey Wish, Society and Thought in America (New 
York; Longman, Green and Co., 1952), pT 152.
3^Harold Buschman, "Humanism and Positivism," TNH,I (1928), 2.
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Organizational Forerunners of 
Modem Humanl am
Growing out of this search for a new religious expres­
sion were at least three^^ significant attempts to unite the 
adherents of the new Ideology under one banner. These three 
were the Unitarian Church, the Free Religious Association, and 
the Ethical Culture S o c i e t i e s . A l l  three represented ultra­
libéral humanistic thought and had much In common, but what 
Is Important here Is that modem Humanism grew rather directly 
out of the seeds of each. Some examination of the three "reli­
gions" Is, therefore, necessary.
Unltarlanlsm (1825-
The largest and most Important humanistic movement of 
the nineteenth century, and the only one which can be called 
a "church" In the usual sense of the word, was Unltarlanlsm.
35There were, of course, more than three organiza­
tions of this kind, but these three are most similar to modem 
Humanism because they each attached a "religious" significance 
to their movement. Other organizations Included the Ration­
alists, the Freethinkers, and Auguste Comte’s "Religion of 
Humanity."
36ihe Unlversallst Church will not be considered as 
a separate movement because It was very similar to Unltarlan­
lsm, but of a lesser Import. The two churches have recently 
merged.
3?The Unitarian church actually existed as early as 
the sixteenth century In Hungarian Transylvania and as early 
as the seventeenth century In America as a development of the 
Congregational movement. The date 1825 Is used here to mark 
the beginning of what some would call "modenf Unltarlanlsm.
It was In 1825 that the American Unitarian Association was 
first organized.
25
Organized before the new European Ideas had widely permeated 
this country, Unltarlanlsm was itself strongly Influenced by 
the new tide of humanistic thought.
Unltarlanlsm has sometimes been characterized as 
primarily a reaction against both Trlnltarlanlsm and a belief 
In the divinity of Jesus, but such concepts have not been 
fundamental to the movement. Willard Sperry points out that 
Unltarlanlsm "was a revolt against the whole grim doctrine of 
human nature and the mechanical means for man's salvation 
which had become the convention In American Calvinism by the 
middle of the eighteenth c e n t u r y . A n d  Professor Commager 
argues that the movement was. In general, a reaction against 
those Protestant sects which represented a "flight from rea­
son"; whereas Unltarlanlsm moved in the opposite direction In 
an effort "to accommodate inherited theology to the realities 
of American experience. "39
But even such a "rational" religion as T T n i  taTd awi «m 
was profoundly Influenced and changed before the «wd of the 
century by Darwinism and the new Interest In s c i e n c e . T h e  
ultra-liberal wing of the tavd an church so completely em­
braced the new humanistic tendency that It became the basis of 
a separate movement— the Free Religious Association (to be




discussed uezt ). The new Association, had an impact on
the whole of Unitaxianism. Professor Stow Persons observes:
Free Religion was most immediately influential in the 
transformation of Unitarianism from a Christo-centric reli­
gion to a pragmatic, humanistic theism, retaining the 
Christian name but actually being Christian only in the 
sense of recognizing its dependence upon the religious 
patterns of Western culture,41
Before the end of the century, therefore, the Unitarian church
became the leading spokesman for the new humanistic trend and
the cult of science.
This relatively small movement of Unitarianism also
had a significant impact on the total religious picture. Dean
Sperry of Harvard writes:
Unitarianism has never bulked large in numbers, but it 
has had an influence on American religious thought out of 
all proportion to its numbers, partly because of the dis­
tinguished names it has carried on its rolls.4%
He goes on to point out that the movement's influence has
further resulted because Unitarianism has led theology into
questions which other denominations refused to face; and that
much of the achievement of Unitarianism in "freeing man from
the iron grip of Calvinism" has now become the common property
of many orthodox denominations. 43 Unitarianism, however, has
continued to move to the theological left, and many of the
"more advanced Unitarians," according to Sperry, in the middle




and weatern part of the United States have given up theism 
for agnosticism and may already be called humanists.^ This 
wing of liberal Unitarianism has been one of the chief sources 
for modem Humanism.
The Free Religious Association (1867-1917)
In a comprehensive study of the Free Religious Asso­
ciation, Professor Stow Persons writes that it
was conceived by the extreme radicals as a  substitute 
for the organization of Unitarianism. In a real sense it 
was sort of a mutual protection for those dissenters who 
would not submit to the yoke of Christ, as prescribed in 
the National Unitarian Conference.
He adds that the FRA was prompted "by purely negative con­
siderations; men needed a new fellowship to replace the old 
one no longer a v a i l a b l e . T h u s ,  Free Religion emerged from 
Unitarianism, and it did so simply by moving further to the 
theological left. As already mentioned, this move tended to 
"liberalize* the entire Unitarian movement.
But it was not nni tayi ftwi HTti idiioh chiefly antagonized 
the Free Religious AaHoaj afcinn « father it was the general 
organized church which the Association considered "inert" and 
bound to a defective social order. ̂  The FRA showed a deep
44rbid.
Charles Francis Potter, The Preacher and I (New 
York; Crown Publisher, Inc., 1951)» p. 394.
^Persons, Free Religion. Au American Faith, p. 75»
^^Ibid. ^Slbid.. p. 132.
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concern for what It called the "dangers of the evangelical 
revival," but its major criticism of Christianity centered 
around authoritarianism, institutionalization, and fixed be­
l i e f s . T h e  constitution of the Free Religious Association, 
for example, talks about the promotion of "pure religion" and 
encouragement of the "scientific study of theology."50 And 
Persons points out that the most import suit goal advanced by 
the FRA was
the application of free thought to religious problems, 
with the consequent emancipation of religious belief and 
life from allegiance to all authority save that of truth 
as determined by rational human intelligence.51
Such expressions of concern for man an,d science clearly place 
the FRA in the midst of the new humanistic ideology.
In contrast to the Christianity it condemned. Free 
Religion made a strong effort to remain individualistic and 
"creedless." This powerful concern for complete individual­
ism within the group, coupled with the fact that the Associa­
tion was fundamentally more negative than constructive in its 
outlook, significantly Interfered with group activity.52 The 
movement was further hampered by the confusion in the minds 
of many people of Free Religion with the general "anti-Chris­
tian cult" of the century.53
Despite these organizational problems. Free Religion
49lbid.. p. 116. 50lbid.. p. 75-
5llbid.. p. 148. 52ibid.. p. 151.
~53lbld.. p. 152.
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helped break down narrow ecclesiastical aathorl tarl anlsm of 
the middle nineteenth century, and. aided In making the Impor­
tant issue of the time one of freedom versus authority.
But as many churches became more liberal, partly through the 
influence of the FBA, most of the young Free Religionists 
began to drift back Into the Unltarl an and other liberal 
c h u r c h e s .55 The net result was that the organisation dis­
solved In 1917.
The Ethical Culture Societies (I876- )
A one-time president of the Free Religious Associa­
tion, Felix Adler, broke with the Association In 18?6 and 
formed the first Ethical Culture Society.5& Adler had a deep 
concern for "ethics," and he argued that "the ethical end Is 
the sovereign, supreme end of life to lAilch all other ends 
must be subordinated."57 His general quarrel with religion 
was that ethics and morality should not be taught as dependent 
on any religion, for a failure of religion would also mean a 
decline In morality.58
Some have asserted that the Societies turned out to
54ibld. 55iblxi.. p. 127.
5&Stow Persons, American Minds (New York: Henry Holtand Co., 19^8), p. 121.
57Clted In Charles Samuel Braden, These Also Believe 
(New York: The Macmillan Co., 19^9)» p. 453%
58ibld.
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be "Just another MoxLemLst ohurch.."59 And., in at least one 
sense, they have resembled, a  ahureh; that is, they have held 
regular meetings with music, inspirational readings, and an 
address by their leader on some social, philosophic, or reli­
gious i s s u e . T h e  historian Harry Elmer Barnes points out, 
however, that some would not call the Societies a religion 
but rather a type of social ethics or social philosophy, 
which has been successful in ariApti n g  itself to "the progress 
of scientific knowledge and critical thought.
At any rate, the Ethical Culture Societies brought 
together people of "all faiths no faiths, " who could unite 
on "promoting religiously and practically a social ethic. 
Schneider further sums up the movement by saying:
These societies gave radical expression to the tendency 
which was increasingly noticeable among liberal American 
faiths, generally, the tendency to subordinate theological 
differences to a practical program of social reconstruc­
tion. They also emphasised as did the Christian Social­
ists, that a social order must be Judged by the kind of . 
human beings it produces, and not by impersonal c r i t e r i a .°3
Thus, the Ethical Culture Societies embraced the humanistic
trend of the nineteenth century. And, like Unitarianism and
39persons, American Minds, p. 121.
^^Braden, p. 463.
élHarry Elmer Barnes, The Twilight of Christianity 
(Peterborough, New Hampshire: Bichard B. Smith Co., Inc.,




Free Religion, they have Insisted upon remaining free from 
dogma or creed.
Common Characteristics of the Organizational
Forerunners
The three groups just discussed share several sig­
nificant characteristics: all have grown out of the Western
religious tradition, and yet, they represented a reaction 
against the church and Christianity In general. Each organi­
zation was an attempt to unite the extreme left In America*s 
religious thinking. The three were deeply Interested In so­
cial reform and subordinated theology to an earthly human!- 
tarlanlsm. Each attached a religious significance to Its 
movement and displayed an Interest In organised fellowship. 
Every one of the groups expressed a strong commitment to rea­
son, the scientific method, and science In general, emphasiz­
ing the Importance of "free thought!* and making an effort to 
remain free from any creed. And all three of the organiza­
tions were responsible for helping spread the new humanistic 
Ideas throughout America.
The Beginning of Organized Humanism 
These three strikingly similar forerunners are sig­
nificant because they represent a thread In American religious 
and Intellectual life, a thread which has persisted Into the 
twentieth century and has been carried forward by the
^^raden, p. 463.
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organization.- of Humanism. As already indicated, Unltarlanlsm 
provided the primary source for modem Humanism. Actually, 
the theological evolution within Unltarlanlsm, Including Its 
efforts to unite the liberal movements, had as Its "natural 
consequence," according to Professors Wieman and Horton, the 
emergence of the "new humanism" idilch replaced the belief In 
God and Immortality with "the very modem belief In the pos­
sibility of Indefinite progress through social cooperation 
and scientific research. Professor Bames also recognizes 
this natural tendency in the Unitarian church as he refers to 
"Unitarian Humanism" as being the "most conspicuous and 
straight-forward representative of Advanced Modernism.
But the seeds for m o d e m  TTnmani gm were not to be found exclu­
sively within the Unitarian church, for both the Free Religious 
Association and the Ethical Culture Societies helped provide a 
base for the new movement. When It Ri-ianfiAfi in 1917, for 
example, the PEA (whose origin and purposes almost precisely 
parallel those of modem Humanism) left a "core of ethical 
h u m a n i s m . T h i s  "core" was soon to be absorbed by the new 
Humanism as It took up the task of unifying the liberals, a 
task which the PEA had never completed.
^^Wleman and Horton, The Growth of Religion, p. 182.
^^Bames, p. 338.
6?Edwln H. Wilson, "Free Religion and Preethought, " 
book review of Free Religion. An Amerloyi Faith, by Stow 
Persons, The Humanist. ÏX (Spring. 1949). 43.
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TwentietJi-cerLtury Humanism, then, drew many, if not 
most, of its leaders and members from the ranks of Free Reli­
gion, Ethical Culture, and Un1.tar1,an3.sm» Because the three 
organizations had no creed and were so much alike in outlook, 
a man could, and sometimes did, become a member of more than 
one at the same time. Indeed, even today many Humanists are 
also members of the Unitarian Church or the Ethical Culture 
Society. The impression should not be left, however, that 
the three organizational forerunners provided all Humanism's 
membership; for the entire humanistic trend of the nineteenth 
century meant that Humanists could be found in many of the 
liberal churches. Also, many of the early Humanists were men 
who had previously belonged to no religious organization or 
church at all.
A Separate Movement Seeks Egression
The truly important period which finally culminated 
in the emergence of wnTnaniHm as a separate movement was the 
decade immediately following World War I. Even before the 
war, Unitarian clergy were allowed to express from their pul­
pits any belief they c h o s e . ^8 The result was an increasing 
expression of a position some were beginning to call "Human­
ism," bringing with it "a conflict in the Unitarian denomina­
tion which threatened to split it."&9 Thus, Humanism was
^®Morain and Moraln, WnmaMism as the Next Step, p. 33*
^9potter, The Preacher and I. p. 36I.
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seeking expression by the 1920’s, and more and more individ­
uals were finding the confines of Unitarianism unsatisfactory* 
Dr. John H. Dietrich has often been called the "Dean 
of American Humanism,” for he was preaching a straight-forward 
Humanist doctrine early as 1915 as minister of the First 
Unitarian Church of Minneapolis.?® In an address delivered 
in Minneapolis in 1925 entitled "Humanism, The Next Step in 
Religion," Dietrich argued that Humanism was simply an exten­
sion and "a more rigorous application of the fundamental 
principles of Unitarianism." He also recognized, however, 
that the new Humanism had not yet been "fully preached" by 
most Unitarians.?! By this time, other influential Unitarian 
ministers had begun to espouse the new ideology; they in­
cluded such men as Curtis Reese of Chicago, Charles ?.
Potter of New York, and Edwin H. Wilson of Salt Lake City.?2 
Outside the confines of the Unitarian church, a number of 
scholars began to identify with the new Humanist ideology; 
the most notable examples in philosophy were Max Otto, Hoy 
Wood Sellars, and A. E. Haydon.?3
?®Charles Francis Potter, Humanism: A New Religion,
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936), p. Ô0.
?lCited in ibid.
?2firaden, p. 463,
?3Henry N. Wieman and Bernard Meland, American Philos­
ophies of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 193^),
p. 258.
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The Movement Is Organized
The inevitable attempts to organize thin scattered 
Humanist thought were soon to begin. In 1927» for exan^jle, a 
number of profeasors and students at the University of Chicago 
began to meet as a group and in 1928 they formed The New 
Hum^ist Associates.7^ That same year they launched a modest, 
mimeographed journal called The New Humanist. The journal 
soon grew in size and importance. Meanwhile, in a separate 
venture, Charles Francis Potter of New York was making plans 
to inaugurate a Humanist Fellowship. Potter successfully be­
gan the First Humanist Society of New York, September 29,
1929. The Society received wide publicity and its meetings 
were well attended.75
The New Humanist Associates evolved into the Humanist 
Press Association in 1934, named partly in an effort to pat­
tern the organization after the Bationalist Press Association 
of England.7^ The HPA in turn gave way to the present American 
Humanist Association formed in 1941. The journal also changed 
its name during this period.
The American Humanist Association was organized as a 
non-ecclesiastical religious group for the purpose of carrying
f^Oorliss Lamont, "John Dewey and the American Human­
ist Association," TH, XX (January-February, i960), 6.
75potter, The Preacher and I. p. 356.
7^Lamont, ra, XX, 3.
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on educational activities in the United States "for the ad-
77vancement of naturalistic humanism," and to serve its members. 
The leaders of the American Humanlst Association in the 1930*s 
and 19^0*s were primarily men with other liberal religious 
responsibilities— ministers of the Unitarian church and Ethi­
cal Culture Societies for the most part. The bulk of the 
editorial and organisational work of the AHA, during its first 
twenty years of operation (including the NHA and the HPA) was 
carried on through the volunteer work of one Unitarian minis­
ter, Edwin H. W i l s o n . I n  1949 Dr. Wilson gave up his Uni­
tarian post to become the full-time executive director of the 
AHA.
The Formulation of the Humanist Ideology 
The diversity of liberal intellectual groups from 
vAiioh Humanism has drawn its adherents makes difficult an 
enumeration of propositions to which ai i mamberg of the move­
ment can subscribe. Indeed, as already indicated, HnTno.ri gm 
has traditionally been critical of all "dogma" and has strug­
gled to remain without a creed. Wilson, for ezazgile, asserts 
that "Humanists do not have a creed, " and that ai i creeds are 
bad "because they tend to freeze thought and become a block to
^^Ibid.
78Morain and Moraln, Humanism as the Next Step, p. 84.
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Intellectual progressa "79 Despite this, attitude, bl number of 
rather specific beliefs have emerged as fundamental to the 
movement and are commonly held by most modem Humanists.
These major tenets can best be outlined by an eiamlnation of 
at least three Ideological formulaJjLons, one from each decade 
of the movement's existence.
The Humanist Manifesto
The only formal and official statement of Humanist 
beliefs and the most significant document of the movement was 
the Humanist Manifesto, drawn up and signed by thirty-four 
Intellectuals in 1933*®® The statements in the Manifesto have 
never been able to claim universal Humanist acceptance; how­
ever, they do represent the basic foundation of the Ideology.
The following list of propositions from the Manifesto 
has been abbreviated here,®^ but the core of each Idea re­
mains. The fifteen points in the document are as follows:
1. The universe Is self-existing and not created.
2. Man Is a part of nature and has emerged as a re­
sult of continuous process.
3* The traditional dualism of mind and body must be 
rejected.
79Edwln H. Wilson, "Correspondence," editorial reply 
to a letter, TH, IX (%irlng, 1949), 56.
8Ounitarlanlsm*s relationship to Humanism is further 
indicated by the Manifesto, for by the end of 1933 sixty Uni­
tarian ministers had endorsed the document.
81a  complete copy of the Manifesto and Its original 
signers appears as Appendix I.
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4. Man’s religions culture and civilization have 
developed through interaction with his environmerti 
and an individual b o m  into a culture is largely 
molded by it.
5. The nature of the universe depicted by modem 
science makes unacceptable any supernatural or 
cosmic guarantee of human values. Humanism does 
not deny the possibilities of realities as yet 
undiscovered, but it insists that the way to dis­
cover them is through intelligent inquiry.
6. The time has passed for theism, deism, modernism, 
and the several varieties of "new thought."
7. Religion consists of those actions, purposes, 
and experiences idiich are humanly significant and 
satisfy human living. The distinction between 
the sacred and the secular can no longer be main­
tained.
8. The complete realization of human personality is 
the end of man’s life and should be developed here 
and now.
9» In place of worship and prayer, religious emotion
may be expressed In a heightened sense of personal 
life and an effort to promote social welfare.
10. There are no uniquely religious emotions and 
attitudes of the kind hitherto associated with 
the belief in the supernatural.
11. Man will l e a m  to face the crises of life in 
terms of their naturalness and probability. They 
will discourage sentimental and unreal hopes and 
wishful thinking.
12. Man should develop creative achievements which 
add to the satisfaction of life.
13. All associations and institutions exist for the
fulfillment of human life, and religious institu­
tions must be reconstructed to function effectively 
in the m o d e m  world. '
14. A socialized and co-operative economic order must 
be established to the end that the equitable dis­
tribution of the means of life be possible. Hu­
manism demands a shared world and a shared life.
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15. One needs to affirm life rather than deny it, 
to elicit the possibility of life and not flee 
from it, and to endeavor to establish a satis­factory life for all.82
In 1953» The Humanist conducted a survey of the orig­
inal signers of the Manifesto in an effort to determine 
what changes they might wish to make in the document.
All but one of the twenty-five living signers indicated that 
they still were in general sympathy with the fundamental pos­
tulates of the Manifesto. However, some criticisms were 
raised, and the two most common, ones were (l) that point 
fourte^i regarding a socialized economy should be excluded, or 
that such an economic change was less vital in 1953 than it 
had been in 1933» and (2) that the statements in the Mani­
festo were too "exclusive" and "dogmatic," especially points 
like number six disclaiming all theism, deism, modernism, 
etc. Modern Humanists who had not signed the Manifesto were 
also asked to evaluate the document, and the criticisms made 
were very much like those set forth by the original signers.®^ 
What is significant about the survey is that the general pur­
port of the document can still be said to hold the founda­
tions of modem Humanism.
BZaeprinted in ra, XXII (July-August, 1962), 130-31.
83**The Humanist Manifesto: Twenty Years After," TH,
XIII (March-April, 1953), 58-71. *
84MCojnjnents on The Humanist Manifesto," TH, XIII 
(May-June, 1953)» 136-41.
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Humanists are quick to protest, however, that the 
Manifesto must be put in its proper historical perspective. 
Wilson reflects the movement’s attitude by saying that the 
Humanist Manifesto "was simply what thirty-four men agreed 
on in a general way at a particular time."^5
Another Ideological Formulation
In 1943» two leading Humanists published in The Human­
ist a rather extensive statement of the movement's beliefs.
The statements belong in the main stream of Humanism and have 
met with general acceptance by the membership. Lloyd Morain 
and Oliver Reiser prefer to use the label "Scientific Human­
ism," and they assert that the following twelve ideas best 
describe the Scientific Humanist.
1. He feels that man is a part of nature in a com­
pletely natural universe and that he is an inde­
pendent agent using nature to serve his own en­
lightenment.
2. He is global in his outlook and gains his strength 
not from heaven, but from the resources and 
wonders of the earth.
3. He is a leader in social orogress and interested 
in social change with a global orientation.
4. He is not dogmatic, but feels that there are some 
things which are facts, an uncreated universe, for 
example. He feels that there is no "riddle of 
existence" or antecedent "meaning of life," but 
that such meanings are created, not discovered.
5» He believes that everything occurs or exists in 
a context and that science never 1earns everything 
about anything; and he feels that without being
85Wilson, "Correspondence," editorial renly to a 
letter, TH, IX (Spring, 1949), 56.
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absolute, he must make adjustments on the basis 
of probabilities and predictabilities.
6* He believes that all events are multi-causatlonal 
and that scientific laws are tentative; he feels 
that man Is an agent in affecting nature and so­
ciety.
7« He Is a semantlclst and stands for the applica­
tion of the scientific method to all problems; 
he feels that it la wrong to aeparate reason, and 
emotion, facts and values, or science and moral­
ity, and that science has a deep social responsi­
bility.
8. He believes that scientific central of the world 
has reached the point where all men can enjoy 
security and peace; and that through humanized 
and socialized changes global problems can be 
solved.
9* He holds that a universal ethics is needed; that 
morality needs no supematuralism and is not 
heaven-sent, but rather it evolves from man's 
e^erience.
10. He feels that religion which interferes with 
social progress should be subordinated; anA in 
the Humanist world, "religion” should become obso­
lete, vdiile the "religious" attitude of awe in 
the universe should become vital.
11. He believes in all groups co-operating in the 
world so that knowledge can be available to all 
and a good society can be made to serve universal 
humanity, as opposed to selfish interests.
12. He holds that the wonders of scientific discovery 
will help break down the religious, political, 
and economic barriers which now prevent a global 
orientation.
Morain and Heiser have, thus, set forth some broad 
and sweeping philosophic ideas regarding Scientific Humanism.
S^Lioyd Morain and Oliver Heiser, "Scientific Human­
ism: A Formulation," ra, III (Spring, 1943), 15-19.
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They reflect a strong faith In man, nature, and science, while 
displaying an optimistic outlook toward the future.
Six Humanist Premises
A radio address delivered in 1951 by the most promi­
nent spokesman of the movement, Edwin H. Wilson,8? offers a 
clear picture of Humanist beliefs, though less formal and 
philosophic than the formulation just outlined. Wilson out­
lines six major premises of Religious Humanism.
His first premise states that Humanists are not 
"other-worldly,” and that time spent thinking about an after 
life is "time wasted.” If there is another life, argues 
Wilson, the Humanist is willing to let it take care of it­
self.
The second premise is an affirmation of the Human­
ist’s concern for man. Wilson states that the Humanist lives 
as if ”men count most of all with him,” and "human fulfill­
ment” is of "primary value.”
The third premise is an extension of this idea, for 
it asserts that Humanists strongly believe in the equality of 
all men, and that there is "no master race, no nationality or 
class vdiich is superior to others.” The Humanist, Wilson 
continues, is concerned where "any human is abused,” and is 
found leading the struggle against prejudice and injustice.
8?Edwin H. Wilson, "Humanism: The Fourth Faith,"
TH, XI (May-June, 1951), 105-109.
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In premise four, Wilson states that "freedom of 
thought and action is integral to the Humanist way of life." 
He develops the point further by saying that "Humanism is 
opposed to all totalitarianisms, vrtiether political or reli­
gious— whether Communist or Fascist or known by any other 
name— which imposes arbitrary authority on individual thought 
and conduct." Wilson adds that whatever robs the individual 
of the free use of his mind is "anti-Humanistic."
Premise five affirms the Humanist's faith in the 
findings and methods of science. Wilson states that the 
"other faiths" have lost their hold on the Humanist, who is 
no longer satisfied with assertion, but demands the authority 
of scientific facts. Wilson concludes the point by saying 
that the "evolutionary world view" which science has revealed 
is not absolute, but offers the truest picture the Humanist 
can find- on which to build a new world.
The final premise is a forward-looking statement of
optimism. Wilson asserts that Humanists live as if they must
and can depend on the intelligent cooperation of men of good
will to end poverty, war, disease, and prejudice. He argues 
that scientific knowledge in the hands of men of good will 
can meet these challenges and build a free and Just world.
Clearly, these six premises do not differ markedly 
from earlier ideas of the Humanist movement. The ideological 
differences between the three decades of the movement are 
largely ones of emphasis; more specifically. Humanism has
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moved. In the direction of expressing Itself In a positive 
manner, a position of being for rather than against something.
SuTTTmfl-Ty
Fundamental humanistic Ideas can be traced back Into 
ancient history, but it was the Renaissance idiich. gave them 
new force and meaning. These new humanistic perspectives 
finally spread from Europe to America where, In the nineteenth 
century, they caused a severe upheaval in both religious and 
intellectual life. The new humanism not only permeated all 
of traditional religion, but found separate movements willing 
to dedicate themselves to the new ideology. Three such human­
istic movements of the century were Unitarianism, Free Reli­
gion, and Ethical Culture, each of which was a forerunner to 
modem Humanism.
The early twentieth century saw a  number of Unitarian 
ministers begin to preach an ultra-liberal doctrine they called 
"humanism"; and this wing of the Unitarian church was largely 
responsible for the formation of the new Humanist movement.
By the end of the 1920*s Tnimani gm had. its own modest organiza­
tion and was producing its own journal.
The ideology of the new movement has never been fixed 
or dogmatic, but can be summarized as follows: (1) an agnostic
position regarding God, immortality, and other beliefs of 
traditional religion; (2) a belief that truth is discovered 
not by the use of revelation, but through the scientific
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method; (3) a belief that ''religious'* values are to be found 
in nature and life since man is a part of, and has evolved 
from, nature; (4) a faith in the future of man and society 
based on the belief that man, with the help of science, can 
solve most of his problems^ and (5) a belief in the dignity 




Social movements require at least a minimum of 
"cultural homogeneity and a certain *we' feeling," write 
Turner and Killian; and they add that the members of a social 
movement must be able to interact through a "chain of communi­
cation."! Sherif and Sherif support the idea by saying that 
a social movement involves geographical distance and "requires 
communication among the discontented and the a s p i r i n g . As 
a movement, Humanism has been keenly aware of the need for 
communication among its membership and has established and 
kept open a variety of communication channels. Not only have 
these been largely responsible for the movement's survival and 
growth, but they have also resulted in Humanism's development 
of a common ideology and a common pattern of presentation and 
defense of that ideology.
The various communication media utilized by Humanism
!Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Be­
havior (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1957), pp. 21-26.
^Muzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of So­




differ in kind and overlap in function. They provide for an 
interrelation among individual Humanists and for a method of 
attracting new members. The four channels to be discussed in 
this chapter are (1) organizational communication, (2) publi­
cations, (3) tape recordings, and (4) miscellaneous member- 
producing channels.
Organisational Channels
The Organizations and Their Structure
As described in the previous chapter, the scattered 
humanistic thinkers of the 1920*s inevitably began to seek a 
method whereby they could speak with something of a united 
voice. The first step involved their banding together into 
small groups (the Chicago "Fellowship" of 192? and the New 
York "Society" of 1929 are the earliest examples). The forma­
tion of a broader "parent" association was the next step, 
specifically met by the foundation of the New Humanist Asso­
ciates of 1928. In those early days of the movement, of 
course, the central organizational structure was extremely 
loose, if not ineffective.
The importance of the NHA, however, increased as its 
journal3 grew in size and quality. After changing the na­
tional association's name twice. Humanists appear to have 
settled for the AHA as the peimanent parent association;
3The movement's publications will be discussed laten
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nevertheless, the three national organizations have been some­
what similar In purpose and structure. Yet a vast change In 
the AHA's Influence and activity did talce place after 1950 
(these changes to be discussed in other sections of this 
chapter).
Some of these early Humanist "fellowships" eventually 
came to be referred to as "chapters" of the AHA, suggesting a 
stronger tie between the local and national organizations. 
Although national officers and members of the board are di­
rectly elected by the Humanist membership, local chapters are 
Independent and operate without significant national restric­
tions.
The only other organization of the movement (other 
than those designed to extend Humanism) is a rather recent 
establishment. In 1952 the first meeting of the International 
Humanist and Ethical Union was held In Amsterdam, representing 
a joining together of the Ethical Societies and the AHA to 
create a world organization related to American Humanism. The 
IHEU meets every five years and appears to be growing In Im­
portance and participation; however, the newness of the organ­
ization makes evaluation of It difficult. The AHA does, how- 
evez; consider the IHEU to be an Important aspect of the organ­
izational structure of the movement.
Organizational Purposes and Functions
That the highly Independent and heterodox Humanist
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should find it necessary to associate or organize may appear 
strange and ironic, but his reasons are made abundantly clear 
by his own declarations. For example, the preamble to the 
constitution of the first Humanist Fellowship speaks signifi­
cantly of a desire "to band ourselves together because of 
certain convictions we hold in common, and certain purposes 
whose consummation is among the major objectives of our 
l i f e . T h i s  need for organization and communication was 
echoed by H. G. Creel, president of the Chicago Fellowship, 
when he wrote in the first issue of The New Humanist:
Great and effective social movements seldom spring from 
the efforts merely of numbers of individuals working in 
intellectual isolation. The program of such efforts is 
a social growth never the mere production of a single 
mind. Religious, political, scientific, and even commer­
cial groups recognize this, providing means whereby their 
members may benefit by interchange of ideas and experi­
ence.
Up to the present, there has been no considerable 
instrumentality by which Humanists might enjoy this 
intercourse so necessary for the actualization of the 
program of Humanism, and for the working out of a program 
progressively more worthy and more tangible. It was to 
provide such mutual awareness that the Humanist Fellow­
ship was formed in November, 1927.5
Thus, from the very beginning, the Humanist movement strongly 
recognized the need for communication through some kind of 
association.
But beyond a desire to communicate and to strengthen
4"Preamble to the Constitution of the Humanist Fel­
lowship," Tm, I, No. 2 (1928), 4.
^TNH. I, No. 1 (1928), 1.
50
the taus^ of Humanism, Individuals within the movement have 
also sought union for what might be termed a "need to be­
long." Lloyd Mo rain, for example, writes that the AHA not 
only serves as a means of communi cation but as a "uniting 
force for Humanists vdio are scattered In ones and twos and 
small groups over this country and the world . F u r t h e r ,  a 
letter to The Humanist declares that a major function of the 
AHA is to provide the liberal In religion with "both a haven 
and a home" and to give members a "feeling of group purpose."? 
Likewise, the AHA says of Itself that It offers the modem- 
minded "a place to belong."® And Professor Gardner Williams 
points to the Inevitable discrimination aimed toward such a 
minority group as Humantsm and states that the organizational 
structure of the movement provides "social corroboration" for 
such Individual Humanists.^
But perhaps the most significant expression of a de­
sire and need for belonging came from Professor Hermann J.
^Lloyd Morain, "The American. Humanist Association,"
TH. XIII (January-February, 1953)» 26.
7Paul E. Kllllnger, "Small, Hopeful, Helpful Groups," 
TH, XIX (July-August, 1959), 255.
Concerning the American Humanist Association," TO,
X (July-August, 1950), 181.
9Gardner Williams, "Unsettled Issues of Humanism," a 
panel discussion, AHA Cleveland Conference (1958), Tape Re­
cording Library.
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Huiler* s acc^tance apeech. upon being elected as president of
the AHA in 1956* He stated:
. • . I am so glad that at last I have found you, for 1 
have been seeking you for about half a century. Of 
course in a n  that time I have been fortunate enough to 
meet many persons with, the same general attitude as 
yourselves, long before the word Hnmani mm in its present 
application was known to them or to me. But just because 
we were pot organized, because we seemed to be only scat­
tered voices in the wilderness, life often to us
lonely, bitter and thankless as compared with the seemingly 
rich world of hypnotic illusions in which the vast major­
ity of people lived, and from out of which they peered 
askance at us and our children. 10
Muller*s statements are particularly important , for they
clearly and openly point to a social and emotional need for
organizational unity. Of interest also is his reference to
loneliness resulting from a minority belief, and his mention
of traditional religion and its success in satisfying such
human needs. H
Clearly, then, a major function of all Humanist asso­
ciations has been to provide communication and unity among 
the membership and a certain "we" feeling for the scattered 
individual Humanists. IMderlydng, or perhaps pemeating, 
these broad purposes is, of course. Humanism's persistent 
desire to reach beyond the movement for new members;
^®"In the Cause of Humanity," Œ ,  XVI (May-June,
1956), 107. This statement was repeated over NBC radio in May, 1956.
llMuUer's cospLete frankness regarding the Human­
ist's *need to belong" would probably not appeal to many 
highly "individualistic" Humanists.
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however, the evangellatlc purpose does not substantially af­
fect the organizational structure.
The nezt logical question of Import involves the man­
ner in which Humanist organizations, national and local, at­
tempt to satisfy the need for communication and a sense of 
oneness; there are a number of dimensions to the movement’s 
efforts in that direction. First of all, the local fellow­
ships and chapters^^ play an important role as they provide 
like-minded Humanists and potential Humanists with a chance 
for direct association together. Having a large measure of 
independence, the local groups differ widely In function and, 
approach. Most of them meet on a regular basis and conduct 
ideological discussions, study groins, book reviews, forums, 
or social action projects. Some of the groups function much 
like a church (to some extent, this was more true in the 
early days of the movement), providing at least a degree of 
ceremony and ritual. Most significantly, the chapters pro­
vide each individual with a direct means for active partici­
pation within the movement.13
12ln general, chapters are directly related to the 
AHA, while some local groups are called fellowships and are 
independent, but still affiliated with the AHA.
13lnfoimation regarding the diverse activities of 
Humanist groups is scattered. On occasions, various groups 
have reported their specific programs and projects in the 
movement’s publications; other information comes from Humanist 
discussions carried on at regional conferences which are 
available through the AHA Tape Recording Library. The pub­
lications, the conferences, and the tape recording library 
will all be discussed in this chapter.
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Interaction at the local level helps keep Humanism 
vital, growing, and changing. Also, to the extent that there 
is national agreement with regard to desired action (protec­
tion of the separation of church and state is a good exam­
ple), local groups may carry forward the program of the move­
ment. As the chapters vary in size and attitude, so also do 
their activities and influence.
Union and communication among the various small 
groups, however, has been slight throughout most of the his­
tory of Humanism. Such comparative isolation has doubtless 
resulted from the Humanist's antipathy for the totality of 
orthodox religion and his special distrust of sect authori­
tarianism in any form. Of course, the central national or­
ganizations have served as the link between individual chap­
ters, and this has been accomplished largely through the asso­
ciation's publications.^^ Materials for programs, study 
groups, and discussions also have frequently come directly 
from the national association. In addition. Humanist "field 
representatives" have sometimes been provided as national 
organizational aids for local groups.
However, a pivotal point in the evolution of Human­
ism—  especially involving the matter of communication among 
members--occurred in 19^9 when Dr. Edwin H. Wilson became the 
full-time executive director of the AHA. Since that time, the
l^To be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
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movement has not only achieved the hulk of its growth, but 
has strengthened and effectively utilized the available chan­
nels of communication which hind together the Individual Hu­
manists and chapters throughout the country. The result has 
not been that Individual chapters have lost their Independence^ 
but rather that the movement has become more closely knit as 
a national association. The very growth of the movement (to 
be further discussed later) may probably be directly related 
to the Increasing effectiveness of national Humanist communi­
cation.
A vital communication innovation was begun In May, 
1952, at which time the first meeting of the AHA "Regional 
Conference" was held. This national effort to Increase mem­
bership Involvement and communication among Individual members 
and chapters met with success and has continued on a regular 
basis to date. The meetings last two or three days And in­
clude workshops, symposiums, addresses, discussion groups, 
business meetings (election of atta. officers, etc.), and even 
debates. Problems grappled with at the regional conferences 
are varied, but Insert ant among them are (1) philosophical 
and religious Ideological question^ such as the meaning of 
the movement, where Its emphasis should He, etc.; (2) Human­
ist advance, or methods idiereby the movement might spread its 
Influence and increase Its size; (3) specific social problems, 
such as mental héalth, world peace, civil rights, separation
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of church and state, etc,; (4) methods whereby chapters may 
Improve their programs and activities; and (5) the relation­
ship of chapters to the AHA..
Many of the conference workshops and discussions do 
not result in agreement; indeed, frequently, wide areas of 
disagreement are brought to the surface. However, the major 
religious and philosophic foundations of Humanism are not 
often contested; matters of the movement's emphasis, direc­
tion, and role are. That disagreements do arise appears not 
to concern the AHA; in fact, leaders of the association per­
sistently applaud healthy and open lines of communication as 
a vital element in the movement's life, and they further think 
of disputes as only a confirmation of the desirability and 
necessity of such regional conferences.^^
The chain of communication begun -kh-mngVi regional 
conferences would not be complete p-gg the "core" of what 
transpired there was made available to the "rank file" of 
the movement. In large measure, thi g baa and is bfting accom­
p l i s h e d . T h e  result is that the most important thinking of 
the leadership and membership, which is expressed during a 
conference, finds its way into the hands of the individual
^5such an attitude might be contrasted with certain 
examples of individual "dogmatism" and rigidity discussed in 
Chapters V and VI,
1&AS will be discussed,later in this chapter, major 
conference activity is reported in The Humanist, and is also 
made available through a tape recording library.
56
Humanist. Seemingly, the least one could conclude is that 
the AHA leadership is keenly aware of the value of open and 
complete communication among its members.
A problem centering on organizational communication 
and interaction does exist, however. A lengthy workshop con­
cerning problems of chapters (held during the 1956 AHA regia®! 
conference) was quite revealing. 17 First of all, a report 
from a committee on "Inter-group Relations" indicated that 
there existed considerable organizational difficulties among 
the local chapters— problems such as (1) unsatisfactory pro­
grams for chapter meetings, (2) inability of groiq)s to sustain 
interest in meetings over a long period of time, so that 
chapters often declined rather than grew, (3) inadequate 
leadership at the local level, resulting in part from not 
having full-time leaders, and (4) general inability of chap­
ters to attract and hold young people and parents with small 
children. Obviously, all of these problems are closely Inter­
related; however, the workshop efforts to find answers to 
them produced little but diverse points of view without any 
consistent pattern. For example, some of those present sug­
gested more aid and guidance from AHA; some suggested less; 
some suggested Increased and more effective study groups; some 
suggested meetings patterned after churches— especially
17Rudolf Drelkucs ( ch. ), "Workshop on Problems of 
Chapters," AHA Chicago Conference (1956), Tape Recording 
Library.
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Uni tari anism— involving Sunday morning meetings with a "Sun­
day school" for children. The chairman made the suggestion 
that more cooperation between the various chapters and knowl- 
*tge of "good" and "bad" organizational methods might ulti­
mately result in a kind of "manual" for local chapters. At 
any rate, the workshop was an effort to meet local problems 
despite the fact that no specific and permanent answers were 
found.
The chapter problems listed above seemingly grow out 
of a common confused source within the movement. On the basis 
of the chapter workshop and other similar indications, Human­
ism does not appear to know what it wishes to become or where 
it is heading. For example, do Humanists wish to create 
another "church" even la organizational structure? Do they 
really hope to establish a mass movement as they so often 
declare? Just how inçjortant is complete local chuter inde­
pendence? Do Humanists expect Humani am to become a religion, 
a philosophy, a social organization, a social action movement, 
or an anti-orthodoxy ideology? These are the kinds of ques­
tions which, although sometimes asked, have not been answered 
or have been answered but without accord. When such fundamen­
tal issues are resolved within the national movement, the dif­
ficulties confronting the local chapters may be alleviated.
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Publications Channels
Hlatory of Publications 
Doubtless, Humanism*s most vital and pervasive channel 
of communication has been, and Is, the publication of a mem­
bership journal (joining the AHA carries with it a subscrip­
tion to the journal). In 1928 the Chicago Fellowship launched 
the first journal In the form of a modest, mimeographed publi­
cation called The New Humanist. It soon grew In size, stature, 
and clTculatlon, but was abandoned after nine volumes In 
October, 1936. A short time later (February, 1938), however. 
The Humanist Bulletin began publication. The Bulletin sur­
vived only until January, 1941, after which the AHA was formed 
and publication of the present journal, The Humanist, began.
The Wnmani at. appears to have met with the greatest success, 
for after nine years as a quarterly It became a bi-monthly In 
1950.
Other publications of the movement are quite recent 
ones. In 1952, for example, the Free Mind was begun strictly 
as an organizational membership publication. The Free Wind 
is also published on a bi-monthly basis, being mailed to 
Humanists on alternating months with The Humanist. Two other 
recent, but less Important, publications are Intemahi nnai 
Human! sm (begun in 1955), reporting news of the International 
Humanist and Ethical Union, and the 5tudsnt_amani5t (begun 
in 1961), a modest bulletin for college students. Other
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Humanist publication efforts which are less related to the 
functioning of the movement will be discussed briefly in the 
last section of this chapter.
Purposes and Functions of the Publications 
The national association's goal of providing a commu­
nication link among its scattered members is achieved largely 
through the distribution of a membership journal. By putting 
such a Journal in the hands of all its members, the AHA, is 
exposing its readers to the core of Humanist thinking and is 
establishing an element of the "we" feeling. That most of 
the Journal articles are written by leaders in the movement 
means that the leadership speaks directly to the membership 
on a regular basis.
The Journal also provides a forum for Humanist thought 
in that members may write letters to the editor and express 
like or divergent views. In such a fashion (and also through 
the "debates" and discussions involving disagreements among 
the leading Journal authors) an ideological dialogue is carried 
on. The result is that a channel providing for Humanism's 
growth and change, not only in emphasis but also in ideology, 
is established.
Historically, at least some change in purpose or focus 
of the Journals has occurred. For example. The New Humanist 
was at first thought of by many as simply a place where 
general problems of liberal religion could be discussed.
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An effort was made to avoid being exclusive or entirely human­
istic in the selection of material to be printed. Actually, 
it was not uncommon during the early years of the Journal 
to find an article which was ideologically hostile to Human - 
ism. An editor's note which appeared with one such article 
in 1928 explained that The New Humanist was devoted "prima- • 
rlly" to Humanist expression, but that the scientific method 
involved an examination of "all the e v i d e n c e . "18 Five years 
later, an editor's note again described the Journal's attempt 
to present both sides of various issues, but conceded that 
The New Humanist, which had found most of its support among 
Humanists, "has become increasingly representative of the hu­
manist viewpoint."19 Despite such changes in emphasis, which 
have simply been the natural evolution of a growing and unify­
ing philosophy, the Journals published by Humanism have always 
been the major organ of egression for the movement.
What the Journals have meant to the movement can be 
seen in part by looking at some evaluations of the Journals 
made by leading Humanists. Charles Francis Potter, for ex­
ample, wrote that The Mew Humajij st "serves a real and growing 
need in America as an organ of liberal religion."20 In that
18tNH. I, No. 7 (1928), 1.
19Edwin H. Wilson, "On Accepting the Responsibility of 
a Philosophy of Life, An ̂ peal," TNH, VI, No. 3 (1933)» 46.
20charles Francis Potter, "Indispensable," TNH, VI,
No. 1 (1933), 44.
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same year, 1933» Professor Oliver Reiser argued that the
Journal served a unique and important purpose, being the
"outstanding Journal specifically devoted to the promulgation
of the humanist v i e w p o i n t . "^1 Another observer stated that
The New Humanist "is filling a need long felt by religious
l i b e r a l s . "22 And E, Burdette Backus asserted that Humanism,
as the most important movement in the "religious life of
America, very much needs a national Journal as an organ of
e x p r e s s i o n . "23*' Soon after The Humanist was first published.
Professor Maurice Visscher wrote that the Journal is "an
important agent in the strengthening and unification of the
liberal intellectual movement."24 The purposes and functions
of The Humanist were outlined in a 1954 editorial as follows:
The function of The Humanist is threefold. It serves as 
a first introduction to Humanism and the AHA for hundreds of new readers each year. For long-standing Humanists it 
provides a humanistic commentary on happenings In all 
fields of human endeavor. And for the general public,
It attempts to be an Interesting, readable, and Important periodical.25
As these last statements Indicate, an important part of the
21oilver Reiser, "Serves an Important Puroose," TNH, 
VI, No. 1 (1933), 46. ■
22Maurlce N. Elsendrath, "Fills a Long-Felt Need," 
TNH. VI, No. 1 (1933), 45.
23e. Burdette Backus, "Vigorous and Able Editors," 
TNH. VI, No. 1 (1933), 44.
24Maurlce Vlsscher, "What Others Think," TO, II 
(Autumn, 1942), Inside cover.
25"Three Adjectives and a Shrug Are Not Enough; An Annual Appeal and Progress Report," TH, XIV (March-Aprll, 1954), 78.
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journal's function Is to go outside the membership and Intro­
duce Humanism to potential Humanists.
In addition, leading journal authors, as well as 
numerous letters to the editor, have often shown a deep con­
cern for keeping the journal "readable" In all walks of life. 
The criticism that The Humanist Is too philosophic, too ab­
stract, or too academic has not been uncommon. The house- 
vh fe as well as the professor. It Is argued, should be able 
to find meaning In the journal, especially If Humanism is to 
become a mass movement.
There Is, then, a kind of "communicative awareness" 
amener the ip«^ers of the movement; however, there Is neither 
complete clarity nor agreement concerning the precise commu­
nication role which the Journal should play. For example, 
confusion exists regarding the extent to which The Humanist Is 
primarily a magazine for Humanists and the extent to which It 
Is written lor non-Humanlsts. Humanists appear to be reluc­
tant to say that the Journal Is really written and read pri­
marily by them. At an AHA workshop, however, one leading Hu­
manist did protest that the membership should face up to the 
fact that the journal Is written by and for H u m a n i s t s . A t  
the same meeting, someone Insisted that The Humeuilst should be 
more bold In Its Ideological statements and not be guided by
Z^Leo Koch, "Humanist Advance Through Education," a 
workshop, AHA Cincinnati Conference (1957)» Tape Recording 
Library.
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a concern for offending the non-Humanist reader.^? What does 
appear clear is that the dual purpose of the Journal produces 
some editorial frustration; however, clearly, the primary 
audience of The Humanist has been and will continue to be 
members of the movement.^®
Another broad but related function of the publica­
tions involves the dissemination of information among the 
membership. As mentioned earlier, important happenings at 
the regional conferences should be reported to the total mem­
bership; this is accomplished by printing in the Journal the 
major addresses delivered at a conference, as well as other 
progress made there. Ideological matters are left primarily 
to The Humanist, but since 1952 organizational matters are 
printed in the Free Mind. At any rate, a member may keep in 
rather close "touch" with the national association and its 
leadership through those two publications, for every month 
one or the other is delivered to him. The lines of communi- 
cation have not only improved but increased since 1950.
Seemingly, the increased organizational communi cation 
coupled with the Journal's change from a quarterly to a
2?Corliss Lamont, "Human!st Advance Through Education^ 
(Lamont's statements were made from the floor as a reaction 
to the panel discussion). Tape Recording Library.
Z^This remains true although in recent years actual sales of The TTiimflni R-h have been double that of AHA member­
ship. Readers of the Journal may be sympathetic to the move­
ment without being active members of it.
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bi-monthly have significantly affected the growth of the 
movement.29 For example, the AHA reports that the first four 
years after the journal's change to a bi-monthly (1950-1954) 
saw the magazine circulation " q u a d r u p l e d . "3^ a year later 
the AHA reported that its membership growth since 1950 had 
increased 500 per cent.31 A still later growth figure re­
ported in 1961 indicates that four-fifths of the total member­
ship of the movement has been added since 1948.32 These 
growth figures are impressive and speed: directly to the AHA's 
total change in emphasis euid increased communication activity 
since Edwin Wilson became the full-time executive director 
in 1949.
Scope of the Publications
The general scope of the publications has already 
been suggested; however, there are some other aspects which 
should be mentioned here. The journals have always covered a 
wide and diffuse subject-matter area, and the AHA leadership 
would probably argue that no subject which has philosophic,
29lt is impossible to determine which activity most 
affects growth. Specific member-producing efforts (to be 
discussed later) such as Humanist lecture tours doubtless 
play an important role in gaining new members.
30«Three Adjectives and a Shrug Are Not Enough; An 
Annual Appeal and Progress Report," TH, XIV, 78.
31«Pive Years of Achievement— 1949-1955,” TH, XV (March-April, 1955), unnumbered insert.
32Editor's Note, ra, XXI (July-August, I96I), 195.
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religious, scientific, or •’human” interest is alien to the 
journal.
But some more narrow areas of scope can be indicated. 
For instance, one major concern of the journal has tradition­
ally been to Include ideological, philosophical, and religious 
discussions. This means that "Humanism” is persistently dis­
cussed, as well as its relation to other philosophic and reli­
gious trends. The coverage is accomplished through major 
articles written in the journal and. also through the regular 
journal section devoted to book reviews. The book reviews are 
important for they allow a reviewer to evaluate a new book and 
at the same time contrast or compare a given idea to Humanism. 
Again, the range of subject-matter covered by the books selec­
ted is wide.
Another aspect of the scope of the Humanist journals 
involves areas related to rights of religious and other 
minorities. For many years, a column entitled ”The Sectar­
ian Battlefront, ” in which matters HpaT 1 ng with the s^aera­
tion of church and state were discussed., was regularly carried 
in the journal. Court decisions affecting church and state 
separation as well as those dealing with the individual legal
j
rights of an atheist^^ have been closely followed and reported.
Also frequently finding a place in the Journals have 
been various scientific discussions. Advancements in science
33The legal status of the atheist or agnostic as a 
conscientious objector in time of war is an example.
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on many fronts are mentioned, but usually the discussion of 
science has centered upon its relation to man and his values. 
Technical scientific findings have not been reported, but 
the broad field of science and scientific advance has been 
regularly discussed.
Some small amount of fiction has been written for 
the journals while a somewhat larger amount of poetry has 
been published. That both do find their way into the journal 
is indicative of the magazine's scope.
Another important aspect of the publication's scope 
involves social reform issues. For some Humanists, the 
movement is fundamentally and simply an expression of concern 
for the plight in which many human beings find themselves; 
therefore, the journal rather naturally faces such social 
problems as slums, birth control, civil rights,35 and pov­
erty. While, admittedly, articles dealing with social prob­
lems have not dominated the journal, they have been persist­
ently discussed throughout the years.
Perhaps the scope of the movement's journal is best 
represented by simply listing the major program committees
3^Hegular columns devoted to a discussion of science which have appeared in The Humanist have included "Science 
for Humanity," "Science iJotes," arid "Reliable Knowledge."
35por a period of time, a regular column devoted to a discussion of race relations entitled "All Men" was 
carried in The Humanist.
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of the AHA which have been printed inside the cover of The 
Humanist for the last several years. The list includes a 
committee on church and state, family relations, group activi­
ties, Humanist students, human rights and welfare, public 
education, and world Humanism. These committees suggest the 
Humanist areas of concern, especially in regard to social re­
form and advance.
Tape Recordings Channel
Humanism's moat unique channel of communication is 
its use of tape recordings for the purpose of the dissemina­
tion of ideas and information. Beginning in the early 1950's, 
the AHA began tape recording important Humanist speeches and 
thereafter soon established the "Tape Recording L i b r a r y . "36 
The material found in the library includes (1) Humanist inter­
views and speeches broadcast over radio, (2) Humanist addres­
ses delivered before various groups (Unitarian and Humanist 
fellowships have been common audiences, though there have 
been others less sympathetic to Humanism), end (3) addresses, 
panels, symposiums, and workshops presented before one of the 
annual AHA conferences.
The purposes of the recording library are not very 
different from those of the journal. First of all, the tape 
recordings are made available through the mails to any
36The AHA Tape Recording Library is located at 6l5 
Davis St., Evanston, Illinois, Appendix II includes the 
library's listing of available tape recordings.
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chapter or fellowship which requests them. If the tapes were, 
in fact, widely played, they could serve as a major link be­
tween the AHA and its scattered chapters and membership.
Again, to the extent that Humanists hear the tapes, members 
are allowed to "listen in" on fl-wmiai conferences awrf important 
Humanist speeches delivered elsewhere. But the AHA leader­
ship thinks the library's primary function is one of providing 
programs for discussions in the chapters and fellowships.
While the tape recording library has been utilised 
since its inception, it has not been as successful as origi­
nally hoped. A number of chapters, for example, have not been 
satisfied with the t^e recordings as a basis for programs 
and discussions,37 As yet, the tape recordings do not serve 
as a vital chain of communication for the movement; however, 
the channel is a relatively new innovation for Humanism and 
its ultimate value would be difficult to assess.
Miscellaneous Member-Producing channels
As mentioned earlier, the Humani st movement has al­
ways maintained an interest in expansion. Actually, all the 
channels of communication thus far listed have had as their 
secondary purpose the proselytizing of new Humanists. The 
leaders of the AHA hope that active and effective chapters 
will bring new members, that an interesting and readable
3?Dreikurs, "Workshop on Problems of Chapters," Tape Recording Library.
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Journal will do the same, and that all other activities de­
signed primarily for the membership will Influence the growth 
of the movement.
The concern here, however. Is with those few communi­
cation activities which have "evangelism" as their major 
objective. The first such effort Involves radio broadcasts 
of Humanist speeches and Interviews, designed specifically 
to stimulate a wider Interest In..the movement. Since 1950 a 
number of AHA officers and leaders have speared before the 
radio microphone, often over local stations located near a 
college or university. However, NBC's donation of time to the 
AHA (as a public service) through a series of programs enW&ed 
"Faith In Action" has provided the movement with Its widest 
exposure.38 The radio broadcasts have met with some measure 
of success, for the AHA reports that after most broadcasts 
"hundreds of people" write In with favorable comments and ex­
press an Interest In learning more about the movement.39
A second major AHA activity has been the sponsoring 
of lecture tours throughout the country, providing leading 
Humanists with a wide range of audiences. Frequently the
I
addresses are delivered before college anri university audi­
ences, but other groaq>s are also Involved, Including liberal 
churches and Humanist chapters and fellowships. For the
38a number of AHA radio broadcasts may be found In 
the tape recording library and are listed In Appendix II.
39Moraln, ra, XIII, 29.
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purpose of coordinating these tours, a Humanist Speaker's 
Bureau was established in 1953*^^ The efficacy of these lec­
ture tours is impossible to measure, but they probably play a 
part in adding to the growth of the movement.
Another activity begun since 1950 is called the "Hu­
manist Pamphlet Series" in which the A H A  publishes various 
kinds of Humanist literature, most often reprints of articles 
which have appeared in The WnTnani mt. The pamphlets are made 
available to anyone and are especially put in the hands of 
any Humanist who wishes to distribute them. In such a fash­
ion the printed literature provides a means whereby Humanism 
may be e^lalned to prospective members. A corollary activity 
is the Humanist "Book Service" through which books dealing 
with Humanism (and other subjects) are made available at a 
discount in price to AHA members and chapters for use in 
study groups or perhaps as introductory material for new mem­
bers. These "extra" publication efforts of the a h a  are in 
part an answer to the problem raised earlier regarding the 
dual purpose of The Humanist.
Summary
Humanism, like other social movements, has necessar­
ily utilized a number of channels of communication which have 
helped the movement to develop a cohesiveness and establish
40Ibid.
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an atmosphere conducive to growth and change. The most vital 
channel within the movement has been the publication of a 
membership journal. Since 1928, Humanists have published a 
Journal which has provided a forum for Humanist ideas and has 
played a role in molding the movement into a common ideology. 
Religious Humanism has also established local chapters, or 
fellowships, throughout the country, which have resulted in 
another medium of communication and have increased the possi­
bility for interaction among the various members. A third 
communicative device utilized by Humanism has been a tape re­
cording library, through which important speeches and discus­
sions of the Humanist ideology are made available to the local 
chapters for study and deliberation. While there have been 
other communicative activities, the three above appear to be 
the most significant within the Humanist movement.
However, to some extent at least, the channels which 
help unite Humanism within also serve to attract new members 
to the movement. In addition, the ATTA has established some 
communication activities which are almost exclusively de­
voted to attracting membership. These include Humanist radio 
broadcasts. Humanist lecture tours, and a Humanist pamphlet 
series. Significantly, most of the major channels of communi­
cation have either been added or improved since 1950» and 
since that time the movement has achieved its greatest 
measure of growth.
CHAPTER IV
IDENTIFICATION WITH SCIENCE AND 
THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
Through Humanism's utilization of the various chan­
nels of communication, the movement has developed not only a 
common ideology, but also a common argumentative pattern 
whereby that ideology may be defended. All social movements, 
according to Alfred McClung Lee, in addition to producing a 
set of beliefs, develop a body of defense doctrine "serving 
as justification" for the movement.̂  Indeed, Humanist leaders 
may well have attached unusual importance to the development 
of a rationale or Justification for their movement, because 
the Humanist ideology has not only been heterodox in the gen­
eral sense, but in particular has been hostile to the highly 
valued and widely accepted Christian religion. This chapter, 
then, will discuss one phase of the Humanist's rhetorical ef­
forts to justify or defend his position.
As indicated earlier, leading Humanist speakers and 
writers have frequently shown a concern for evangelism
^Alfred McClung Lee, New Outline of the Principles of 
Sociology (New York; Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1946), p. 210.
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outside their movement, but they have always found their pri­
mary listening or reading audience to be composed of other 
Humanists or near-Humanists. Thus, attention here will be 
centered upon the argumentation employed by Eumaniat leaders 
as they seek to Justify and defend the movement’s ideas to 
Humanist members. The major source of information for this 
analysis will be the various Humanist Journals which were 
discussed in Chapter III; for those Journals have served as 
the most important i ink between leadership membership and 
have most effectively represented the movement's rhetorical 
pattern. Humanist statements quoted herein should be viewed 
as representative of the movement at large, and, for the most 
part, as having originated from leading or influential Human­
ists.
The Humanist's rhetorical defense of his ideology, 
which lies at the heart of his argumentative position, rests 
primarily upon his (1) identification with science in general 
and (2) his identification with the scientific method. These 
two are, of course, closely related and to a large extent de­
pend upon each other. The Humanist's rhetorical approach to 
ethics and values, as an extension of the pattern of scientific 
identification, will also be discussed in this chapter.
Identification with Science in General
One Important argumentative pattern of defense em­
ployed by Humanists has been that of attempting to identify
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their movement with ideas, attitudes, and labels which are,
2in their own way, orthodox or at least widely accepted. Per­
haps the most significant attitude (and certainly the most 
pervasive throughout Humanist literature) with which Humanists 
have sought to identify has been a reliance on science—  
science from its broadest interpretations through its most 
narrow applications.3 The word "science" as used in Humanist 
discussions seems to have many rather loose meanings. The 
word has been used to mean psychology, history, biology, man's 
acquired knowledge, objectivity, etc. The list of meanings is 
long, but the point is that Humanists have tried to blend 
science into their movement to the extent that they have gone 
beyond a mere ideological assertion of a belief in science. 
Rather, they have achieved in their argumentation an all-perva­
sive identification with science.
The impression must not be left, however, that Human­
ism was or is an organization of scientists. As explained 
earlier, the movement was sparked and led from the first pri­
marily by liberal Unitarian and Universalist ministers. Ethi­
cal Culture leaders, and ethical philosophers. In addition,
^Humanist's efforts to identify their movement with a 
number of commonly accepted ideals will be discussed in Chap­ter VI.
3Chapter II indicated how the "cult of science" in the 
nineteenth century served as a springboard for the humanistic 
trends which developed and culminated in modern Humanism. Historically, the "respectability" of science continued to 
grow even into the twentieth century, so that by the time 
that Humanism began to appear, science had acquired an aura 
of "goodness" and "truth," its own kind of orthodoxy.
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the movement has always attracted a number of scholars from 
various disclplin.es, many of whom have, in fact, been scien­
tists or men from the physical sciences. But acientists, in 
that narrow sense, have never dominated Humanism. While the 
literature of the movement does reveal considerable interest 
in scientific matters, the fundamental concern of Humanists 
(as discussed in Chapter III) has centered upon ethics, values, 
emd human social problems— essentially non-scientific areas 
of concern.
The movement, nevertheless, early adopted as its ban­
ner or symbol the language, the spirit, and the very essence 
of science. Bhetorically, the leaders of Humanism have, 
throughout the years, attempted to identify or link Humanism
with the broad stream of science and they have done so in at
least two general ways.
The first method of identification can be classified 
as a kind of loose association of TTmnani am with science, cul­
minating in something of a fusion of the two. Even before
Humanism was formally organized, for example, those who were
beginning to espouse the new philosophy were frequently refer­
ring to it as something closely akin to science, if not a 
part of science.4 Early efforts to define Humanism (as well 
as later ones) Inevitably resulted in the "calling up" of
^Chapter V examines Humanism's use of science and 
scientific data as a means of refutation and attack, as con­
trasted to the present discussion involving defense.
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scientific language (that Is, reference to science or Its 
Importance or Its rapid growth, etc). Indeed, a number of 
leading Humanists have actually preferred that the movement be 
called "Scientific" Humaniam. Still another popular label 
for the ideology has been "Naturalistic" Humanism, again 
directly suggesting the scientific. The literature of the 
movement clearly reveals that few Humanists are able to dis­
cuss their ideology without considerable use of the word 
"science."
The culmination of such an association seems to be a 
rhetorical union of science with Humanism. For instance, the 
whole humanistic trend, writes Rev. John Brogden, is a "fusion 
of science and philosophy."^ And Professor Horace Fries 
significantly refers to Humanism as the "marriage of science 
and human aspiration.Science and Human1mm become so 
closely identified that they ^  nearly become one in the sense 
in which the movement uses them; for some Humanist authors 
the two words are almost used interchangeably.
Further, Rev. John H. Dietrich writes that "science
has become predominantly Humanistic in that it investigates 
cosmic processes for the purpose of controlling and using them 
for human ends."7 And Rev. Harold Marley says simply that
5john Brogden, "Trends Towards a Philosophy of 
Science," THE. II (March, 1939)» 3»
^Horace S. Fries, "The Theology That Obstructs 
Science," TO, IV (Spring, 1944), 18.
fjohn H. Dietrich, "What Is Humanism?" TNH, VI, No. 2 (1933), 4. ---
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Humanists are "trying to make religion scientific without re­
ducing it merely to a science."8 Rev. R. Lester Mondaie as­
serts that Fnmarii am baa found "in science" what other reli­
gions have found elsewhere, "the authority and the content" 
for their practical "gospel" of saving man.^ Clearly, all 
three of these men are linking Humanism and science together, 
illustrative of the pattern of identification.
A second way in which Humanists attempt to identify 
science with Rumaniam involves the description of science as 
the raison d*etre for their movement. Science is considered 
to be an organic part of Humanism, or am is considered
as a "child" of s c i e n c e . 10 The preamble to the constitution 
of the first Humanist fellowship (1927) points to science as 
the prime reason for organizing. Specifically, the preamble 
speaks of a world "dominated by science" making necessary new 
religious awarenesses and answers in the twentieth century.H 
The suggestion is that science has created the atmosphere and 
the need for the fellowship.
The Humanist Manifesto (discussed in Chapter II)
®Harold P. Marley, "Religion's Greatest Adventure," 
Tm, VIII, No. 6 (1935), 197.
9R. Lester Mondaie, "The Second Generation Humanists," 
TNH. V, No. 4 (1932), 2-3.
lORlstorically, this is at least partly true.
ll"Preamble to the Constitution of the Humanist 
Fellowship," TNH. I, No. 2 (1928), 4.
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clearly illustrates the Humanist*s depend.en.ee upon the lan­
guage and spirit of science. The preface to the Manifesto, 
for instance, speaks of the disruption of old beliefs by 
science and economic changes and the necessity of coming to 
terms with the new knowledge gained by man. Further, proposi­
tion sir of the Manifesto closes with the statement that 
"religion must formulate its hopes and plans in the light of 
the scientific spirit and method,C l e a r l y , then, the 
Manifesto authors are insisting that Humanism grows out of 
science and exists because of science.
The Humanist Manifesto also relies heavily on specific 
scientific language, including several affirmations of belief 
in actual scientific postulates. The total result is that the 
Manifesto is seemingly as much a statement of commitment to 
science as it is a statement of the Humanist's belief in hu­
manity,
A final example which epitomizes Humanism's identifi­
cation with science comes from the pen of Dr, Edwin H,
Wilson, He writes that
the simple fact is that what we are calling Humanism is a 
subtle pemeating influence growing organically out of 
the progress of scientific knowledge wherever that knowl­
edge is effectively related to human life.13
12"The Humanist Manifesto," TH, XXII (July-August, 1962), 130.
13Edwin H. Wilson, "Humanism States Its Case," TNH,
VI, No. 2 (1933), 46, ---
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Identification with the Scientific Method
After having adopted science, the Humanist qnlte 
naturally moves on to lay cla1 m to the scientific method. 
Again, argument goes beyond an Ideological assertion of a be­
lief In the eplstemology of science; for the ultimate claim 
of the Humanist Is that Humanism Is the representative or the 
symbol of the m e t h o d o l o g y . The two general ways In which 
the pattern of Identification Is accomplished Involve (1) the 
expression of high acclaim for the method of science and (2) 
the portrayal of Humanism as the spirit and embodiment of the 
methodology.
Since the Humanist's eplstemologlcal commitment Is so 
deep and pervasive, his effusive praise for the methodology 
Is predictable. Wherever and whenever Humanists meet and 
talk, laudation of the wonders of the new age resulting from 
the application of the scientific method Is abundant. The 
ills of the world. It would seem, dtminiRh in direct propor­
tion to the application of the method of science.
Professor Rudolf Drelkurs, for example, asserts that
l^Aotually, Identification with science and the scien­
tific method are difficult to separate and are very closely 
related.
l^The movement's eplstemology serves a vital role In 
refutation, as discussed In Chapter V.
lÔThe examples cited here must necessarily be limited 
In order to avoid moving Into the area of refutation. For 
example, a Humanist's praise of the scientific method usiiany carries either an explicit or Implicit attack upon the method­ology employed by orthodox religion.
80
only scientific research can uncover the knowable information 
and that knowledge is sufficient "to permit human living," so 
that the unknowable "need not concern man."!? Likewise, 
Professor Pries writes of fighting the "good humanistic fight 
for the method of science."!® He adds that to the extent that 
Humanists do apply the method of science to all areas of human 
conflict, "we are practicing and living the philosophy of the 
new age."!9 What is important regarding such Humanist praise 
is that throughout the literature of the movement the scien­
tific method is extolled. Generally, however, specific support 
for the merit or value of the eplstemology is not offered; 
its worth is taken for granted or assumed.
The second and perhaps more significant aspect of the 
movement’s pattern of identification centers cn the Humanist's 
ascribing to Humanism the spirit and essence of the scientific 
method. The rhetorical result pictures a Humanism which em­
bodies the spirit of inquiry and investigation, so that an 
objective examination of "the facts" regarding a specific 
matter becomes a unique humanistic procedure or character­
istic.
Professor A. Eustace Haydon, for example, writes
!?Rudolf Drelkurs, "The Religion of Democracy,
Part II: Aspects of thé Next Great Religion," TH, XV
(November-December, 1955)» 26?.
!8pries, TH, IV, 18.
!9lbld.. 22.
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that the Humanist is one who "takes his naturalism seriously" 
and "works with the method of science in all r e a l m s , S i g ­
nificantly, Haydon is asserting that the Himanlat ^  scien­
tific, that the application of the scientific method is some­
how a uniquely "humanistic" characteristic.
J, Hutton Hynd emphasizes the Humanist's concern for 
examining all data before reaching a conclusion and his will­
ingness "to prove all things," and "bear the burden of uncer­
tainty. "21 Again, the Humanist is pictured as the symbol of 
objectivity and the scientific approach.
The blending of the scientific and humanistic, how­
ever, is best dramatized in Bdwin Wilson's interview with 
Julian Huxley. The following question and answer make the 
point:
Wilson: You make 'scientific* and 'humanistic' then some­
what synonymous; but there is a difference between the 
two words, isn't there?
Huxley: No, I didn't mean to make them synonymous. All
I meant to say was that modem TTuTnani mm must be scien­
tific because the method of science is the most efficient 
method yet invented by humanity for getting at more truth.22
These statements illustrate the rather natural tendency of 
Humanists to interchange scientific and humanistic to the
20a , Eustace Haydon, "Neo-Humanism— What Is It?" TNH, 
I, No. 4 (1928), 1.
21J, Hutton Hynd, "The Greatest Hoax in History— The 
Claim to Infallibility," ra, V (Summer, 1945), 61-62.
22Edwln H. Wilson, "An Interview with Julian Huxley," 
TH, XI (July-August, 1951), 171.
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extent that an observer might conclude that in order to be 
truly scientific one must first be a Humanist. Humanism*s 
pattern of identification, then, culminates in a wedding of 
Humanism and science and Humanism and the scientific method. 
The reader will observe how this pattern is extended and 
developed into a refutation technique in Chapter V.
Science, Ethics, and Values
The charge that a non-theistic religion is without 
a foundation for morality has not been an uncommon one, and 
it has been frequently leveled at Humani sm by its critics.
As a method of defense. Humanist leaders have boldly moved 
into the arena of "ethics and values" and, in addition to 
denying the charge, have identified their movement with a 
positive ethical and value-oriented foundation.^3 The rhe­
torical attempt has been to demonstrate that Humanism means 
or symbolizes a concern for the highest in ethical and moral 
human behavior.
Rhetorically, the movement has done so by building 
upon its identification with science and the scientific 
method; that is, once Humanists had demonstrated their insep­
arable attachment to science, their next task was to show
23The intention here is not to suggest that Humanists 
have sought to show a relationship between values and science 
merely as a means of answering their critics. As an argumen­
tative position, however, the process of identifying science 
with ethics and values does serve as an answer to the criti­cism that there can be no basis for morality without a the- 
istic belief.
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the relationship of science to behavior— the suitability of 
the scientific approach In dealing with questions of values 
and ethics.24 In so doing, Humanists also tended to corrob­
orate their assertions that science and the scientific method 
were superior to all other approaches. Thus, a dual role 
Is played; Humanism Is able to Identify Itself with ethics 
and at the same time substantiate the merit of the scientific 
method.
The scientific approach to ethics has become meaning­
ful rhetorically only In the past few years of the movement, 
primarily since 1950. Although ethics suid values were dis­
cussed during the early years of Humanism, early discussions 
within the movement lacked the positive approach of more re­
cent ones. Humanist leaders of the early years certainly In­
sisted that theism and supernaturalism were at least superflu­
ous, If not detrimental. In dealing with ethics,put a 
clear scientific and Humanistic answer was not well developed 
until later. The early Humanist approach to ethics Is typi­
fied by this 1934.statement:
24rhls series of arguments has not necessarily oc­
curred In any step-by-step time sequence; however, as this 
section of the study will demonstrate, one aspect of the 
Identification of science with ethics and values has been a 
rather recent development within the movement.
25several criticisms of orthodox religion’s approach to ethics and values of necessity appear In this section; 
however, such criticisms will be discussed In detail In Chap­ter V.
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In the first place this means that ethics must be freed 
from its theological background, so that moral Issues 
are considered without reference to such debatable mat­
ters as the Immortality of the soul or the existence ofgod.26
This attempt to disassociate ethics and values from tradi­
tional religion was furthered by C. J. Herrick in 1942 when 
he argued that man's standards and values have grown out of 
"the total experience of the race with things as they are and 
as experiences are widened, so do the codes and ethics alter 
to meet changing conditions." He stated that man looks to his 
leaders for guidance, but in the selection of values, "free 
man reserves the right to choose his own values."2? A 1943 
statement by Humanists Morain and Reiser echoed this atti­
tude by claiming that morality does not need "supernatural 
sanctions" and is "man evolved."28 They went on to discuss 
the possibility of a future "universal morality."29
Professor Haydon moves closer to a specific defense 
of the scientific method in the field of values when he argues 
that the Humanist world view is based upon "modem knowledge" 
and that the sciences "provide the techniques for actualizing 
values." He further states that "masters of the scientific
26oiiver Reiser, "The Social Objectives of Humanism," 
TNH. VII, No. 6 (1934), 24.
27c. Judson Herrick, "What Churches Are For," TH, II 
(Winter, 1942), 135. ““
28Lloyd Morain and Oliver Reiser, "Scientifio Human­
ism* A Formulation," TH, III (Spring, 1943), 1?.
29lbid.. 18.
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method in all areas of culture may furnish the analysis of 
problems and create the programs for the progressive realiza­
tion of a good s o c i e t y . P r o f e s s o r  Van Meter Ames in a 
discussion of values states:
Only through understanding value in terms of what is 
sought and cherished is it possible to see how the good 
things of life can be increasingly selected, secured and 
enhanced. Then it can be understood how science becomes the guide.31
He more specifically refers to science and morality in the 
following:
For science effective morality and religion are relative 
to cultural development; and when science becomes decisive 
in culture, morality and religion will lose ground except 
as they become partners with science and learn from it to guide society.3%
Ames states the idea in another way when he says that morality
and religion should be scientific and science should be moral
and religious. He argues that the social sciences should
study ancient religious beliefs to determine which of them
are "usable."33
In 1949, the editor of Tbt» mimani «t wrote in answer
to a letter to the journal that the religious needs of man
"as understood by psychology and philosophy" can and should be
30a . Eustace Haydon, "Inquiry: Is Humanism a Reli­
gion? Part I: Humanism Has Its World View, Techniques and
Ideals," TH, II (Autumn, 1942), 105.
31van Meter Ames, "Science and the Reconstruction of 
Values," V (Spring, 1945), 14.
32lbid.. 15. 33ibid.
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met, but they do not depend upon "the wishful rationalization 
of an ancient theology whose anti-scientific record is well 
d o c u m e n t e d . S u c h  a statement, again, clearly disassociates 
morality from traditional religion and links morality to 
science.
This trend was followed by philosopher James Jarrett 
in 1950 when he charged that the violence promulgated "by 
churches in all ages" is an indication of their ethical fail­
ure; whereas, the Humanist ethical position holds that moral 
problems "are most effectively solved by pooled intelligence, 
by carefully controlled observation, diagnosis and prognosis, 
by the experimental testing of hypothetical solutions." He 
added that the Humanist is one "who recognizes the role of 
the economist and the political scientist, of the engineer 
and the social worker and the psychologist in working out 
answers to genuine problems of social ethics."35 Jarrett has 
thus clearly exemplified the rhetorical pattern of identifi­
cation in that he has ascribed to Humanism a unique and vigor­
ous concern (even a deeper and more meaningful involvement 
than the totality of traditional religion) for human ethics 
and values, so that the humanistic approach becomes or sym­
bolizes an improved ethical attitude and foundation.
3^Edwin H. Wilson, "Correspondence," editorial reply 
to a letter, TH, IX (Autumn, 19^9), 150.
35James L. Jarrett, "Must Religious Humanism Be 
Thin?" m ,  X (May-June, 1950), 108.
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Maurice Visscher, author of the coliunn "Science for 
Humanity," continues the theme by saying that "ethics and 
morals have some relation to verifiable systematized knowl­
edge.” He goes on to lament : "The great pity is that the
human race fails to use the information that exists about 
conduct and its m o t i v a t i o n . Sociologist Erwin Fellows wrote 
in 1952 that certain moral "standards" may be derived from 
scientific knowledge and the scientific method. A scientist, 
he contended, is willing to consider all available facts, to 
experiment, and to make changes as research dictates, rather 
than relying upon mere authority. "An extension of the scien­
tific approach to questions of values," wrote Fellows, "would 
represent one of the most fundamental changes in human his­
tory." And he added:
If the outcome of the present moral confusion is to be 
other than destruction or a retreat to an irrational ab­
solutism, the values inherent in scientific activity and 
organization, and compatible with scientific knowledge, 
must receive all possible d e v e l o p m e n t .37
But there are still more modern attempts to inter­
relate Humanism, science, and ethics. For example, in 195^, 
Priscilla Robertson, as newly appointed editor of The Human­
ist, emphasized that science is becoming involved in matters 
of values, but that the venture is a new one because of the 
lack of knowledge in the area. She wrote:
3%aurlce B. Visscher, "Science for Humanity," ra, XI 
(October-November, 1951), 230.
^^Erwin W. Fellows, "Science in a Time of Moral Con­
fusion," TH, XII (March-April, 1952), 62.
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A certain number of scientists within the last ten years 
have repudiated the ethical neutrality of science and 
have laid barefaned claim to be arbiters of values both 
for individuals and for whole cultures; at the same time, 
many more tactful students use their science to form 
Judgments without stating an outright philosophy of their 
right to do s o . 38
She pleaded for a strong link between science and values and 
went on to examine some specific scientists and their involve­
ment in ethics and values.
Another leading Humanist, research sociologist Stuart 
C. Dodd, writes quite specifically about the connection of 
science to the field of values. He feels, as does Bobertson, 
that science is only now beginning to achieve the capacity 
for dealing with human values. He argues that in 1933, the 
year of the signing of the Humanist Manifesto, the scientific 
method was not well enough established in the social sciences 
to produce a scientific value system. He asserts that many 
new scientific developments have emerged since that time, and 
he mentions such fields as information theory, general seman­
tics, axiology, transactional psychology, dimension sociology, 
and others.39 Ee writes that scientists are nearly able to 
classify man's choices and goals to the point where ultimately 
"'The Good' becomes what is measurably most wanted by most 
men in most periods, places, and contexts."^0 Dodd claims,
38priscilla Robertson, "On Getting Values Out of Science," M ,  XVI (July-August, 195oT, 169.
40ibid.. 264.
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then, as have many other Humanists of late, that a scientific 
value system is near at hand.
But perhaps the most incisive defense of the scien­
tific method in the field of ethics is that offered by 
Professor Alfred Kuenzli. He asserts that a new source of 
ethical guidance is emerging out of scientific methodology and 
especially out of "social-psychological r e s e a r c h . K u e n z l i  
discusses two specific applications of science to the area 
of moral guidance. First, he points to the recent Supreme 
Court decision on Integration In which, for the first time, 
psychological evidence was used "as a part of the basis on 
which a judgment of considerable ethical consequence" was 
decided. Next, he contends that In the field of child psy­
chology research has resulted In some conclusions with ethical 
consequences. He states that evidence Indicates today that 
the "good" family Is the democratic family as opposed to the 
patriarchal in terms of "human happiness and fulfillment."^3 
He concludes by claiming that by recognizing the ethical con­
tribution of the behavioral sciences and by Increasing our 
capacities for utilizing new data, "we can come to gain a 
reasonably objective basis for 'right' action and we shall 
have a firm foundation on which to build the good Ilfe.




Perhaps the phrase which best epitomizes Humanism’s 
application of the scientific method in the field of values 
is "science for humanity." "Science for Humanity" served as 
the title of a regular column in The Humanist for many years 
and has been used widely throughout the literature of the 
movement. The phrase implies the direct involvement of 
science in all the human problems confronted by modem man.
Summary
The nineteenth-century’s growing fascination with 
science which extended into the twentieth century became the 
foundation for Humanism’s defense of its ideology. The move­
ment early adopted science in name and method as its banner, 
and, from the first, Humanist leaders went beyond a mere 
assertion of their belief in science to the point of identi­
fying the scientific with the philosophic-Humanism. The rhe­
torical pattern involves the interchanging of science and 
Humanism and the scientific and Humanistic, and the implica­
tion left for a reader or listener is that one must be scien­
tific to be a Humanist and a Humanist to be scientific.
Once the Humanist has identified his movement with 
science and the scientific method, he moves on to show how 
Humanism may also be linked with ethics and values. He does 
this by showing how science and its method are becoming in­
volved with human moral behavior. The rhetorical result of 
the pattern is a picture of Humanism as an ideology with the
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highest concern for and relation to ethical standards* Iden­
tification with ethics and values also serves the role of 
further substantiating the assertion that the scientific method 
is effective and superior, for Humanists offer specific exam­
ples of the progress made by science in the area of human be­
havior.
CHAPTER V
REFUTATION OF TRADITIONAL 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
Sherif and Sherif point to the common "unrest" and 
discontent which motivate social movements;! and for Humanism 
that discontent has centered primarily upon traditional Chris­
tianity. What the Humanist finds most objectionable in Chris­
tianity (and, consecuently, what he first seeks to destroy 
rhetorically) is the belief in a personal God, a belief which 
has been called "historic religion's most fundamental con­
c e p t . A l s o ,  since most Humanists think of themselves as 
philosophic naturalists, they are quick to quarrel with the 
supernaturalism of Christianity. Other theological and meta­
physical issues surrounding Christianity, as well as many 
other religions, with which the Humanist chooses to disagree
iMuzafer Sherif and Carolyn Sherif, An Outline of 
Social Psychology (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers,
1956), p. 722.
^Douglas Macintosh, "Contemporary Humanism," Human­
ism Another Battleline. ed. William Peter King (Nashville, 
Tennessee: Cokesbury Press, 1931), p. 57»
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Involve such claims bs. the existence of a soul and the possi­
bility of individual immortality.3
Further, Humaniats condemn the whole institution of 
organized C&iristianity itself and describe it as a negative 
force in society. An important distinction, however, regard­
ing Christianity is that it has many faces, and some varieties 
of modem Christian thought differ sharply from the more 
traditional branches. Nevertheless, nearly all Humanists 
condemn the total spectrum of Christian thinking, excepting, 
of course, Unitarianism. Clearly, though, while Humanists 
are ostensibly directing their condemnation toward all of 
Christendom, many of their arguments seem appropriate only if 
viewed as aimed at fundamentalism; that is, some specific 
attacks fall short of a genuine criticism of certain aspects 
of liberal Christianity.
Some observers, both religious and secular, have pro­
tested that debates over such ancient philosophic questions 
as the existence of a God, for example, are fruitless and 
serve no meaningful purpose. That such a position may, in 
fact, be valid does not alter the fact that the "God question" 
and related religious claims have historically been given 
some degree of prominence both by the religionist and his
^These beliefs are all interrelated and there are, of 
course, many others. It should be noted that Humanists at­
tack such views as a belief in God, supematuralism, etc., 
wherever they are to be found, whether in Christianity or any 
other religion.
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opponent. Thus, to the extent that Humanists have felt it 
necessary to attack various theological tenets and to the ex­
tent that traditional religionists have felt It necessary to 
defend such tenets, Humanism's total efforts to condemn reli­
gious orthodoxy deserve attention and analysis.
In this chapter,' Humanists' attempts at refutation 
will be categorized In the.following ways: attacks based on
(1) science and the accumulated data therefrom, (2) eplstemo­
loglcal considerations, (3) common sense and reason, and (4) 
the failures and harms of Christianity as an Institution. 
Obviously, these categories are Interrelated, but they are 
discrete enough for the rhetorical analysis Intended here. In 
each category of argumant, sufficient examples of Humanist 
rhetoric will be examined to Illustrate the nature and worth 
of the rhetorical pattern.
Science its ated Data
The first and most significant rhetorical pattern 
within the Humanist movement has already been suggested Indi­
rectly In earlier chapters. The movement's leaders have begun 
by making a number of aasun^tlons which make science paramount 
In Its relation to man, the universe, knowledge, and philo­
sophic thought; after having mad.e those assumptions, such 
leaders have gone on to Insist that most traditional religious 
conoepts have already been destroyed by man's accumulation of 
data through scientific research. Some Humanists have seen
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this destruction as a recent one and have implied that cer­
tain religious claims have been somewhat Justified until re­
cent scientific discoveries rendered them false. Others have 
viewed religious tenets as if they were in the "process" of 
being destroyed by scientific data. These two points of view, 
however, do not differ significantly, for both rest squarely 
upon science, and both fall into an argumentative structure 
of either cause to effect or argument from authority. Exam­
ples of actual Humanist attacks will illustrate.
An early Humanist writes that the "old supematural- 
ism" has been replaced by "naturaliam, " and this means that 
the "old techniques of religion in so far as built on magic 
and supernaturalism are no longer t e n a b l e . T h e  key words 
here are "no longer tenable," for the author is not charging 
a long-standing fallacy in supematuralism, but is basing the 
fallacy upon recent scientific advances. Professor A. E. 
Haydon makes much the same point when he argues that orthodoxy 
has been "eroded by the tides of science and the winds of so­
cial change."^ He further points to the modern religious 
"truest" which can no longer "be lulled to sleep by opiates con­
fined in old dogmas and institutions.Both men are arguing
^Hoyal G, Hall, "The Idea of God and the New Human­
ism," TNH. I, No. 7 (1928), 3.
^A. Eustace Haydon, "A Meditation on Modernism,"
TNH, V, No. 1 (1932), 10.
6lbid., 13.
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that the refutation of traditional religious beliefs has al­
ready been accomplished by science; and, significantly, both 
employ the past tense in much the same fashion.
Perhaps the Humanist Manifesto best typifies this 
rhetorical pattern and sets the tone for the movement to 
follow. Proposition five, for example, asserts that "the na­
ture of the universe depicted by modern science makes unac­
ceptable any supernatural or cosmic guarantee of human 
values." Moreover, the claim of proposition six is that "the 
time has passed for theism, deism, modernism, and the several 
varieties of 'new thought.' That these two propositions 
leave no room for traditional religious beliefs, and especially 
theism and supematuralism, is important; for science, the 
Manifesto authors insist, has closed the book and the refuta­
tion is complete.
The early Humanist minister Dietrich attacks super­
naturalism in another typical presentation of the movement's 
rhetorical pattern as he writes:
Since that discovery [that the universe is governed by 
natural law, as opposed to a Deity] we have learned to 
refer every event to natural causes, and to deny super­
natural interference either in the processes of nature 
or in the affairs of humanity. Thus the ground has been 
removed from under supematuralism. which was the very 
basis of the established religion.®
7"The Humanist Manifesto," TH, XXII (July-August,1962), 131.
®John H. Dietrich, "What Is Humanism?" TNH, VI, No.
2 (1933), 3.
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He further emphasises his position in another way by saying 
that "the achi.evements of science** have **undermined the whole 
scheme of supematuralism, ** and any religion "which would fit 
into the modern thou^t-frame must be naturalistic instead of 
supematuralistic."^ Dietrich's refutation pattern does not 
differ materially from the earlier citations; obviously, he is 
making several assumptions about science, and, on the authority 
of science, he is certainly ruling out supematuralism.
E. C. Vanderlaan who, like Dietrich, was a signer of 
the Humanist Manifesto and a Unitarian-Humanist Minister, at­
tacks immortality as a concept in much the same fashion, when 
he says:
We might like to believe that we shall never die, «nri 
that man is totally exceptional in the scheme of things—  
but that is to insist that the world must be different 
from what we are able to discover about it; that is, like 
primitive man, to take refuge from facts in a world of 
fairy tales.19
The "facts," he is saying, have already determined the inva­
lidity of the major religious issues, and to cling to tradi­
tional religious concepts is but to ignore what science has 
discovered.
Professor H. E. Bames turns to the accumulation of 
historical data and asserts that the history of religion 
"proves the impossibility of maintaining for a minute the
9lbid., 4.
lOEldred C. Vanderlaan, "Why Insist on God?" TNH. VI, 
No. 6 (1933), 24.
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unique or revealed nature of the Jewish or Christian reli­
gions." ü  With great certainty, he adds that knowing the 
origin of religion "proves at once how absurd is the orthodox 
obsession with salvation in the world to come."12 While 
Bames does not here use the word-"science, " he is still ar­
guing within the same pattern as others in the movement. He 
is insisting that present available knowledge has accomplished 
the task of refutation in regard to the major religious 
tenets.
Rev. Harold Scott bases his argument against orthodox
views more exq)licitly on science:
Supematuralism assumes that there are phenomena beyond 
human experience. If there were man could not know it.
As soon as man becomes conscious of phenomena they become 
part of this experience which by definition is natural. 
There is no point in calling any part of man*s experience 
supematural. To do so is to introduce the notion of dis- 
orderliness. The work of the exact sciences show an or­
derly universe. Those who believe there is disorder in 
the universe have the burden of proving it.13
"Orderliness" in the universe, one should note, has tradi­
tionally been an argument advanced by the theist to support 
supematuralism. Scott has tumed the point by arguing that 
that which is not a part of human experience or nature must
llRarry Elmer Bames, "Has History Value to Human­
ism?" TNH, VI, No. 5 (1933), 18.
IZlbid.. 19.
13Harold Scott, "Humanism as Religious Instrumental­
ism," VIII, No. 5 (1935), 171-72.
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represent "disorder."1^ Also, his point is much the same as 
Dietrich’s, for both men are relying upon the "proven" con­
clusion that only natural law governs the universe. Later, 
Scott makes his point more simply by saying that science does 
not "sustain the alleged supematuralism of historic reli­
gion. "^5
William Floyd, another original signer of the Human­
ist Manifesto, launches his attack against orthodox tenets 
in the following typical rhetorical pattern:
Now that science has resolved the traditional supematural 
into the natural; now that heaven has been swept from the 
skies by astronomers and hell has been interred by geolo­
gists, the orthodox conception of the universe must be 
revised. The universe that formerly was supposed to be 
separated sharply into the spiritual and the material, 
one realm being celestial and the other terrestrial, is 
now believed to be a unity.
Other Humanist rhetoric cited has reduced Floyd’s argument
to a simple redundancy. Like other Humanist writers, he
makes assumptions regarding science which function as implied
premises; but given those assumptions as a foundation, his
conclusion may be valid.
Perhaps a more dogmatic refutation of the body-spirit
duality and of immortality comes from the pen of author 
Corliss Lamont. He posits as a tenet of the Humanist philos­
ophy the following: -
l^Scott’s use of human experience as a criterion for 
knowledge raises an epistemological question to be discussed 
in the next section. See page 110.
l^Ibid.. 172.
^^William Floyd, "Humanist Principles," TH, II (Spring, 1942), 1. —
100
First, a belief, based mainly on the sciences of biology, 
psychology and medicine, that man is an evolutionary 
product of the nature that is his home and an inseparable 
unity of body and personality having no possibility for 
individual immortality.^7
Although absolutistic, Lamont*s statements fit easily into the
movement's argumentative structure. 18 His point is that the
"naturalness" of the universe and man excludes all possibility
of an "unnatural" immortality.
Professor Haydon, still another signer of the Manifesto 
cited earlier in this chapter, describes how science has 
"swept the ages" to tell the story of man and his earth; and 
how scientific knowledge put "Gods and institutions and 
moral codes" into "proper perspective." He further asserts 
that "the absolutes, ultimates and finalities of earlier ages 
have vanished. "19 He advances the characteristically Human­
ist contention that modem scientific advances have completed 
the job of destroying traditional religious beliefs.
The literature of Huinahl,am is replete with Just such 
generalizations as those made by Haydon; and they are nearly 
all alike in structure and tone as they describe the victory 
of science over religion. The following four generalizations 
are cited here to accentuate the persistent refrain of the 
rhetorical pattern.
^?Corlis8 Lamont, "The Meaning of Humanism," TH, II (Summer, 1942), 42.
l®Lamont*s statement "no possibility of individual im­mortality," has,been^criticized by other Humanists as being too dogmatic. Lamont himself later agreed.
^9a , Eustace Haydon, "Humanism Has Faith in Man," ra,
X (January-February, 1930), 1.
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First of all, philosopher Harold Larrabee criticizes 
those who cling so long to old beliefs and insists that had 
the religionists just been "logical," they would "have long 
since abandoned their inherited religious tenets which are so 
glaringly inconsistent with their scientific k n o w l e d g e . "20 
Next, sociologist Frank H. Hankins argues that the "rejection 
of all supematuralism" is Humanism's most "distinguishing 
philosophical tenet," which places the movement in line with 
that phase of thought which has "paralleled the advancement 
of science." He argues, further, that not only does science 
make the idea of God invalid, but "unnecessary."^^ A third 
generalization in this refrain comes from Humanism's most im­
portant figure, Edwin Wilson, who writes that "agnosticism is 
alone intellectually Justified beneath the banner of 
science."22 And finally, semanticist Anatol Rapoport asserts 
that religious beliefs such as supematuralism and the Resur­
rection can no longer be maintained, because "the evidence is 
overwhelmingly against these statements being true."23 
Clearly, then. Humanist leaders have persistently utilized a
20garold A. Larrabee, "150 Years of Smearing the In- 
fiddl," ra, X (September-October, 1950), 192.
2lFrank H. Hankins, "Humanism and the Culture Stream," 
TH, XX (March-April, I960), 69.
222dwin H. Wilson, "Pious Scientists Brought to Task," 
TNH. IV, No. 6 (1931), 38.
23Anatol Rapoport, "Religion and 'Salvation,'" TH,
XVI (March-April, 1956), 62.
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pattern of argument which has placed traditional religious 
claims in the "past tense," having fallen to the march of 
scientific discovery.
Before leaving the discussion of this particular 
method of refutation, however, some brief mention of the 
"trend?*or "tendency" aspect of the argument must be made. 
Doubtless, most of the Humanists cited above think of the on­
slaught of science against traditional religion as being a 
continuing one; however, the pattern of argument is sometimes 
directly focused on the "on-going" nature of that scientific 
advance. Some such arguments will be noted here, although no 
fundamental change in the rhetorical pattern results.
Professor Roy Wood Sellars is a representative example 
as he argues that the "tables are being slowly tumed on the 
polemical field." He states that while the natural is being 
"filled out," the supematural is becoming "ever more ghostly 
and incredible, a sort of twice-told tale."^^ These advances 
of science, he writes, have meant that the Humanist may feel 
less of a responsibility for disproving the existence of God 
and revelation and may come to see that the job of proving 
now rests with the supernaturalist.25 While Sellars does not 
leave much hope for the survival of traditional religious
2^Boy Wood Sellars, "Naturalistic Humanism: A Frame­
work for Belief and Values," ra, XIII (March-April, 1953)» 52.
25lbid.. 53.
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beliefs, he does stress that the scientific battle Is still 
In the process of being won, rather than being past history.
Likewise, sociologist Head Bain argues that the rise 
of science has meant that "the supematural aspects of Chris­
tianity have steadily declined." He further states that as 
science progresses toward Its goals, "Christianity and other 
world religions gradually will fuse Into a secularized world 
r e l i g i o n . I n  a later article, Bain writes:
Supematuralism In all Its forms Is dying out.
Science has been slowly destroying It for over three hun­
dred years, with rapid acceleration during the last cen­
tury. Its final stronghold Is In the psychosocial realm. 
During the last fifty years the social sciences have made 
great strides toward becoming natural sciences and most 
of the former psychosocial mysteries have become matters 
of rapidly developing scientific knowledge. The Christian 
myth Is taking Its proper place among other primitive mythologies.27
Bain, then. Is also concerned with the continuing advance of 
science and he looks to the future for final destruction of 
traditional religion. Noteworthy Is his assertion that super- 
naturalism Is "dying out," for the evidence at hand today 
would certainly not support the claim that fewer people be­
lieve In supematuralism now than have In the past. What 
Bain probably means Is that for those idio place their primary 
reliance In science, supematuralism Is losing ground.
26aead Bain, "Basic Religion: Man Creating Himself,"
ra, X (July-August, 1950), 155.
27Head Bain, "Scientific Humanism," TH, XIV (May- 
June, 1954), 116.
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Finally, Wendt strongly attacks the concepts of
heaven and hell and says that
they are not merely inadequate now; they are incompatible 
with our knowledge. And this knowledge is still prelimi- 
issqy and inadequate. Some day we shall have the answers 
to such far questions.2°
Wendt appears confident that certain religious claims, es­
pecially immortality, do come into conflict with modern knowl- 
edge; however, he, like Bain, is looking ahead to answers 
from science. Of particular note is Wendt’s conviction that 
man has very inadequate knowledge at present, a statement not 
always clearly made by Humanists. Nevertheless, the rhetori­
cal pattern of refuting the traditional religious views through 
the authority of science remains the same for those who feel 
the job of refutation is complete and those who believe 
orthodox religion is only in the final stages of the process 
of defeat.
The actual argumentative structure of the Humanist 
attack (in this section as well as the next) is quite clear.
At one level, the argument falls into a cause and effect pat­
tern:
Cause— Many scientific discoveries 
Effect— Orthodox tenets are no longer tenable
But more properly the pattern should be viewed as an argument
from authority. In a.sense. Humanist rhetoric personifies
science in such a way that it serves as an indisputable
^®Gerald Wendt, ”A Time for Ethical Humanism,” TH,
XXI (September-October, I96I), 270.
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authority for the movement’s assertions. The result is as 
follows:
Science has discovered a world 
guided by natural law and has 
not found any evidence to 
support supematuralism, theism,
immortality, or any of the other Therefore, the major
claims of Christianity. Science Christian tenets are
has produced evidence in direct either untenable or
conflict with religions claims. false.
I
Science is the most reliable 
and modern source for truth, 
physical as well as philosophic. 
The discoveries of science are 
dependable and that which con­
flicts with them cannot be con­
sidered valid.
The key to this pattern of argument obviously lies in the 
connecting link between evidence and claim, for the Human­
ist's position rests upon the assumptions he makes regarding 
science and truth.
Epistemological Factors 
Closely related to the foregoing pattern of refutation 
is Humanism's condemnation of traditional religious views on 
the basis of epistemological considerations. Humanists deal 
with the methodological question in two ways. They argue 
that (1) the nature of the scientific method repudiates Chris­
tian tenets and (2) religious epistemologies are old and in­
valid. In each case, the ends achieved are the same: reli­
gious tenets are rejected, quite apart from their validity
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or invalidity, on the grounds that they were "discovered" 
through the use of a faulty eplstemology.
The Scientific Method Utilized 
As Refutation
Humanist rhetoric often attacks traditional religion 
on methodological grounds, and the Humanist Manifesto exem­
plifies the pattern In the clearest possible language. Prop­
osition five, for Instance, asserts that Humanism
does not deny the possibility of realities as yet undis­
covered, but It does Insist that the way to determine 
the existence and value of any and all realities Is by 
means of Intelligent Inquiry and by the assessment of 
their relations to human needs. Religion must formulate 
Its hopes and plans In the light of the scientific spirit 
and method.29
These statements are of primal significance, for they repre­
sent the very heart and foundation of the movement’s episte­
mological position. Clear and definite limits are placed upon 
what Is to be "acceptable" knowledge, euid any further Investi­
gation In the area of religion must be conducted scientifi­
cally. Obviously, the Manifesto, through such restrictions Is 
excluding and rejecting most religious tenets. The methodol­
ogy clearly predetermines the nature of the conclusion.
Individual Humanists also persistently follow this 
same pattern of argument and Insist on much the same defini­
tion of "truth" as does the Manifesto. Scott, for example, 
says that "religious propositions must meet the same tests
29"The Humanist Manifesto," TH, XCII (July-August, 1962), 131.
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as propositions in other fields."30 He means, of course,
"scientific" tests. And Floyd echoes Scott when he argues
that knowledge of the physical world comes from science, and
so also must knowledge concerning the "metaphysical world."31
Hankins, too, is clear and to the point as he discusses
science as "the one universal language" and adds that
its devotees everywhere seek the same kind of truth, the 
only kind of truth that is universally understood and ac­
ceptable, because it is the only kind that contains within 
itself the means and methods of correcting its own er­rors .32
Hankins, like Scott and Floyd, identifies his methodology 
and the kind of truth he seeks with such specificity that 
religious beliefs are ruled out without a contest. Thus, it 
is the actual "nature" of the epistemology which does the job 
of refutation.
Another prominent Humanist, Rev. Curtis Reese, past 
president of both the Humanist Press Association and the Amer­
ican Humanist Association, describes the movement's position 
as being one of
an attitude of inquiry toward the mystery that envelopes 
man and his world. I am increasingly convinced that for 
most people religion is basically a pious attitude toward
^^Harold Scott, "What Humanism Is," TH, VII (Winter,
1947), 131.
3lFloyd, TH, II, 2. 
^^Hankins, TH, XX, 70.
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mystery. And as mystery disappears religion tends to 
disappear with it.33
He goes on to say that the Humanist may not always find the 
answer and may at times be "baffled by the mystery," but "he 
will never cease to inquire."3^ Beese is here placing the 
blame for the religious-scientific conflict upon the "atti­
tude" toward investigation held by the religionist. While he 
recognizes the limitations of man's knowledge, he insists 
that all answers to "mysteries" must come from science. 
Clearly, R e e r e ' s  pattern of argument does not differ signifi­
cantly from earlier quotations cited.
In this same stream of thought, Professor George 
Axtelle, another former president of the AHA, discusses the 
naturalistic and the scientific as the "core of common atti­
tude" for the movement. His statements concerning the 
"scientific" epitomize the movement's rhetorical pattern:
The term 'scientific' has reference specifically to the 
nature of dependable human knowledge. Our only reliable 
knowledge is the fruit of a scientific way of thinking.
We are generally agreed that this way of thought is not 
only possible but necessary in matters of religion, 
morals, and social policy. We believe that the ^est 
of an idea is the same in religion, morals, and social 
policy as it is in scientific matters.35
33Curtis W. Beese, "The Social Implications of Human­ism," ra, XXI (July-August, 1961), 196. This article first 
appear^ in The Humanist the summer of 1948: it had been de­livered before une annual meeting of the AHA of that year. Beprinted upon Beese's death in I96I.
34 i M d .
35Ceorge E. Axtelle, "Unity in Diversity," ra, XXI 
(January-February, I961), 26.
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Again, this common attitude toward "truth" seems to unite 
Humanism against traditional religion, and that attitude, as 
Axtelle expresses It, Is that the only reliable human knowledge 
comes from science.
The distinguished scientist Dr. Hermann Muller fur­
thers the point quite succinctly In a presidential address 
before an AHA conference. He speaks of the prime value of 
scientific discoveries such as evolution and Insists that we 
must rely upon
the conclusions based on the cooperative efforts of free 
honest minds served by searching eyes and probing hands. 
That Is the kind of knowledge and the only kind that our 
children ^ v e  a right to be taught as knowledge In our schools.36
The point he Is making here (as well as throughout his 
speech) Is merely that nothing really deserves to go by the 
name of knowledge unless It has emerged out of scientific 
research.
That the Humanist does not have such knowledge about
God and the universe Is quite freely admitted by Dr. Gerald
Wendt. He argues that we need to have "sure knowledge" about
God and other questions, but that scientific research Is the
only way to acquire such data; we don't have the answers yet,
he s^s, "but let us find out I "37 Again, the criterion for 
what Is acceptable data Is made quite clear.
36«ppeedom from Ignorance," AHA Cincinnati Confer­
ence (1957)» Tape Recoxdlng Library.
37Gerald Wendt, "Science and Democracy In Human Prog­
ress," TH, XII (September-October, 1952), 217.
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IndlTldual Humanists have sometimes attempted to 
Justify the scientific method at a very concrete level.
Scott; for example, in contrasting the scientific method 
with revelation, argues that the scientific method has not led 
man astray and into the "contradictions" resulting from reve­
lation. He asks of the method of science:
Is there any other fruitful way to find truth? Look 
about you at the things which give us as abundant a life 
as you have. Are these instruments of happiness the re­
sult of revelations from a supematural world or of the scientific method?38
Scott assumes that when a methodology proves to be effective
in one arena (the "instruments of happiness" representing the
physical or material world), it must, therefore, be the most
effective in all other arenas.
Scott's defense of the scientific method is nearly 
duplicated by Larrabee who notes that the religionists apply 
the laws of nature and science in their daily lives but re­
fuse to do so in matters of religion. He emphasizes that the 
scientific approach has produced marvels for mankind and that 
such a methodology must be inherently superior to all others .39 
Like Scott, Larrabee fails to demonstrate that a method of 
investigation which works in the material world will also 
work in the non-material world; he is making an assumption
38Harold Scott, "The Extravagance of Religious 
Claims," II (April, 1940), 3.
39Harold A. Larrabee, "The Humanist Frontier," TH, 
XVIII (July-August, 1958), 240.
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regarding the relationship of the physical to the metaphysi­
cal. These two specific efforts to defend the scientific 
method, however, do fit into the movement's main pattern of 
argument, for they both represent a methodological attack 
upon traditional religion.
Another aspect of the Humanist's epistemological at­
tack centers on the definition of "human experience" and 
"nature." Dietrich, for example, in criticizing Christianity 
for being rigid and dogmatic, argues that Humanism has
a flexible and adjustable attitude, basing its faith 
entirely upon the recognized and changing facts of hu­
man experience. Its difference from theistic religion 
is not in its denial of God, but in its change of method. 
It refuses to assume the existence of god and then to 
interpret human experience in terms of that assumption.
It has adopted the experimental or scientific method, 
which merely observes and accepts human experience as the 
basis of all thought and activity, and includes every 
phase of human experience in its attempt to educe a sys­
tem of thought idiich might form a practical and working 
basis for human life.^
Dietrich here recognizes that the conflict between theism and
Humanism largely centers on the question of method. What is
most significant, however, is his use of "human experience"
as the key to the methodological issue. He is saying that
all knowledge must come from human experience, a statement
which might well be made by the religionist. The difference
is that Dietrich thinks of human experience as sensory, or
natural, or testable. Actually, his use of human experience
40jo)m H. Dietrich, "Is Humanism Dying?" THE. I (May, 1938), 3.
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In that manner excludes the possibility of finding validity 
for such concepts as God and immortality, both of which might 
be said to go beyond nature or the "natural."
Scott echoes that position as he asserts that all 
human experience is natural and likely "what the psycholo­
gists say it is, the reception of data from stimuli."^1 As 
cited earlier in this chapter,Scott goes on to spell out 
the natural-supematural dilemma. He says that supematural­
ism could not be experienced by man because it is beyond na­
ture, and if it were so experienced, it would become a part 
of nature. At one level, the argument appears to be little 
more than a claim by definition, but on another level, the 
argument reflects a rather fundamental epistemological issue.
Professor J. A. C. F. Auer of Harvard makes a related
point, but with a slight change in emphasis and language. He
insists that man cannot discover or experience God because
God has been defined
as infinite auid man as finite, God as perfect and man as 
imperfect, man as bound by time and space and God as 
bound by nothing at all, you have taken away all points
at which the two could possibly meet.43
He adds that man’s "power to understand" depends upon the
setting up of limits and God therefore is beyond comprehen­
sion. Auer concludes that man will never be able to
4lScott, Tm, VIII, 171.
^^See page 08.
A. C . Fagginger Auer, "What Is Religion? The Answer of Humanism," m ,  vi (Winter, 1946), I30.
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"discover God," for there are no "lines of demarcation," no 
ways that God can "be set off against anything else."^^ From 
a scientific point of view, Auer makes the point very well 
indeed; that which are "beyond" nature discoveries are not 
likely to come out of "natural" investigations. Most signif­
icantly, he is typifying the Humanist's epistemological argu­
mentative pattern of claiming that the nature of the scien­
tific method refutes, rejects, and excludes the possibility 
of veracity among the major tenets of traditional religion.
Specific Attacks Upon Traditional 
Religious Epistemologies
Humanists continue their offensive by carrying the 
battle deeper into "enemy" territory by condemning the spe­
cific methods used by religionists to arrive at truths. Cer­
tainly, such a position is implicit in the foregoing section; 
however, the intent here is to point to some of the direct 
arguments raised against such devices as revelation and intui­
tion, ultimately leading to a rejection of the veracity of 
the Bible and the authority of the Church. The two broad 
criticisms which Humanists direct toward orthodox methodol­
ogies are (l) that revelations are not reliable because they 
conflict and (2) that religious epistemologies are absolutist 
and anti-scientific.
Professor Oliver Reiser, in an address before the
^^Ibid.. 132.
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First Humanist Assembly in 1934, spelled out the movement's
total position as being one of opposition to
(a) the theological doctrine of the verbal inspiration 
of religious literature; (b) the belief in intuition, 
revelation, or any other non-rational source of knowl­
edge; and (c) the idea that institutional authority, 
traditions, or conventions provide an infallible guide 
for belief and actions.^5
To some extent at least. Reiser's three items run together.
To Reiser, revelation is the cardinal evil, and all other 
"non-scientific" sources of truth used by religion are 
secondary evils.
More pointed, however, are Professor Sellars' vigor­
ous assertions that the Humanist religion
is a religion without revelation. But, of course, it is 
his opinion that Christianity is also a religion without 
revelation because revelation is an illusion. Rather is 
Christianity one of the many historic religions irtiich 
believed that it had a revelation. And so the humanist 
would demand that Christianity give up this belief in arevelation.46
Sellars here offers little support for his charge that reve­
lation is an "illusion"; he merely raises the issue that reve­
lation has existed in many different religions,
Scott expands that very point with considerable 
specificity as he chides those who "cling to authoritative 
revelation from a spirit world." He builds his case as 
follows :
4^0liver Reiser, "The Social Objectives of Humanism," 
VII, No. 6 (1934), 23.
^Roy Wood Sellars, "Naturalistic Interpretation of 
Religion," M ,  III, No. 4 (1930), 2.
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That revelations from a hypothetical spirit world were 
different In every place, India, Palestine, Arabia, China, 
aborigines of the tropics, and savages of the arctics 
seems to be no hindrance to people who had to believe or 
be soared to death. All great religions of the world 
wrote sacred books preserving their conflicting and con­
fused messages from the spirit world . . . The confessions 
of faith, articles of belief and creeds, have been the at­
tempts of later people to give plausibility to alleged 
voices from a spirit world by reinterpreting the old reve­
lations in terms of current subtleties.4?
Thus, Scott effectively argues that all true and infallible
revelations would have to originate from the same source and
be of the same nature; this, he shows, has not been the case.
That so many revelations have said so many different things
in different times convinces Scott that all revelations are
false.
Scott embellishes his thesis by discussing the common 
situation surrounding all the "great mediators" of the "inco­
herent messages from the spirit world," around whom wer̂ e 
built up legends of miraculous deeds, supematural births, 
strange powers, etc. All of which, Scott says, gave the mes­
senger his authority and prestige.̂ 8 The distressing factor 
for Scott is that such events have been common to so many 
historic religions.
Professor Ames, in contrasting the universal nature 
of the language of science with religious methodology, says 




conflict.**^ And Professor Malcolm Bis sell calls such con­
flicts a "dilemma" and describes it as follows:
To admit that supernatural revelation has flowed through 
more than one narrow channel is to grant the validity of 
claims the sectarian must ever reject; to deny that a 
Gandhi or a Buddha has been God-inspired is at once to 
dispose of the unique efficacy of divine grace. In either 
case, nothing is left of the doctrine of 'one true faith.'50
Of course, Bissell's argument does not differ materially from 
Scott's. He is merely insisting that there cannot be the 
true revelation, because revelation is not unique to any one 
religion or sect.
A second common mode of Humanist criticism of reli­
gious epistemology is to charge that its methods are anti- 
scientific, because, among other reasons, the religionist 
claims absolute and infallible truths. Ethical Culture 
leader J. H. Hynd, for example, calls the claim of infalli­
bility "the greatest hoax in history." 'Any claim to infall­
ible authority," he argues, "by imputation or imposition is a 
hoax under whatever guise it may appear."51 That claim, he 
insists, is to be found in all the supematural religions, 
and his accusation specifically includes the Roman Papacy and 
certain religious "parchments."52 He expresses a particular
^9Van Meter Ames, "Science and the Reconstruction of 
Values," ra, V (Spring, 1945), 12.
50Malcolm H. Bissell, "Escape from Reality," TO, X 
(November-December, 1950), 261.
51j. Hutton Hynd, "The Greatest Hoax in History— The 
Claim to Infallibility," TH, V (Summer, 1945), 56.
52ibid.. 58.
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disapproval of the infallible authority of the Bible and 
states that it is an "incredible fact" that in many Protestant 
churches "the Old and New Testaments are the only authorita­
tive books permitted to be read in the pulpit." Hynd adds 
that "to submit so naively to the play of such a hoax as this 
is to surrender the intellect and the moral life to a static 
and backward state of bondage."53 Obviously, Hynd is condemn­
ing religion only on the epistemological grounds that it is 
based on infallible authority— which ^  a "hoax." Such a 
statement does not seem inappropriate to the Humanist, given 
his predispositions and assumptions toward science and the 
world.
Auer further assails absolute authority as being in­
herently invalid when he discusses the "inner certainty" used 
by theism to prove its case, and argues that such is "a two- 
edged sword." He explains that
the mystics were certain that their visions reflected 
reality. Both Ignatius Loyola and Saint Teresa were cer­
tain that they had seen the Trinity, so certain indeed 
that no argument would ever have persuaded them that they 
were wrong. Yet you and I would scarcely accept their 
experience as a proof for the existence of the Trinity.54
He adds that two of the most certain men in history were
Hitler and Mussolini, and they were w r o n g . H i s  point is
53lbid.. 59.
54Auer, TO, VI, 133.
55lbid.
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clear enough; certainty that one has the truth or has re­
ceived revealed truth is far from a guarantee of validity.
The charge that religious methodologies are non-re­
liable and non-scientific is furthered by William Floyd. He 
argues that revelation is over 2,000 years old and the general 
antiquity of the scriptures
militates against their sufficiency as a modern guide, 
for their authors, writing in a pre-scientific environ­
ment, assumed a physical world quite different from that 
disclosed by science; and their misconceptions influenced 
their delineation of a supematural theocracy.
He goes on to emphasize the point made earlier in this chap­
ter, namely, that all truths, both physical and metaphysical, 
must come from "scientific scholarship."57
Professor Harold McCarthy criticizes the whole notion 
of intuition as already rejected by science and irrelevant 
to knowledge. He writes that "no intuition is self-validating 
and therefore every intuition must be regarded as a hypothesis 
to be tested rather than a conclusion to be recorded.^58 He 
does not eliminate intuition as a source of inspiration, but 
proposes that its findings be subject to strict scientific 
testing for validation.
Muller follows this general pattern by contrasting 
the information gained through science with what he refers
56pioyd, TH, II, 1.
57ibid.. 2.
58Harold E. McCarthy, "Science and Its Critics," TH, 
XII (March-April, 1952), 53*
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to as "supposed supematural revelation or any other type of 
superstition,"59 Another author says that since revealed 
truth must be supematural, the natural world and science may 
both be ignored. He expands the idea by saying that revela­
tion has no "coercive, self-repairing quality," and one irtio 
has received revelation can completely set aside all scientific 
truths which conflict with his t r u t h , T h e  argument is that 
traditional religious methodologies such as revelation are 
inherently unreliable because they are non-scientific or even 
anti-scientific.
Obviously, Humanists have made many epistemological 
attacks upon traditional religion, but the foregoing specific 
efforts at refutation typify the movement’s rhetorical pattem.
Appeals to Gommon Sense and Reason 
"Those who care to ’reason* will find the claims made 
by orthodoxy to be p.bsurd and foolish." Such is the basic 
form which this pattern of refutation assumes. Humanist ap­
peals to "common sense" and "reason" are much less significant 
than those in the foregoing patterns. Appeals to reason are 
secondary in that they rest on the assumption that answers to 
theological questions may be found by human inquiry and
59Hemann J, Muller, "Modernized Magic: A Protest"
(Humanist discussion), XX (July-August, I960), 227.
^®Lynn L, Weldon, "When Revelation Has Meaning," TH.
XXI (November-December, 1961), 336,
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investigation. This pattern differs from the preceding ones 
in that science is not here called upon directly as the ration­
ale for the position.
Most of the arguments to be cited here are not new.
Many of the specific attacks can be found in the writi^s of 
such men as Voltaire, Paine, Ingersoll, Darrow, and others. 
Also, many Humanists do not enter this particular field of 
polemics, for they find debates over specific religious 
claims to be fruitless. Furthermore, the pattern here illus­
trated does not represent the heart of the Humanist position 
and does not occupy a prominent place in Humanist literature.
The movement's appeals to common sense and reason 
center on refuting the ideas of God and immortality, emd, as 
listed here, are paraphrased and condensed into a sample of 
the argumentative pattern.
Immortality
The following list includes a few of the common sense 
attacks on the concept of immortality.
(1) How is God to judge between the saint and the 
sinner? Most people are basically good, but find difficulty 
in living up to their highest ideals. Most people are both 
good and bad— will they go to heaven or hell? What about non- 
Christians? If belief in Christ is essential for eternal 
life, then millions of religious Jews, Moslems, and Buddhists 
who have lived upright and noble lives will go to hell. Is
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that Just? How can God punish a man for what He knew was 
going to be done? If God is all-powerful, why should he pun­
ish man for the sins which He could prevent but does not?6l 
What about the village idiot? If he does not go to hell, will 
he retain his idiocy in heaven or be reconstructed? If the 
latter, the "continuity of self" will be lost.^^ How could 
a God be "so immoral that He would torture His children" be­
cause they did not select the right church or the right scheme
of salvation?^3
(2) The entire "scramble for heaven" after death is 
"undignified, undemocratic, and implausible." How can any 
religion be "noble" which demands "special privilege" after 
death?64 Man looks' absurd as he evades the facts of this 
world by believing that "all will come out right in another 
world," a world about which he knows n o t h i n g , Life will 
continue to remain a "rigid routine of totems and taboos" as 
long as God is sittihg in judgment, for how many men dare risk 
eternal punishment to seek new truths and progress?&6
^^Harry Ruja, "Is Immortality Reasonable?" TH, VII 
(Winter, 1947), 123. “
62ibid.. 125.
63Harold Scott, "Dr. Scott Answers His Critics,"
Radio Interview, Salt Lake City (n. d.). Tape Recording LUaaajt
64ibid.
ü^Eldred C. Vanderlaan, Tlffi, VI, No. 6, 25.
66paul Eldridge, "What a Man Fears Determines His 
Character," TO, VII (Spring, 194?), 185.
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(3) What abou;b existence itself after death? When a 
man remarries after the death of his first wife, whom shall he 
join in heaven?^? With such conflicts resolved, still the 
very idea of immortality even as a Estate of bliss" would 
appear to be extremely "boring." The survival of the soul 
without the mind would constitute a "drab existence.
Further, if happiness is achieved through the overcoming of 
obstacles, how shall there be happiness in heaven where there 
are no obstacles? Also missing will be any pleasure achieved 
through biological functions. And how, indeed, will man occu­
py himself? By playing harps? Or by hunting and fishing as 
many have believed?^9
(4) How can anyone really imagine immortality to 
exist? For example, the mind is a function of the physical 
organ called a brain just as the voice is a function of the 
vocal chords. When the brain decomposes, the mind disappears; 
and how can anyone possibly conceive of a "disembodied mind 
wandering around in the cosmos," any more than a disembodied 
voice?70 And how can there be such a "place" as heaven? It 
cannot really be in the sky, because there is actually no 
such thing as a sky and the farther up one goes the blacker
67BuJa, ra, VII, 124.
68Harold R. Bafton, "What Can We Believe?" TH, XIII 
(May-June, 1953), 121.
69Ruja, ra, VII, 123.
70Hafton, Tg, XIII, 121.
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the scene. Likewise, hell as an ancient dogma is beyond con­
ception. Hell is more and more being ignored, for it is im­
possible to "think of Hell as a reality down in the solid 
granite that is under the earth's surface everywhere." Hell 
and Heaven cannot be located any more than the Greeks could
locate the mountain homes of the gods.71
(5) Of course, when man's life on earth was wretched 
and frustrating, he may have gained some release through his 
delusions of eternal life. But modern life in the twentieth 
century, for most men at least, makes that need no longer im­
portant. 7^ But in the last analysis, even when a man is about 
to die or be killed, can he really find any consolation by 
fooling himself into believing that he is going to "a far 
far better place?"73
Thus the Humanist argues against the concept of immor­
tality. The arguments, of course, could not be made without 
the basic assumption that all things can be touched, observed, 
or understood by man.
The Idea of God and Some Corollaries
The movement's appeal to reason may be extended through
71Wendt, IB, XXI, 270.
72RuJa, TH, VII, 126.
73David A. Rickards, "What Does the World Need: Mpre
Christianity or More Humanism?" speech delivered before the 
Warren, Ohio Unitarian Fellowship (January, I96I), Tape Recording Library.
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the following list of common attacks made against the concept 
of God and some related religious claims.
(1) Over 1700 Gods have been recorded, each believed 
to be the only true God by its followers. Belief in the 
Christian God is largely a matter of geography and accident 
of birth. How strange it is to see a person smile "indul­
gently" at other Gods as if they were obvious myths, and then 
to insist that his God, which has equally mystical and incred­
ible qualities, is real and true. The whole "savior idea" is 
likewise strange, for many "savior gods appeared, died and 
were resurrected long before Jesus was bom." Nor is the 
Christian idea of a God who died on a cross a unique one, 
because even that "dubious distinction must be shared by 
Jesus with at least sixteen others." The identical situation 
surrounds the scriptures as a guide, for there have been at 
least twenty-five from various religions, each held to be 
sacred by its followers.7^ Good Christians everywhere deny 
the existence of all Gods but their own, making themselves 
atheistic in their attitude toward the nearly 2,000 Gods.
The atheist, then, only denies the existence of one more God 
than does the Christian.75 Very simply, man has always created
7^Bafton, ra, XIII, 119-22.
75Bickards, "What Does the World Need: More Chris­
tianity or More Humanism?" Tape Recording Library,
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God in man*s image. Gods have merely been men of majestic 
proportion. With equal logic the ant could say that God was 
an ant, but of majestic proportions. The whole structure of 
Christianity rests on that unproved assumption that God 
exists.76 By creating his Gods man has been able to call his 
"package of ignorance" by the name of God. Disease, flood, 
conception— whatever man did not properly understand— he at­
tributed to God; but man's increased knowledge, of course, 
steadily diminished the "God package.”7?
(2) To imagine a God may be possible, but how can 
any person who has learned to think at all possibly believe 
in or "set up" a "God who is all-loving, all-powerful, all- 
seeing— and at the same time vengeful and punishing?" How 
can a person worship a God which is less civilized than him­
self? The old tribal God would not be tolerated by most 
civilized men today, and yet that type of God is still wor­
shipped by many people. Such individuals were conditioned in 
childhood and have never had the chance to think for them­
selves.78 If Goji does exist and is all-powerful, then every­
thing that happens is by divine plan, and that means that 
disease, floods, and human suffering are the will of God.79
7^Scott, "Dr. Scott Answers His Critics," Tape Recording Library.
??Bafton, ra, XIII, 119-20.
^^Brook Chisholm, "It Starts with Santa Claus," edi­torial interview conducted by Edwin Wilson, TH, XVI (November- December, 1956), 293.
79Rickards, "What Does the World Need: More Chris­
tianity or More Humanism?" Tape Recording Library.
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In the final analysis, if there is a predetermined end with 
the final result fixed by a Creator, "what is man but the 
creator's plaything?"®®
(3) Another Christian concept, the devil, was invented 
simply to explain evil in a world ruled by a "supposedly good 
God." Why hasn't the "omnipotent God" destroyed the devil 
thereby ridding the world of that evil? Perhaps the answer
is that the theologians would have had little left to preach 
a b o u t . L i b e r a l  Christians have, in fact, at times sought to 
eliminate the devil, but they have failed because he is needed 
to blame as a "scapegoat." Actually, if there were no devil 
it would be necessary to invent one.8%
(4) Just idiat difference does a belief in God make?
The liberal Christian has already so altered his concept of 
the power of God in his life that there is little left. What 
does he "expect his God to do" that the Humanist cannot "ex­
pect from the neutral universe?" He (the liberal Christian) 
gets on so well without the rest of the "apparatus of super­
naturalism," why can't he take the next logical step and give 
up the word "God" to which he clings?®3 Twentieth-century man
8®Arthur E. Morgan, "The Significance of Life," TH,
XV (May-June, 1955), 123.
Slfiafton, ra, XIII, 120.
82John Morris, "The Devil and Madison Avenue," TH.
XXI (November-December, 196I), 340.
83vanderlaan, TNH, VI, No. 6, 23.
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actually only gives lip service to his belief in God. Of 
course, if you ask him if he believes in God you can depend 
on his strong affirmation, but ask him "itrtiat God is like, 
idien he last talked about God with an adult, when God last 
helped or punished him, or any question which would reflect 
a belief in an active God, and he is likely to respond with 
an “embarrassed silence or an answer hastily and insincerely 
concocted." Ask the same man what he expects from a "man, a 
woman, or a gallon of gas," and he will be quite clear and 
definite. The conclusion is that modern man is either not 
really concerned with God or does not believe in him.84 jf 
the Humanist is right, then man has always been without God in 
actuality. "Are we to suppose that we are unable to get by 
without the spiritual crutch which we invented for ourselves 
in our limping past?"®^ Modern man is already largely human­
ized, for he does not pray when he is ill; he goes to a doctor, 
for he has faith in the power of man and medicine. Society 
has learned, despite its protestations to the contrary, that 
you can’t "depend on God."86
(5) Actually, everyone is an agnostic if he "thinks 
at all." Some only become agnostic sooner than others. In
84Anatol Hapoport, "Signal Reactions to Religious 
Symbols," ra, XVIII (July-August, 1958), 201.
85Kenneth L. Patton, "Religion Without God," TH, VII (June, 1947), l6. ~
86Hickards, "What Does the World Need: More Chris­
tianity or More Humanism?" Tape Recording Library.-
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the final analysis, only the "unreasoning can escape agnosti­
cism, What a dilemma the intelligent and honest contempo­
rary is "up against" when asked to believe
that Jesus who walked in Palestine was the miraculously 
begotten Son of God, sent to the earth to shed His blood; 
that those who are able to take advantage of the divine 
sacrifice may wash away the inherent sinfulness of their 
human nature, a sinfulness which natural man can do 
nothing to eradicate or even to di m i n ish?88
A series of Christian myths have been built around a simple 
story: "A Jewish carpenter-teacher became involved with the
Roman government of Judea, and accused of treason, wag cruci­
fied."^9 The religionist confuses literal and symbolic 
truths, especially when he tells his children Biblical stories 
as if they were completely factual. The religionist may some­
times admit that the whale did not swallow Jonah and that the 
story is a symbolic representation of Jonah's despair for 
having disobeyed God; however, that same Christian is slow to 
take the next logical step and admit that the idea of a God 
is only a symbolic representation of faith in brotherhood and 
order in the universe.90
There is a refrain, a theme, an undercurrent running 
through Humanism's appeal to common sense and reason,
87Alfred W, Hobart, "A Significant Distinction," TNH. 
I, No, 9 (1928), 3.
SSMax Otto, "In Defense of Secularism," TH, XII 
(January-February, 1952), 19,
89Harold Scott, "Humanist Students and Biblical 
Study," TH, III (Summer, 19^3), 77.
90Rapoport, ra, XVI, 63-64,
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Explicitly or implicitly, the H'-umanist argues: Hc’.v can any
thinking person who is wil.iing to apply reason accept the ab­
surd beliefs of orthodox rellsclon? The basic argumentative 
structure does not differ markedly from thaï discussed in the 
foregoing sections.
Orthodox religious claims 
are not reasonable; they 
conflict with common sense. 
They appear incredible. Therefore, they are false,
Only that which appeals to 
reason can be true. That 
which conflicts with the con­
crete and testable, or which 
cannot be empirically explained 
must be judged as untrue.
Although such appeals may be less significant than the reli­
ance on science and the scientific method, they do play a 
part in the Humanist's efforts to refute existing religious 
beliefs.
Evils Inherent in the Christian Religion 
The Humanist, satisfied that a beleaguered orthodoxy 
can no longer defend the veracity of its tenets, moves the 
invasion to a new front. The battle here is not based upon 
the validity of religious claims, but rather is grounded 
upon the charge that traditional religion results in evil 
consequences for the individual and society. As in the pre­
ceding section, many of the arguments here noted may be found 
in the works of earlier critics of religion.
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Humanists have presented four indictments of tradition­
al religion, criticizing it (1) as narrow, absolutist, and 
intellectually detrimental, (2) as anti-social and intoler­
ant, (3) as indifferent, irresponsible, and (4-) as containing 
other ethical and moral weaknesses.
Narrow, Absolutist, and Intellectually 
Detrimental
Humanism's abjuration of absolutism in any form has 
already been noted in several connections. Absolutism is 
argued against, also, for its inherent harm to the individual 
and society. Professor Bissell, for example, in a stem re­
buke of orthodoxy writes:
For the tragedy of mankind has not been written by the 
searchers for the final answer, but by those who have 
found it. No man can hate his brother for doubting what 
he himself could still question. No Columbus who knows 
what lies beyond the horizon ventures forth to find a new world.91
Absolutism, he is saying, restricts and limits man.
Wilson objects on much the same basis when he de­
scribes organized religion as a
group of men obtaining absolute power over the thoughts 
and loyalities of large numbers of citizens in the name 
of a revelation that is spurious and on the basis of 
that 'revelation* upholding an anti-democratic absolut­
ism and demanding the right to determine our socialpolicies.92
9lBissell, ra, X, 262.
92Edwin H. Wilson, "The Sectarian Battlefront," TH, X 
(March-April, 1950), 88.
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Wilson objects to the power over thought held by orthodoxy, 
and calls it "anti-democratic."93
Priscilla Robertson describes the religionist as an 
"authoritarian personality" ?Aio demands that everything be 
simple and right or wrong, while the world is not so con­
structed. She argues the importance of an open mind and 
learning to live with uncertainty.9^
A. D. Black laments the dogma and "set creeds that
claim authority and finality." Such, he insists,
constrict man’s minds within a narrow rigid framework, 
whereas it is our sense that man's spiritual nature 
requires openness and freedom and stimulation to doubt 
and explore, to think and work out and grow,95
He further states that religion’s emphasis on absolute truth 
and authority result in a "rigidity and an exclusiveness and 
a fanaticism that is in itself a violation of the spiritual 
needs of man."96 Black castigates orthodoxy on the same basis 
as does Robertson in the foregoing paragraph. They both be­
lieve that traditional religious authority places damaging 
restrictions upon the mind.
93This attack is significant in that Chapter VI dis­
cusses Humanism’s attempt to identify with the "democratic."
9^riscilla Robertson, "On a Scientific Standard of 
Personal Ethics," TH, XVI (September-October, 1956), 223.
Q<Algernon D. Black, "Can Humanism Meet Han’s Spir­
itual Need?" ra, XIX (July-August, 1959), 197.
P^ibid.. 198.
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Dr. Brock Chisholm refers to a common conception of
faith as something not to be thought about or questioned, for
that might lead to doubt and therefore sin. He calls this
conception harmful and elaborates by saying that
it is the setting up of concepts in a child's mind that 
he is not supposed to question and that will persist 
into adulthood, that does the damage. There are many 
sound attitudes in' some of the most theocratic and abso­
lute religions, but they are nevertheless damaging be­
cause they are absolutistic, because they mustn't be 
thought about, because their validity must not be ques­
tioned. It is the threat against any questioning, the 
opposition to individual, independent thinking that makes trouble.97
Chisholm has thus spelled out the harm of absolute authority 
in greater specificity than earlier quotations. He sees the 
harm as being most severe with regard to children whose minds 
can be more completely conditioned.
Hapoport points to the inadequacy of "the religious 
view" as being primarily its "insistence on 'closure.'" He
charges that the religionist must carry his thinking to a
point where he can "put a period and think no more." That 
period, he continues, is "unrealistic," and can be "disas­
trous" if placed too early. Wendt refers to the same danger
as that of having "one's innate curiosity satisfied by the 
authority of others" and of accepting "half-knowledge and 
tradition."99
97Chisholm, ra, XVI, 293.
98Bapoport, ra, XVI, 66.
99Gerald Wendt, "The Right to Understand," TH, XIII
(January-February,. 1953)» 20.
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The point is made more concrete hy Wilson who carries 
his disapproval of absolute authority in the church to some 
specific doctrines of the Catholic Church. He singles out 
the church’s opposition to birth control, to marriages be­
tween people of different religions, and to divorce. He is 
particularly critical of any institution which would not 
leave a child free to choose its own religion upon maturity, 
and adds: "We hold that where the religious liberties of un­
born generations are signed away before a marriage transpires, 
such persons never know religious liberty."100 Like Chisholm, 
Wilson objects to the indoctrination of a child, and espe­
cially the manner in which the Catholic Church demands a 
pledge regarding the future of its children. Wilson’s other 
criticisms are also based squarely upon his opposition to the 
authority of the church.
In such fashion, then, do the Humanists find harm in 
orthodox religion’s absolutism and narrowness.
Anti-Social and Intolerant
Humanists have persistently charged organized reli­
gion with being cruel and intolerant, with allowing practice 
to fall far behind preaching.
C. J. Herrick, for example, says that religious faith 
is at best "meaningless verbiage" and at worst a "pernicious
lOOfidwln H. Wilson. "The Sectarian Battlefront," TH,XV (January-February, 1955), 34.
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Ideology with a fruitage of bigotry, intolerance and persecu­
tion."^®^ But Bissell best typifies the Humanist attack by 
saying that the "fruitless battle of the sects has long since 
told its bitter and bloody tale." He adds that "a thousand 
centuries of fears and forebodings, of priests and prayers 
and persecutions hare broùght us only to the inscrutable 
stars and the silent mountains."1®% He furtljer describes the 
"bloody" history of the Christian Church, and says that all 
revealed religions are "frauds" and tell the same story.1®3 
Bissell, then, would insist that the blood shed in the name 
of Christianity condemns the church as a failure, that the 
results of Christianity have been harmful, rather than help­
ful.
Bissell's precise point is echoed by three other Hu­
manists. First, Professor James Jarrett speaks of the "fact 
of the cruelty and violence promulgated by churches in all 
ages."^®^ Rev. Kenneth Patton points out that the theists 
have been in the majority for thousands of years with no 
"adequacy" of brotherly love exhibited among them. He speaks 
of the brutal crimes "committed in the name of the loving God
l®lc. Judson Herrick, "The Creed of Humanism," TH,
XIV (September-October, 1954), 216.
l®2Bissell, TH, X, 266.
l®3Malcolm Bissell, "Humanist Progress," ra, IX 
(Summer, 1949)» 103.
l®4james L. Jarrett, "Must Religious Humanism Be 
Thin?" TH, X (May-June, 1950), 108.
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of Jesus."I05 And Haydon, writing at the close of World War 
II, describes the horrible suffering of the War and calls the 
world situation "the most terrible indictment that has ever 
been brought against the religious leadership of the last 
hundred years." He points out that over all the earth are 
"churches, temples, mosques, synagogues, pagodas, shrines-- 
and yet this tragedy."1®^ Haydon*s point differs somewhat 
from the others in that he is not talking about the history 
of "religious wars," instead he is condemning organized reli­
gion as a trtiole for not having prevented a specific "political" 
w^r.
Intolerance is another orthodox evil to vAiich Human­
ists point; They accuse Christianity of racial and religious 
bigotry. Wilson begins by saying that the causes of anti- 
Semitism are "inherent in Christian doctrine." He adds that 
he believes many men are better than their creeds and ignore 
the Christian doctrine to "return to the creed of Jesus, 
iriiere anti-Semitism was not to be found."107 Nevertheless, 
he argues that the evil of intolerance is inherent in Chris­
tianity.
Anti-Semitism, as a charge against Christianity, was 
105patton, ra, VII, 12.
10&A. Eustace Haydon, "Churches, Synagogues— And Yet 
Tragedy," ra, V (Summer, 19^5)» 53»
107Edwin H. Wilson, "Anti-Semitism: A Political
Weapon in Clerical Hands," ra, IV (Autumn, 1944), 112.
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most frequently advanced by Humanists during and immediately 
following World War II. For instance, one author entitled 
his article "No Security for the Jew in Christendom."108 
Another author accuses Christianity of persistent indoctrina­
tion of its members toward a belief in Christian superiority 
and Jewish inferiority, thereby laying a foundation for anti- 
Semitism. ̂ 09 still another writer asserts that the Roman 
Catholic hierarchy has given tacit approval to several frank 
cases of anti-Semitism.HO
Humanists thus argue that Christianity has failed 
because its followers have perpetrated cruelty in the name 
of the church and have been guilty of intolerance against 
minority groups, especially against the Jew.
Indifferent and Irresponsible
Humanists, with their concern for solving the social 
problems of the day, are highly critical of Christianity for 
not involving itself deeply enough in those problems. Melvin 
Rader raises the common cry when he chides those well-fed 
people talking of love, irtiile ignoring others* hunger; and 
those who cry for peace without fighting to "create and
^®8paul Eldridge, "No Security for the Jew in Chris­
tendom," ra, VI (Winter, 1946), 157.
109Karl W. Chworowsky, "Is Protestantism Anti-Semitic?" 
TH, IV (Autumn, 1944), 97.
HOj, j, Murphy, "Catholic Antj,-Semitism, " TH, IV 
(Autumn, 1944), IO3.
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organize peace."HI Most importantly, he argues that even
when religion is concerned with injustice, it operates under
the "illusion" that things can be corrected through "mental
fiat," that ends may be discussed while means are neglected.
He is arguing that something inherent in religion?s view of
the world makes it ineffective in correcting the ills of
society. Gordon Kent makes the same general point this way:
Traditional religion shorts the circuit and kills the 
potential of human energy. It relies on God to do for 
man what man alone can do for himself. The spur of ef­
fort is responsibility.113
Kent argues that the belief in God inherently obstructs man’s
social action.
Another Humanist criticizes the notion that God 
"calls" people to certain tasks and locations and states that 
"there are few Fosdicks in the slums." He asks, "Why is God 
made to be the master of immobility?"H^ Harry Ruja feels 
that Christians get so involved in the compensations "of the 
next world" that they overlook the possibilities of this 
one.115 Jarrett insists that organized religion tends to 
divert more and more time away from ethics "to ritual and
lllMelvin Rader, "World Community and a World Con­
science," ra, III (Autumn, 19^3)» 109.
llZlbid.. 110.
113Gordon Kent, "Humanism by the Millions," TH, III (Summer, 1943), $5.
Il4pi.ed I. Caims, "Light Breaks Through," TH, VII 
(Summer, 1947), 26.
ll5Ruja, TH, VII, 126.
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ceremonial observance of r u l e s . T h e s e  three men are say­
ing that the primal emphasis of religion is not where it 
should be, that supematuralism, immortality, and ritual are 
all obstacles to social progress and action.
Floyd says that traditional religion and neo-ortho- 
dozy insist on man's "helplessness" and make him dependent 
upon supernatural guidance. And E. C. Lindeman succinctly
expresses his regret that some people he had known "had 
found God, but in their search had somehow lost Man.
This criticism of Christianity's indifference toward man is 
best epitomized by Wilson and Auer. Wilson accuses religion 
of "robbing man to pay theology."119 Auer calls it "emptying 
the house of man in order to enlarge H e a v e n . "120
Humanists, then, consider orthodoxy inherently inef­
fective, even irresponsible and indifferent, with regard to 
the social problems of the day.
Other Ethical and Moral Weaknesses
Humanism's final attack on the evils of religion
llGjarrett, ra, X, 108.
117pioyd, TH, II, 3.
ll®Eduard C. Lindeman, "Ethics of a Life," TH, VIII 
(Autumn, 1948), 118.
119Edwin Wilson, "Render Unto Man the Things That Are 
Man's," TH, X (September-October, 1950), 232.
120j, A. 0. Fagginer Auer, "Religion as the Integra­
tion of Human Life," ra, VII (Spring, W ? ) ,  159.
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focuses on the whole ethical and moral structure of Chris­
tianity. Professor M. A. Larson condemns Christianity*s at­
tempts to influence ethical behavior through the use of fear 
of eternal punishment. This, he says, "does not work," and 
he points to the hundreds of millions of God-fearing men who 
have lived lives of wickedness, whereas many who have not 
feared or believed in God have lived highly moral lives.
Larson notes that the key to the system is that any religion 
idiich uses rewards and punishment gained through creeds, 
rituals, atonements, sacrifices, etc., rests upon the assump­
tion that "god is corruptible and that his favors can be pur­
chased through appeasement." He elaborates by discussing 
the inequalities of the system and compares the repentent man 
on the scaffold who is "saved" and the lifelong noble man who 
is condemned. The only way immortality could work effectively, 
he continues, is for rewards for an ethical life to be equal 
and just, and to remove the "purchasing" of God*s f a v o r s . 121 
Larson does not argue the invalidity of the idea of immortal­
ity, but rather he is attacking its efficacy as a moral and 
ethical foundation.
Dr. Budolf Dreikurs also objects to the principle of 
rewards and punishment. He condemns the idea of fear 'tdiich 
surrounds sin and he writes that as society becomes more demo­
cratic and men are recognized as equals rather than superior
12lMartin A. Larson, "Christian and Humanist Ethics," 
ra, XX (March-April, I96O), 99.
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and subordinate, sin will lose its effectiveness as a social 
syiabol.l^^ Dreikurs rejects the whole foundation of the 
Christian ethical system as inherently weak.
J. P. Warbasse says that the church has failed in its 
ethical quest, and people should come to do good deeds because 
the deeds themselves have merit and because those good deeds 
are a road to happiness. By the religionist’s standards, he 
argues, to try for complete happiness here and now is con­
sidered selfish, but to try for bliss in another world is 
considered " g l o r i o u s . "1^3
Wilson states that "those who rule in the name of 
God" are more loyal to theocracy than they are to democracy. 
The church, he writes, opposes humanistic ideas and democracy 
because their chief aim is "to glorify God"; this means that 
the "moral measure" becomes the advancement of the church.124 
In Wilson’s mind the entire Christian moral and ethical focus 
is misplaced; he finds the church and God to be the wrong 
standards.
Finally, in a discussion of a new basis for ethics, 
Kuenzli writes that the tragedy of churches is that "they have 
not been able to give persons very satisfactory moral guidance,
IZ^Eudolf Dreikurs, "Humanism— A Philosophy for Daily 
Living, ra, X (July-August, 1950), l6?.
123james Peter Warbasse, "The Selfish Way to Happi­
ness," ra, XI (October-November, 1951)» 215.
124Edwin H. Wilson, "The Sectarian Battlefront," TH,
XI (November-December, 1951), 283.
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especially on some of the larger questions of the day. He 
points out that the churches are "notoriously divided" on 
ethical and moral questions; that theatre going, birth con­
trol, square dancing, etc., "will send you to hell in some 
of the churches but not in others."125 Kuenzli’s point, like 
that of other Humanists, is simply that the churches have 
failed in the area of ethical and moral guidance; and they 
have failed because the fundamental structure of their empha­
sis is wrong.
Evaluation of the Humanist's 
Argumentative Pattern
An inescapable observation concerning the Humanist's 
pattern of refutation is that he is a child of the nineteenth- 
century iconoclastic tradition; to a measurable degree, the 
discourse of this chapter is colored and structured by the 
Humanist's zeal to "crush" his ideological opponent--orthodox 
Christianity. As a result, some rather definite argumenta­
tive "deficiencies" emerge.
First of all, a number of prominent Humanists tend 
to express themselves or argue in language which could only 
be called "absolutistic" or "dogmatic." In significant num­
bers, Humanists "close the book" on such complex theological 
questions as the existence of God, the possibility of immor­
tality, the existence of a soul, and the validity of
^^^Alfred E. Kuenzli, "An Objective Basis for 
Ethics," ra, XX (May-June, 196O), 155.
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revelation. Such an Inclination is particularly conspicu­
ous since Humanists constantly chide traditional religion 
for that very propensity. "Dogmatism" among the Humanists 
would be well represented by Harold Scott and Corliss Lamont, 
although they are in no sense isolated examples.
A related weakness is the Humanist tendency to claim 
that the evidence "proves" more than it does in fact prove. 
This proclivity to overstate claims is particularly evident 
in the movement's use of science and the scientific method 
as supports. The assertion is often made that "scientific 
truth" proves an anti-religious claim; doubtless, scientific 
scholarship would frequently find concurrence difficult.
Another major weakness within the Humanist pattern of 
argument is the tendency to consider all Christianity to be 
orthodox or fundamental, thus ignoring the totality of lib­
eral Christianity. Many of Humanism's strongest criticisms 
only fit a small segment of modem Christianity. One Human­
ist admits that he himself has been accused of "beating a 
dead horse," meaning that he was criticizing aspects of reli­
gion which no longer existed. This particular Humanist denied 
the charge, but not altogether convincingly.
One must also consider that most Humanist arguments 
rest on the assumption that all theological matters are best 
settled through the application of science and the scientific 
method. While making such an assumption is certainly not
1 3̂
wrong per se« reasonable rhetorical practice would call for 
the advocate more clearly to ”spell out” and support the as­
sumption, or, indeed, to admit at least that the position in­
volves an assumption.
That the primary reading and listening audience for 
the Humanist advocate is in general agreement with the move­
ment * s ideology and makes the foregoing assumption about the 
world is no doubt true. Thus, rhetorical caution is not de­
manded by the Humanist audience; nevertheless, one wonders 
if the nature of the audience affords sufficient justifica­
tion for argumentative carelessness.
One might also wonder why Humanists persist in at­
tacking traditional religion, especially before Humanist 
audiences who already recognize orthodoxy's weaknesses. To 
say that the Humanist is really writing in an effort to "con­
vert” the non-Humanist who may "overhear" is an unsatisfac­
tory explanation. Perhaps a better answer is that social 
movements unite around a disapproval of the status quo; thus, 
the movement of Humanism "stays alive” or maintains purpose 
and direction by persistently condemning orthodoxy— whether 
it be a "dead horse” or not. In achieving that purpose the 
refutative arguments analyzed in this chapter appear rhetori­
cally effective.
CHAPTER VI
IDENTIFICATION WITH COMMONLY 
ACCEPTED IDEALS
The final argumentative pattern to be considered In­
volves the Humanist's efforts to Justify his Ideology by 
Identifying It with a number of broad human Ideals, Ideals 
which have probably achieved nearly universal acceptance In 
Western culture. Neither the nature nor the structure of the 
general argumentative design employed differs markedly from 
that of the earlier discussed defensive pattern of Identifi­
cation. 1
This chapter will examine Humanism's Identification 
with the following Ideals; (1) democracy and the democratic 
way; (2) the good life, human happiness, and human fulfill­
ment; (3) peace, security, a progressive and advancing social 
order; (4) open-mindedness, fairness, tolerance for all 
people and views; and (5) the religious. Admittedly, such 
Ideals are generalized and at points appear to merge, but 
they are discrete enough for separate examination.
Ostensibly, Humanist's Identification with commonly
^Identification with science and the scientific 
method, discussed In Chapter IV.
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accepted human ideals would serve to narrow the Humanlst- 
Christian area of disagreement by establishing some degree 
of "common ground" between the two camps; however, the con­
verse has been the result. The reason lies with the extent 
to which Humanists have chosen to accentuate the ideals.%
The conflict between Humanism and traditional Christianity 
is further heightened by the Humanist's overt tendency to 
describe specific ideals as if they were somehow in contra­
diction to Christianity. But the pattern of identification 
considered in this chapter is primarily a defensive one in 
which Humanists are seeking a justification for their ideol­
ogy, rather than a condemnation of their opposition.
Democracy and the Democratic Way
Humanist discourse throughout the history of the 
movement has been interspersed with references to "democracy"
and the "democratic way." Spokesmen for Humanism have sought 
to link their ideology with these highly abstract concepts.
pAs the Humanist emphasizes certain human ideals such 
as human happiness, human fulfillment, etc., the ideological 
result is an anthropocentric view of life which is inimical 
to traditional Christianity.
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perhaps "because of the aura of '’rightness” which has so long 
surrounded them,3 but whatever the reasons, it is clear that 
Humanists have characterized their ideology as democratic.
That no precise meanings may be found for democracy 
and the democratic way is obvious, but Humanist usage of the 
two abstractions has produced some loose definitions. Some 
Humanists, for example, seem to equate the democratic directly 
with the scientific, where all ideas are treated "equally” 
through testing and examination. Others appear to make the 
definition of democracy pivot on the distinction between 
authoritarianism and "freedom.” Still other Humanists would 
prefer to think of democracy and the democratic way as sym­
bols of a view of man. At any rate, Humsuiists do
not necessarily use the words to refer to a specific political 
or economic ideology or system.
The argumentative pattern of identification has been 
accomplished by (1 ) calling for an extension of a democratic 
world, (2) contrasting Humanism as a democratic religion with
3There are probably a number of reasons why democ­
racy has been given a prominent place in Humanist discourse. 
One reason may have been to answer the critics of Humanism 
who have sometimes labeled the movement as "un-American" and 
"unpatriotic." Such charges may have arisen because of the 
Humanist’s heterodox religious views, or perhaps because of 
his long-standing discontent with certain aspects of the 
economic system of capitalism. For the latter, see propo­
sition fourteen of the Humanist Manifesto (Appendix I).
Another possible reason for Humanism's endorsement of democ­
racy may be the "anti-authoritarianism" connoted by the con­
cept.
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the so-called anti-democratic religions, and (3) by charac­
terizing Humanism as the epitome of democracy. These three 
positions are indeed highly generalized, and, partly for 
that reason, sometimes overlap.
The first endeavor to link Humanism with democracy 
is summarized in the assertion that Humanism, after all, is 
only seeking to extend democracy to all mankind. Democracy 
in this sense seems to refer either to man’s freedom to work 
out his own destiny, unhampered by any form of authoritarian­
ism, or to the establishment of effective methods of investi­
gation allowing for the collective resolution of all public 
problems. The preamble to the constitution of the first Hu­
manist fellowship, for instance, includes this indicative 
statement: "We conceive our task, in the broadest sense, to
be the promotion of cultural d e m o c r a c y . "4 Apparently, the 
authors of this early constitution were using "cultural 
democracy" to refer to a spirit of fair play and free in­
quiry extended to the widest areas of human life. What is 
important with regard to the pattern of identification, how­
ever, is that the word democracy was chosen as a focal point.
Corliss Lamont describes a major tenet of Humanism 
as being a "far-reaching social program," which involves the 
establishment throughout the world of "peace and democracy on
^"Preamble to the Constitution of the Humanist Fel­
lowship," I, No. 2 (1928), 4.
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the foundation of a cooperative economic order, both national
and i n t e r n a t i o n a l . "5 Lamont writes i few years later that
the best way to summarize the social and economic aims 
of Humanism is to say that this philosophy supports the 
widest possible extension of democracy to all aspects 
of human living.6
Lamont thus argues that a major Humanist goal is the exten­
sion of democracy to "all" aspects of human life; by "all" he 
means such areas as religion, social problems, and any other 
phase of human concern. He is here using the democratic 
nearly as a synonym for the scientific, and is actually 
calling for an extension of the application of science into 
wider human areas.
fludolf Dreikurs, in describing aspects of "the next 
great religion" (his description is of tomorrow's Humanism), 
sees democracy as an integral part of such a religion. He 
writes that
the interests of society are preserved by its religious 
concepts; the democratic society will develop religious 
concepts which guarantee the democratic process for the 
benefit of all.7
Dreilcurs finds an inherent relationship between democracy and
the ideal religion, and suggests that the more democratic
5Corliss Lamont, "The Meaning of Humanism," TH, II (Summer, 1942), 42.
^Corliss Lamont, "Humanism and Democracy," TH, VII 
(Summer, 1947), 1.
7Rudolf Dreikurs, "The Religion of Democracy, Part 
II; Aspects of the Njxt Great Religion," TH, XV (November- 
December, 1955)» 26?.
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society becomes, the more democratic (and Humanistic) reli­
gion will become. By rather direct implication he insists 
that the ideal future religion will be a Humanism merged with 
democracy. Such a pattern of argument is not atypical of the 
movement, for Humanists frequently argue that they are the 
"true" promoters of the democratic society.
Secondly, Humanist leaders attempt to identify their 
movement with the democratic by contrasting a democratic 
Humanism with an authoritarian Christianity.® What Humanist 
groups have in common, writes William Floyd, is that they are 
"right-minded people who believe in the democracy of man on 
earth rather than the kingdom of God in heaven."9 A belief 
in "the democracy of man," says Floyd, sets the Humanist apart 
from the religionist. The validity of such a oharge is dubious 
at best; nevertheless, Floyd is following the pattern of as­
sociating a belief in Humanism with a belief in democracy.
Dreikurs writes that the "democratic religion will 
oppose such C authoritarianism, supernaturalism, and any 
attempts to suppress disagreement] as the Christian religion 
opposes the devil."10 Like Floyd, Dreikurs is contrasting
^Discussions of the scientific method appearing in 
Chapters IV and V are related to and illustrative of this 
method of identification.
9william Floyd, "Inquiry: Is Humanism a Religion?
Part V: Ethical Humanism Is a Better Characterization," TH,
II (Autumn, 1942), 109.
lODreikurs, ra, XV, 26?.
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the democratic Humanist philosophy with an inherent authori­
tarianism in traditional religion. In other words, democracy 
is an integral part of Humanism but is antithetical to Chris­
tianity.
The third method of identification involves a loose 
association of Humanism with democracy and the democratic 
in such a way that Humanism appears to be the embodiment of 
the democratic. For example, A. E. Haydon writes that Human­
ism is "the philosophy of democracy and science, inclusive 
of all phases of culture and wide as the world."11 He adds 
that among other things Humanism is "consecrated" to a 
"democratic fellowship of all m a n k i n d . A n d  Read Bain ar­
gues simply that Humanism is "consistent" with d e m o c r a c y .
Both men are arguing that Humanism is democratic and symbol­
izes democracy. Of further significance is Hayden's connect­
ing of "science and democracy," for it is the essential char­
acter of both with which he hopes to identify Humanism. As 
mentioned earlier, the scientific and the democratic are not 
very distinct as they are referred to by Humanists.
The same pattern was revealed in 19^3 when Edwin 
Wilson called together a number of liberal religionists,
llA. Eustace Haydon, "Humanism," TH, VI (Autumn,
1946), 54. —
IZlbid.. 57.
13Read Bain, "Basic Religion: Man Creating Himself,"
TH, X" (July-August, 1950), 159.
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primarily Humanists, for a conference with the revealing 
title "Conference on the Scientific Spirit and Democratic 
Faith." The conference discussions were focused on the rela­
tionship of the scientific religion to democracy, and the 
group predictably concluded that the scientific approach to 
religion was the very essence of democracy.1^ Van Meter 
Ames epitomizes the pattern when he says that "in our country 
science has strengthened democracy and democracy with science 
gives Humanism a chance. Give Humanism a chance and the 
world has a chance."15 These two Instances illustrate hew 
Humanists are able to tie science, democracy, and Humanism 
together so closely that the three appear to merge.1&
The Good Life. Human Happiness, 
and Human Fulfillment
Humanists next lay claim to and "ovjnership" of the 
search for human happiness, the belief in good will, and the 
desire for the fullest possible development of human person­
ality. This anthropocentric foundation may not be a univer­
sally accepted ideal, especially with the degree of emphasis 
Humanists give it; on the other hand, no religious group
l^E. Burdette Backus, "Science and Democracy," TH,
III (Summer, 1943), 79.
15van Meter Ames, "Humanism for 1951»" TH, XI 
(January-February, 1951)» 4.
l6of course, the identification of science with Human­
ism was discussed in Chapter IV. The patterns involved are 
not essentially different.
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would likely oppose directly "human happiness" or its corol-
Humanists try to identify rhetorically their movement 
with the good life by labeling the search for happiness as 
the true goal of man (either a goal which exists or should 
exist); and then by picturing Humanism as the most concerned 
and best able to meet that challenge. Humauiists would not 
likely assert that theirs is the only philosophy with such an 
ideal, but their argument leaves the impression that Humanism 
is the most devoted or most energetic spokesman for such high 
human aspirations. Humanists go further in claiming that 
that aspect of Christianity which is dedicated to the good 
life on earth is, in fact, humanistic and already a major 
part of the foundation of Humanism.'
The goal of man, writes A. D. Pick, is the "complete 
realization of the highest possibilities of every individual 
personality," and that growth potential can be "limitless."1? 
And Hector Hawton describes the goal of Humanism as being "a 
sane and ordered society in which men can realize to the full 
the rich potentialities of their nature."18 Likewise, Wilson, 
in defending the position that Humanism is more than a
l?Arthur D. Pick, "Inquiry: Is Humanism a Religion?
Part III: It Depends on the Definition," TH, II (Autumn,1942), 107.
l^Hector Hawton, "Humanism: The Third Way," XI
(November-December, 1951)» 268.
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philosophy, writes that the movement goes beyond a rejection 
of supematuralism and moves into a "devotion to the good 
life as the mark of the religious."19 These three men are 
certainly ascribing as a characteristic attribute of their 
movement the search for broad human happiness. While they 
are not contending that their goal is unique, they are also 
not acknowledging that they are, in fact, Joining with mil­
lions of others from a myriad of philosophies and religions, 
including Christianity.
Quite significantly, Professor Paul Kinney refers to 
Humanism as the "inclusive term for all boosters of human 
happiness. Let us unite," he continues, "in building a hu­
manist world."20 In so doing, Kinney requests that "boosters 
of human happiness" should be renamed Humanists, for that is 
supposedly what Humanism symbolizes.
"Strip" Humanism of its "embellishment," writes John 
Dietrich, and its aim is simply "to make the world a place 
which is conducive to the living of a worthy human life, and 
then help men in every possible way to live such lives."21 
The same idea is expressed by A. E. Haydon when he says that
19Edwin H. Wilson, "Humanism: A Philosophy or a
Religion?" book review of Humanism as a Philosophy, by Corliss Lamont, TH, IX (July, 1949), 90.
20paul Kinney, "Humanism Is Inclusive," TH, VIII 
(November, 1948), 150.
21John Dietrich, "What Is Humanism?" TNH, VI, No. 2 
(1933), 6-7. ---
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Humani sm is much more than a philosophy of life; it is a 
“new orientation" pointing toward the "realization of the 
good life for all m e n . F u r t h e r ,  he writes that Humanism 
dares to believe that "good will backed by modem techniques, 
wisdom and resources can make the old religious dream take 
on the form of actuality." He adds that Humanism is "the 
tide of the future," that it is a "new cultural climate lur­
ing the multitudes to new hopes in all lands."^3 Dietrich 
and Haydon thus identify Humanism as the essence of the 
search for the good life. Apropos also is Haydon*s expres­
sion, "a new orientation," through which he, like Kinney, 
portrays Humanism as an attitude symbolic of "goodness." 
Indicative too, are Haydon*s optimistic statements regarding 
the future of man in a "new" Humanist world.
Two other leading Humanists continue the refrain tfith 
little alteration. The first writes that the time has come 
for the old religious concepts to be Replaced by a broad 
"reverence for the real universe, for the richness of life 
and for the dignity of m a n . T h e  phrase, "the dignity of 
man," indicatively permeates the writing and speaking of Hu­
manists almost as if it were a unique tenet of the movement.
22a . Eustace Haydon, "Inouiry; Is Humanism a Reli­
gion? Part I: Humanism Has Its World View, Techniaues and
Ideals," TH, II (Autumn, 1942), 104.
23lbid.. 105.
24oerald Wendt, "A Time for Ethical Humanism," TH,
XXI (September-October, 1961), 276.
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A second Humanist maintains that the goal of Humanism is "to 
foster, redirect, coordinate, and harmonize, science, reli­
gion, art, and all other human activities in the interest of 
more efficient and satisfying life of all mankind."^5 Again, 
the movement's identification with the good life is apparent.
Finally, some of the primary values of Christianity 
are directly claimed by Humanists. Professor Archie J, Bahn 
argues that the best of Christianity is epitomized in Human­
ism, that the "de-dogmatized" Christian is already a Humanist. 
Most importantly, he asserts that "Jesus himself was a great 
humantist."26 such an identification with Christian ideals 
is not an atypical Humanist appeal; indeed, for those Human­
ists cited above who picture Humani sm merely as a broad atti­
tude toward "goodness," praise for the leading Christian 
figure Jesus is quite in keeping with the rhetorical design 
involved.
Peace. Security, Progressive and 
Advancing Social Order
As a corollary to the above pattern of identification, 
the movement's spokesmen refer to a future Humanist world of 
peace and security, of an elevated world order achieved 
through a universal Humanist orientation. In essence, the
25c. Judson Herrick, "The Creed of Humanism," TH,
XIV (September-October, 1954), 219.
26Archie J. Bahn, "Humanism and Sect Membership," TH,
I (Summer, 1941), 55.
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Humanist contends that the "salvation" of the world pivots 
on the degree to which Humanism is embraced; or, at the very 
least, Humanists say that they are seeking a better world 
for all men.
Hamilton Pyfe typifies the pattern when he writes the 
following:
When the Humanist view prevails, the very idea of war 
will be outlawed. Anyone speaking of it even as a pos­
sibility will be put on the same level as a man who 
should discuss murdering members of his own family.2?
Opposition to war, according to Pyfe, is in actuality a unique
characteristic of Humanism, that other ideologies are less
likely to be so inherently opposed to war.
The pattern is continued by Hector Hawton when he 
describes Humanism as the "third way," and says that man does 
not have to be forced to choose between Christianity and 
Communism. He maintains that Humanism is a way out of the 
crisis, "the only way." He asserts that if Humanism were 
adopted and molded into a world federation, mankind might be 
guided "safely through this age of transition.28 Thus, the 
desire for world peace and harmony is again directly tied to 
Humanism.
Similarly, Oliver Reiser and Lloyd Morain emphasize 
the global orientation of Humanism and they speak repeatedly
2?Hamilton Pyfe, "Humanism as a World-Unifying 
Force," TH, XIII (January-Pebruary, 1953)» 18.
28Hawton, ra, XI, 268.
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about the Importance of men cooperating together to build a 
good society. They picture a "humanized" and "socialized" use 
of the scientific method making it possible to "guarantee 
peace and security to all m e n . "^9 Roy Wood Sellars also 
talks of a future improved through Humanism and suggests that 
Humanism has the possibility of providing "direction for hu­
man living which promises much for this distraught and bewil­
dered epoch."30
Attempts to identify Humanism with a secure and har­
monious world are both numerous and consistent. Wilson, for 
example, urges all regardless of belief who are going the 
same direction to "travel with us," the way to "fulfillment 
in creative living of free men in a harmonized world."31 
With a similar tone, the 195^ annual AHA appeal states that 
as Humanism becomes widely accepted "it can become a world- 
unifying faith, a common area of agreement around which many 
of our present problems can be s o l v e d . "32 Further, Professor 
Reiser says that the movement of Humanism may well become the
29Lloyd Morain and Oliver Reiser, "Scientific Human­
ism; A Formulation," ra. III (Spring, 194]), l6.
30Roy Wood Sellars, "Humanism as a Religion," TK, I (Spring, 1941), 8.
3lEdvrin H. Wilson, "Is Humanism Religious?" THE II (June, 1940), 3.
32«Three Adjectives and a Shrug Are Not Enough; An 
Annual Appeal and Progress Renort," TH, XIV (Karch-April, 
1954), 76. ' ~
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"spear-head of the advancing frontier of intellectual and 
social progress,"33 Professor Martin Larson expresses the 
idea by saying that a "general social elevation can be 
achieved through the cultivation of a Humanist conscience, 
especially in the young."3^ Finally, R. W. Sellars talks of 
a transition toward Human!sm which means that people’s at­
titudes will be altered as they are "conditioned differently 
toward life," The hope of Humanism, he says, is that "the 
society of the future will be healthier in mind and body, 
better adjusted to life as it is,"35
These few Humanist statements should suffice to ex­
emplify the movement’s pattern of identification vdth the 
values inherent in a peaceful and harmonious world, axrad­
vanced and progressive social order, and a happy and satis­
fied mankind. The various Humanists so closely identify the 
movement with those values that an aura of peacefulness and 
harmony seems to surround Humanism.
Open-Mindedness. Fairness, Tolerance 
for All People and Views
That Humsuiists oppose rigid creeds and consider their 
ideology creedless has already been mentioned. Indeed, it
33oiiver Reiser, "Humanism and Creative Morality," 
TNH. VI, No, 4 (1933), 12,
3%artin A, Larson, "Christian and Humanist Ethics," 
TH, XX (March-April, I960), 101,
35Roy Wood Sellars, "Religious Humanism," TNH. VI,
No, 3 (1933), 9.
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is not uncommon for a Huçianist spealcer or writer to preface 
his statements with "since Humanism has no creed, I speak 
only for myself." At any rate, Humanism identifies with what 
is a commonly held value, namely, that an open mind is to be 
preferred to a closed mind, tolerance is superior to intol­
erance, flexibility is better than rigidity.
Haydon effectively epitomizes the pattern by stating 
that the Humanist can never be arrogant toward other views 
than his own, for he does not know all the answers; nor vri.ll 
he ever be dogmatic, because his is the more "poised and 
gentle spirit" of understanding and sympathy. He adds that 
the Humanist is also able to understand the "intolerance" of 
those who hold certain dogmas as "eternal truths."3^ Thus, 
Haydon argues that Humanism is not only free of dogma, but 
is understanding of those vriao are dogmatic.
Lamont writes that Humanism is never dogmatic and 
believes in questioning all ideas, including its ovm. He 
continues by saying that the Humanist view is always open to 
nevf facts and can never be "restricted to any final formula­
tion."37 Lament’s suggestion that Humanism will examine all 
facts and ideas is not markedly different from the movement's 
general identification vri.th the scientific method discussed
3^A. Eustace Haydon, "Humanism Has Faith in Man," TH. 
X (January-February, 195O), 2.
37Corliss Lamont, "Comments on the Humanist Mani­
festo," ra, XIII (May-June, 1953), 138.
l6o
in Chapter IV. At some points Humanists specifically refer 
to the scientific method*, however, at other points (those 
being discussed here), the expression is of a belief in a 
more general attitude of open inquiry.
Another example, which is almost tautological, may be 
found in C. J. Herrick's acceptance speech as Humanist of the 
Year. He states that wherever Humanists find resources for 
the enrichment of human life, "we" must use them "with under­
standing and tolerance for many beliefs and faiths that we 
ourselves do not share."38
Bahn furthers the pattern of identification when he 
writes that the sectarian claims that his way is the only 
way, while Humanism admits of "many ways." He adds that 
there are many ways to happiness and when the Humanist "ex­
cludes a way," he becomes a sectarian.39 And |pyfe protests 
that Humanism is not "a set of doctrines," for it has no 
articles of faith and does not call for allegiance."^0 
Finally, Dietrich continues the refrain by contending that 
the Humanist is in "no sense dogmatic" about his views and is 
always ready to alter them "the moment additional knowledge 
suggests such an alternation."^^
38c. Judson Herrick, "Humanism of Today and Tomor­
row," ra, XVI (May-June, 1956), 111.
39sahn, ra. I, 54.
4li
40pyfe, TH, XIII, 14.
-Dietrich, TNH, VI, No. 2, ?.
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Thus, Humanists portray their movement as the truly 
open-minded and tolerant ideology, setting it apart from other 
philosophies and^religions. That the movement is in fact 
often conspicuously dogmatic in its statements has already 
been demonstrated;^^ indeed, some Humanists approach the dog­
matic in their very denial of dogmatism. Nevertheless, the 
point is that Humanists do claim for themselves the fair and 
broad-minded attitude; they do so to the extent that humanistic 
and open-mindedness appear to blend together into one.
The Religious
The quintessence of the Humanist*s endeavor to iden­
tify with the commonly accepted ideal lies with his applica­
tion and adoption of the word "religious.” Ironically, while 
the word may be associated with the "good” and the "Just,” it 
is also firmly linked with the orthodox and supernatural op­
ponents of Humanism; nevertheless, Humanism very early chose 
to lay claim to the word and even to go so far as to call 
itself "Religious H u m a n i s m . ”^3 Perhaps the discovery of the 
word religious, in the sense in which the movement uses it, 
is a debt which Humanists will always owe to John Dewey.
it?See especially the first two sections of Chapter V.
^^That label was also used in the Humanist Manifesto. It must be remembered, however, that some Humanists still 
prefer "philosophic" or "philosophy" to "religious” and "religion." Corliss Lament is such an example.
^^Dewey was a signer of the Humanist Manifesto. He 
also was a member of the American Humanist Association during 
the last ten years of his life.
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For it was Dewey who called for a replacement of "religion" 
with the "religious," the religious being essentially a human­
istic attitude toward man and the universe— "the common faith 
of mankind."^5 The rhetoric of the movement is permeated 
with Dewey and his somewhat unusual use of the word religious.
Since earlier pages have already cited passages using 
"religious" in that broad sense, a few additional Humanist 
statements should suffice to make the point here. Sellars, 
for example, speaks of the "daring" to bring together two 
such "profoundly symbolic" words as "humanism and religion." 
The ultimate union which can and must come, he argues, will 
be when "religion will become humanistic and humanism reli­
gious."^^ And Rev. R. Lester Mondale asks what it is that 
Humanism can offer as against Christianity. He feels that 
Humanism can offer an "at-homeness" in the universe through 
a "flowering out of the self into its fullness," which means 
that Humanism ultimately should be entitled to "be called a 
religion in the fullest s e n s e . T h e  new generations of 
Humanists, he goes on to say, are finding their "very salva­
tion in just such a Humanism.Sellars and Mondale, then, 
quite easily blend religion and the religious into Humanism.
^5john Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 193^), p. 8?.
4&Sellars, TH, I, 5*
Lester Mondale, "The Second Generation Humanists," 
™ ,  V, No. 4 (1932), 7-8.
48lbid., 8.
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Rev. Harold P. Marley discusses the evolution of Hu­
manism to the status of religion and writes that all people 
vjill eventually leam that "to live well, to live harmoniously 
with others, and to be creative is indeed to be r e l i g i o u s ,"^9 
Several years earlier, he quite succinctly expressed the idea 
by contrasting those religionists who were attempting to 
"salvage god from religion" with those Humanists and other 
liberals who were trying to salvage "religion from god,"50 
Marley, in both cases, employs "religion" in the sense men­
tioned above. He clearly typifies the movement’s pattern of 
identification as he "borrows" from Christianity the "spirit 
of goodness," the religious attitude in its best sense, and 
then carefully fuses it into Humanism; to Marley, Humanism 
becomes that which was the best in Christianity.
Summary
Doubtless, Humanists would ooint to the ideals listed 
in this chapter; the dignity of man, brotherhood, democracy, 
happiness, tolerance, fairness, and peace as the religious 
or theological center of the movement. And the Humanist's 
abiding social concern tends to support his religious claims. 
The word "religious" is so tightly bound up with the movement
49Harold P. Marley, "When Humanism Becomes a Reli­
gion," TH, IV (Spring, 1944), 26,
SOHarold P, Marley, "Religion's Greatest Adventure," 
TNH, VIII, No, 6 (1935), 197.
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that likely an individual Humanist, who might not object to 
being called an "infidel," a "radical," or an "atheist," 
might strongly protest upon being called "irreligious.
Certainly the Humanist seeks to identify himself with 
many specific ideals such as truth, beauty, Justice, honor, 
love, and others. A final word, however, must be said re­
garding the anthropocentric propensities of the movement, a 
position which is inherent and evident, either explicitly or 
implicitly, throughout this chapter as well as previous chap­
ters. That man is the ideological heart of Humanism is ob­
vious, and the literature of the movement is replete with 
claims of the potential, the power, and the worth of man. As 
mentioned earlier, few ideologies, including orthodox Chris­
tianity, "oppose" man or deny his value and importance; thus, 
man is, in a broad sense, a universal good, a commonly ac­
cepted ideal. In identifying with man in the five senses 
considered in this chapter, the Humanist identifies ;fith a 
kind of superior innate value, a superordinate ideal commonly 
held. Of course, when "man becomes the measure" to the ex­
tent that he crowds out theological considerations such as 
theism and supematuralism, Christianity cannot be expected 
to concur. Nevertheless, the Humanist's simple refrain that man 
has value and that his well-being is a worthy goal represents 
an aspect of the rhetorical pattern of identification with 
that which is widely accepted.
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Apparently, the argvunentative pattern of identifica­
tion with human ideals does serve a function for the individ­
ual Humanist and provides him with a meaningful rationale 
for his ideology. Argumentatively, however. Humanism does 
seem to over-extend its ideological position; efforts to 
identify with so many ideals result in a Humanism (tradition­
ally very "exclusive”) seeking to become "all-inclusive.” 
Further, the defensive arguments often appear mechanical and 
contrived, almost as if Humanists were frenetically trying to 




Religious Humanism has grown out of a long-fermenting 
social, cultural, philosophic, and religious milieu. The 
nineteenth-century upheaval in American religious and intel­
lectual life, galvanized by the influx of European ideas, 
provided a foundation for the development of Humanism as a 
movement. Indeed, modem Humanism may properly be described 
as the culmination and embodiment of many ultra-liberal and 
heterodox philosophic and religious currents of the last half 
of the nineteenth century and the early part of the present 
century.
The prime target of the "new thought" of the nine­
teenth century seemed to be Christian Fundamentalism which 
most strongly resisted the intrusion of the new "radical" 
ideas. For a time the actual survival of orthodoxy was 
threatened, but a religious "adjustment" under the name of 
"Modernism" prevented any such organizational collapse. Mod­
ernism took many forms, but its principal effort to adjust 
centered on a shift in emphasis from the traditional goal 
of saving man’s soul to the modem goal of saving man him­
self, saving him from earthly suffering. The shift in
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emphasis was tantamount to a new "humanistic" morality and a 
general humanizing of the religious perspective. The new 
humanism was directly related to and accompanied by a strong 
scientific awareness and an abiding faith in human reason.
The organizational result of such ferment was, first 
of all, a new humanistic Christianity, sometimes referred to 
as the "Social Gospel" or in the broader sense mentioned 
above— Modernism. But a second aftermath of the nineteenth- 
century revolt was the emergence of movements, separate from 
institutional Christianity, which espoused a "pure" humanism, 
a humanism in which theology either played little or no part. 
Notable examples were Unitarianism, Free Religion, end Eth­
ical Culture. These three movements embraced the new interest 
in science and the new humanistic orientation vdthout reserva­
tion.
Twentieth-century organized Humanism grew directly 
out of such movements, and actually represented an effort 
to unite all the ultra-liberal humanistic thinkers; the re­
sult was that by the late 1920's modern Humanism was organ­
ized as a national association. That movement has continued 
to grow and today is a significant religious and philosophic 
ideology and has come to represent a true religious option 
for many in the twentieth century. This study has attempted 
to isolate and examine the argumentative patterns within the 
Humanist movement which have emerged out of more than thirty
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years of Hiamanlst writing and speakingH' The folloi/dng are the 
conclusions.
1. Communication has played a key role in the grovrbh 
and development of Humanism, Humanists have utilized a number 
of channels of communication, most of which have served dual 
purposes: (1) to communicate with and unite the scattered 
followers of the movement and (2) to "convert" outsiders to 
the new ideology. Seemingly, Humanist leaders have never 
fully agreed upon the extent to which each of these functions 
should be emphasized. Although this study has been concerned 
primarily with communication within the movement, there has 
been a full awareness of the evangelistic purpose which has 
sometimes conflicted with internal communication.
2. The most essential channels of communication em­
ployed by Humanists have been those which surround the organ­
izational structure itself and those which are established 
by the organization's publications. Throughout the history 
of the movement, communication among individual Humanists 
around the country has been carried on through a loose or­
ganizational structure composed of a national association 
representing the various local fellowships and chapters. The 
local groups have always enjoyed complete autonomy, sometimes 
complete independence, from the parent association. Indeed, 
the looseness of the organizational structure has probably 
hindered the general growth of Humanism; however, many of the
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followers of the Ideology originally become disenchanted with 
orthodox religion because of its rigid authoritarianism, and 
could not have been expected to settle for anything less than 
"independence,” The Humanist movement, nevertheless, has 
been moving toward a closer relationship between the national 
association and the local chapters. This trend is most no­
ticeable since 1950» and the rapid growth of Humanism since 
that date may in part be accounted for by the changing rela­
tionship.
One important organizational attempt to unite leader­
ship and membership more closely has been the recent estab­
lishment of annual regional conferences during which ideolog­
ical discussions are held, goals of the movement are restated, 
and other organizational problems considered. Clearly the 
annual conferences have proved to be the most successful or­
ganizational techniques yet discovered by Humanists for bind­
ing together their members.
The other major channel of communication has been the 
movement's publications. A journal published by the national 
association and put in the hands of each member has provided 
a vital link among individual Humanists. A constant ideolog­
ical dialogue has been carried on through the journal and at 
least a measure of interaction between membership and leader­
ship has been made possible; a degree of movement cohesiveness 
has thereby been established. That the journals have always
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served the dual purposes mentioned above seems not to have 
seriously handicapped their efficacy; indeed, Humanism likely 
could not have survived without such publications.
Other less important channels of communication have 
also been used by Humanists. For example, a membership bul­
letin dealing largely with organizational matters was begun a 
few years ago. Another recent communication innovation has 
been a tape recording library through which major Humanist 
addresses and discussions have been made available to the 
membership. In addition, evangelism has been carried on 
through such channels as a speaker's bureau which arranges 
Humanist lecture tours, general radio broadcast activity, and 
distribution of Humanist literature to non-Humanists.
The channels of communication within the Humanist 
movement have been diverse and have met with a measure of 
success. In general, they have served the goal of unifying 
the scattered individuals into a "we-oriented” movement and 
have kept the lines of communication relatively open. The 
national association has sharply increased and improved its 
communication activity in recent years, presumably recognizing 
more fully the value of communication.
3. An examination of the rhetoric within the Human­
ist movement, primarily that which appears in the journals, 
reveals that some* major argumentative patterns have emerged.
In a broad sense, there have been two patterns— defensive
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and offensive. Patterns of defense represent attempts to 
Justify or provide a rationale for the movement's existence 
and ideology; offensive patterns represent Humanism's rhetor­
ical condemnation of those aspects of the status quo which 
inltla&ly created the need for a separate movement.
4, Two argumentative patterns of defense have been 
employed by Humanists, both of which culminate in an over­
emphasis. The first defensive pattern centers on issues which 
have always been integral aspects of the Humanist Ideology. 
Humanists have sought to associate or identify their movement 
with science and the scientific method. They have gone beyond 
a simple inclusion of such concepts in their ideology and have 
attempted to make Humanism the embodiment of them. Humanist 
spokesmen for the movement have striven to interchange science 
and Humanism in such a way that Humanism becomes an extension 
of science; an observer is left with the impression that 
science is symbolized through Humanism, that the two are in­
separable. Likewise, the methodological impression left by 
the argumentative pattern is that in order to be scientific 
one must first be a Humanist, that to be a Humanist one must 
use a scientific epistemology, and that scientific and Human­
istic are actually synonymous adjectives.
In an extension of that argumentative design. Human­
ists have tried to identify their movement with a high stand­
ard of ethics and values. Building on their identification
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with and their praise of science and the scientific method, 
they have gone on to argue that the scientific approach to 
human behavior is the natural and superior one. Rhetorically, 
they have connected human morality with Humanism, so that 
moral behavior becomes, in fact, Humanistic behavior. Human­
ists have strongly emphasized the relation of science to human 
actions only during the past ten or fifteen years, a period 
in which science has become increasingly involved with ques­
tions of behavior.
Doubtless, this pattern of Identification seems nat­
ural and satisfying to individual Humanists, in part at least 
because of the aura of respectability which surrounds science 
and morality. However, the extent to which Humanists attempt 
to identify their ideology with such ideals somewhat distorts 
the meaning of the movement, and also results in the false 
impression that only the Humanists can really be considered 
scientific or moral.
The second broad pattern of rhetorical defense differs 
only slightly from the first. Humanists have tried to iden­
tify their ideology vriLth several other nearly universally 
accepted human ideals. These ideals, however, are less an 
integral part of Humanism than science and morality. The 
pattern has focused on efforts to associate the movement with 
abstract ideals such as democracy, the good life, brother­
hood, tolerance, world peace, and human happiness. Each
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Ideal has been portrayed as an Inherent characteristic of 
Humanism, sometimes even as a distinguishing attribute of the 
Ideology. The Ideals have been pictured as best symbolized 
In Humanism. Inevitably emerging out of this pattern of 
Identification (and to some extent from the previous pattern 
also), are the Humanist's Innate proclivities toward evan­
gelism, The rather direct rhetorical suggestion left by the 
pattern Is that for the^Ideals to be achieved Humanism must 
become a majority viewpoint. The Implication left Is that 
peace and happiness will only be obtained when the world be­
comes a Humanist world. Thus, the extent of the Identifica­
tion cannot be rhetorically justified. Further, the tendency 
to employ universal ideals as a means of contrasting Humanism 
with other ideologies does not seem warranted.
5. Humanism's rhetorical pattern of offense is per­
haps the most vital and significant pattern within the move­
ment; at the same time, it carries with it some major argu- 
mentative deficiencies. The Humanist rhetorical attack upon 
traditional religion might properly be called the sine qua 
non of Humanism, for It was the dissatisfaction with orthodox 
religion which first sparked the formation of a separate 
movement. It is the "enemy," more than a common positive 
goal, which, after all, gives birth to revolutions, social 
upheavals, and social movements. Without orthodoxy to
1?^
condemn, Humanists could probably not have been united or 
even isolated into a separate ideological current.
Specific argumentative patterns of refutation are 
clear. The first involves the use of the broad field of 
science as an authority, an authority which supposedly has 
already successfully destroyed the foundation of traditional 
religion. Humanists assert that the accumulation of data 
through science has rendered most religious tenets false.
Major Christian tenets with which the Humanists have been most 
concerned with refuting have been the existence of a God, the 
existence of immortality, the existence of a soul, and the 
existence of a body-spirit duality. Humanists charge that 
recent scientific discoveries have made such claims ground­
less, and one is anti-scientific to cling to them.
The next mode of attack is an extension of the first 
one into an epistemological argument. The Humanist charges 
that truth can be discovered only through an application of 
the scientific method, that any claim derived from other than 
empirical sources must of necessity be false. Obviously, 
once the methodological rules have been established, the con­
clusions are predetermined; traditional religious claims 
have not and perhaps cannot be based on scientific investi­
gation.
Both these lines of argument quite clearly pivot on 
an assumption about truth, science, and religion. Humanists
175
argue from an a priori foundation that all truths--metaphys­
ical, physical, religious— must be the fruit of empirical 
investigation, that only science and the scientific method 
can provide meaningful answers to man’s questions, that any 
knowledge acquired by other methods cannot be trustworthy.
In general. Humanists have neither corroborated nor acknowl­
edged this assumption; however, the rhetorical effectiveness 
of the entire argumentative scheme depends upon an audience’s 
willingness to accept such a premise. Presumably, the Human­
ist employs the argument effectively for other Humanists by 
omitting substantiation for the assumption; indeed, the con­
firmed Humanist is likely to supply it for the speaker or 
writer. Conversely, the non-Humanist audience may well be un­
willing to grant the assumption unless it is supported. Yet, 
from an ethical point of view, one wonders whether (even be­
fore a Humanist audience) such a vital premise may responsi­
bly be elided. At the very least, a responsible rhetorical 
approach would seemingly demand that greater attention be 
given to the epistemological assumption and that the argu­
ment be presented ifith less finality.
Any extension of this point leads to the inescapable 
observation that many individual Humanists have fallen into 
a scientific dogmatism, a dogmatism not different in kind 
from that which they have so vociferously condemned in ortho­
doxy. Ironically, the Humanist cloaks his rigidity in the
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guise of the spirit of science and scientific inquiry. On 
the other hand, if the Humanist’s assumptions regarding the 
nature of truth are granted, his position becomes consistent 
and justifiable. The charge of dogmatism, of course, cannot 
be hurled at all Humanists; however, dogmatism may be viewed 
as an observable propensity within the movement.
A less significant aspect of the Humanist's pattern 
of refutation involves the claim that common sense and reason 
conflict with traditional religious beliefs. The argument 
here is that any reasonable examination of such beliefs as 
God and Immortality results in the conclusion that they are 
absurd and mendacious, riddled with contradictions and impos­
sibilities. Again, this entire polemical position presupposes 
that religious claims may be validated through the use of hu­
man reason and investigation. Many of the arguments are in­
deed persuasive and impressive; and to the Humanist, who is 
eager to grant the initial premise, they probably ravage any 
and all of the tenets of traditional religion.
The final refutative argument hinges on an insistence 
that organized religion has failed, has caused much human 
suffering and war, and has contained an anti-humanistic value 
system. Here the Humanist launches a concrete and rhetori­
cally well-corroborated argument; however, he fails to dis­
tinguish sufficiently between orthodox and liberal Christian­
ity. That which he attributes to all religion is usually a
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characteristic of the older fundamental sects and is fre­
quently as alien to modein or liberal Christianity as it is 
to Humanism.
That the argumentative pattern of refutation has been 
built on something less than a solid foundation, and that Hu­
manists tend to make rigid pronouncements, exaggerate, and 
over-generalize, must surely be recognized. Nevertheless, as 
a means of uniting the movement around common attitudes, the 
rhetorical pattern has served most effectively.
Religious Humanism, in its thirty-seven years of 
movement activity, has earned a place in twentieth-century 
American religious and philosophic thought. In trying to 
formulate, justify, and communicate an ideology. Humanists 
have developed some rather definite patterns of argument, 
and these patterns are perhaps as symbolic of their movement . 
as are the soecific Humanistic ideals themselves.
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APPENDIX I 
THE HUMANIST MANIFESTO
The time has come for widespread recognition of the 
radical changes in religious beliefs throughout the modem 
world. The time is past for mere revision of traditional 
attitudes. Science and economic change have disrupted the 
old beliefs. Religions the world over are under the neces­
sity of coming to terms with new conditions created by a 
vastly increased knowledge and experience. In every field of 
human activity, the vital movement is now in the direction 
of a candid and explicit humanism. In order that religious 
humanism may be better understood we, the undersigned, desire 
to make certain affirmations which we believe the facts of 
our contemporary life demonstrate.
There is a great danger of a final, and we believe 
fatal, identification of the word religion with doctrines 
and methods which have lost their significance and which are 
powerless to solve the problem of human living in the Twen­
tieth Century. Religions have always been means for real­
izing the highest values of life. Their end has been accom­
plished through the interpretation of the total environing 
situation (theology or world view), the sense of values re­
sulting therefrom (goal or ideal), and the technique (cult), 
established for realizing the satisfactory life. A change 
in any of these factors results in alteration of the outward 
religions through the centuries. But through all changes 
religion itself remains constant in its quest for abiding 
values, an Inseparable feature of human life.
Today man’s larger understanding of the universe, 
his scientific achievements, and his deeper appreciation of 
brotherhood, have created a situation which requires a new 
statement of the means and purposes of religion. Such a 
vital, fearless, and frank religion capable of furnishing 
adequate social goals and personal satisfactions may appear 
to many people as a complete break with the past. While 
this age does owe a vast debt to the traditional religions, 
it is none the less obvious that any religion that can hope
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to be a synthesizing and dynamic force for today must be 
shaped for the needs of this age. To establish such a reli­
gion is a major necessity of the present. It is a responsi­
bility which rests upon this generation. We therefore af­
firm the following!
First: Religious humanists regard the universe as
self-existing and not created.
Second: Humanism believes that man is a part of
nature and that he has emerged as the result of a continuous 
process.
Third: Holding an organic view of life, humanists
find that the traditional dualism of mind and body must be 
rejected.
Fourth : Humanism recognizes that man's religious
culture and civilization, as clearly depicted by anthropol­
ogy and history, are the product of a gradual development 
due to his interaction with his natural environment and with 
his social heritage. The individual b o m  into a particular 
culture is largely molded by that culture.
Fifth: Humanism asserts that the nature of the
universe depicted by modem science makes unacceptable any 
supematurai or cosmic guarantees of human values. Obvious­
ly humanism does not deny the possibility of realities as 
yet undiscovered, but it does insist that the way to deter­
mine the existence and value of any and all realities is by 
means of intelligent inquiry and by the assessment of their 
relations to human needs. Religion must formulate its hopes 
and plans in the light of the scientific spirit and method.
Sixth: We are convinced that the time has passed
for theism, deism, modernism, and the several varieties of 
"new thought."
Seventh: Religion consists of those actions, pur­
poses, and experiences which are humanly significant. Noth­
ing human is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, 
science, philosophy, love, friendship, recreation— all that 
is in its degree expressive of intelligently satisfying hu­
man living. The distinction between the sacred and the 
secular can no longer be maintained.
Eighth: Religious humanism considers the complete
realization of human personality to be the end of man's life 
and seeks its development and fulfillment in the here and 
now. This is the explanation of the humanist' social passion.
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Ninth : In the place of the old attitudes involved 
in worship and prayer the humanist finds his religious emo­
tions expressed in a heightened sense of personal life and 
in a co-operative effort to promote social well-being.
Tenth; It follows that there will be no uniquely 
religious emotions and attitudes of the kind hitherto asso­
ciated with belief in the supematurai.
Eleventh: Man will learn to face the crises of life
in terms ot his knowledge of their naturalness and probabil­
ity. Reasonable and manly attitudes will be fostered by 
education Anri supported by custom. We assume that humanism 
will take the path of social and mental hygiene and discour­
age sentimental anri unreal hopes and wishful thinking.
Twelfth: Believing that religion must work increas­
ingly for joy in living, religious humanists aim to foster 
the creative in man and to encourage achievements that add 
to the satisfactions of life.
Thirteenth; Religious humanimm maintains that all 
associations anri 1nstitut1 ons exist for the fulfillment of 
human life. The Intelligent evaluation, transformation, 
control, and direction of such associations anri institutions 
with a view to the enhancement of human life is the purpose 
and program of humanism. Certainly religious institutions, 
their ritualistic forms, ecclesiastical methods, and com­
munal activities must be reconstituted as rapidly as exper­
ience allows, in order to function effectively in the modem 
world.
Fourteenth; The humanists are firmly convinced that 
existing acquisitive and profit-motivated society has shown 
itself to be inadequate anri that a radical change in methods, 
controls, and motives must be instituted. A socialized and 
co-operative economic order must be established to the end 
that the equitable distribution of the means of life be 
possible. The goal of humanism is a free anri universal so­
ciety in which people voluntarily and intelligently co-op­
erate for the common good. Humanists demand a shared life 
in a shared world.
Fifteenth and last; We assert that hrnnani am will;
(a) affirm life rather than deny it; (b) seek to elicit the 
possibilities of life, not flee from it; and (c) endeavor 
to establish the conditions of a satisfactory life for all, 
not merely for a few. By this positive "morale" and inten­
tion humanism will be guided, and from this perspective and 
alignment the techniques and efforts of humanism will flow.
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So stand the theses of rellgloua humanism. Though 
we consider the religious forms and Ideas of our fathers no 
longer adequate, the quest for the good life Is still the 
central task for mankind. Han Is at last becoming aware that 
he alone Is responsible for the realization of the world of 
his dreams, that he has within himself the power for Its 
achievement. He must set Intelligence and will to the task.
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APPENDIX II
TAPE RECORDING LIBRARY OP THE AMERICAN 
HUMANIST ASSOCIATION*
NBC •’Faith in Action” interviews - approximately 15 minutes 
each
TAPE NO.
1. Julian Huxley - "Evolution and Humeui D#tiny” -
November 195^» Two 15-minute periods. NBC 
interviewed Dr Huxley during his lecture tour 
in this country.
2. Horace M. Kallen - *• Individualism and the American
Way of Life”
William H. Kilpatrick - "Moral Values in Public Edu­
cation” Both recorded July 1953»
William H. Kilpatrick - "A Tribute to John Déwey * - 
August 1953 (with Dale DeWitt).
3. Arthur E. Morgan and George Stoddard - ”Can Know-How
Save the World?” Two 15-minute periods. NBC 
staff members interview two prominent Human­
ists on a continuing theme of the Humanist 
program: "Science for Humanity.”
4. Gerald Wendt - "Time to Live” - May 1956.
Hermann J. Muller - "Humanism in the 20th Century"
5« "Where Does Modem Man Stand Today?”
"Faith in Action” series. The theme of the 
series is man’s role in today’s society. Dr. 
Edwin H. Wilson conducts the two interviews. 
Presented on NBC January 19 and 26, 1958.
*This list includes all the AHA tapes available up 
to I96O; others have been added since that time. The list 
is a copy (in form and numbering) of that distributed by the 
Tape Recording Library, with only slight abridgments regard­
ing tape descriptions and their lengths.
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#1, Professor Charles Franks1, Chairman, 
Department of Philosophy, Columbia 
University, talks on "What About Man’s 
Future," commenting on the "Age of 
Anxiety."
#2. Dr Harold Taylor, President, Sarah
Lawrence College, Bronxville, New York, 
talks on "Science and Education Today."
6. S. I. Hayakawa - "Language; Key to Human Understand­
ing" - an address given to San Francisco 
Chapter of the AHA.
7. Julian HnYi fty - "Evolution and munan Destiny" - In
this radio address Dr Huxley really sums up 
lectures given in India. Presented in San 
Francisco, October 1954.
8. Alma Reed - "The Humanism of Orozco."
9. Harold Scott - "Dr Scott Answers His Critics" - radio
interview by Austin Alsop, Salt Lake City.
10. V. T. Thayer - "Let’s Keep Our Public Schools Public."
11. Edwin H. Wilson - Two talks on Humanism given on WOSU
University Symposium, March 1954. 30 minutes
each.
12. Edwin H. Wilson - three 15-minute interviews: "The
Humanist Position" - WLW; "Humanist World 
Congress" - given the morning Dr Wilson 
stepped off the plane from Paris after return­
ing from the First World Congress of IHEU; 
"Humanism’s Answer to Fear and Confusion."
13. Edwin H. Wilson - "Humanism - A World Movement" -
New Orleans lecture, February 1955»
14. Annual Meeting and Conference, AHA, Chicago, Illinois
1958. Merit Awards to Dr Halph Blount and 
Dr Walter Verity.
Vashti McCollum - "Ten Years of the McCollum 
Decision"
William H. Kilpatrick - Humanist Pioneer - 
"Moral Values in Education"
Oscar Biddle - Humanist of the Year - "Is
Organized Religion Responsible for 
Moral Impasse?"
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15* "The Transactional Approach to Human Behavior"
"Arthur F. Bentley’s Place in American Thought" 
by Sidney Ratner, Institute for Advanced 
Study, Princeton, New Jersey.
"The Word 'Transaction*," Arthur F. Bentley, 
Paoli, Indiana (read by Dr Eatner).
"The Transactional Approach to the Psychology 
jof Perception," Harold Mooney, Ohio State 
University.
"Transactions in Politics and Government," 
Richard W. Taylor, Northwestern University. 
This is another of the symposiums presented 
at the Indianapolis regional conference in 
October 1956.
16. Hermann J, Muller - "Science for Humanity."
1?. Dr Brock Chisholm - "The Psychological Foundations of 
Peace," presented to the Chicago Chapter, 
October 1956.
18. Dr Wallace W. Culver - "Religion as a Social Phenom­
enon." Presented to the Philadelphia Ethical 
Society, December 1957»
19. Dr Brock Chisholm - "Learning to Live in a New Kind
of World."
20. Julian Huxley - "Evolution and Human Destiny" -
Chicago lecture, October 1954.
21. Harold Larrabee and Edwin J. TniVas - "Conformity,
Dissent and Democracy." IHEU New York Con­
ference, January 1955*
22. Priscilla Robertson - "What Shall I Tell My Chil-
dr en?" - an article written for Harper’s 
Magazine, August 1952, by the Editor of The 
Humanist, and read by Adelaide Winston.
23. Maxine Greene - "Humanism in the 18th Century."
24. Dr Alfred Emerson - "Is There Purpose in the Uni-
verse?" A talk presented to the Chicago 
Chapter, AHA, April 1958.
25. Dr Rudolf Drei^rs - "A Humanistic View of Sex."
Presented to the Chicago Chapter, October
1956.
26. "The Investigator." This is a take-off on the McCarthy
investigation.
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27. Dr Charles Morris - "Varieties of Human Values."
Given at the Chicago Conference, October 1956.
28. J. Talbot Winchell - "How General Semantics Advances
the Aims of Humanism." San Diego Chapter, 
August 1956.
Tapes 29 through 33 are all from the program of the Annual 
Conference and Meeting of the American Humanist Association 
held in Cincinnati, Ohio, on March 1 and 2, 1957*
29. "Humanism and Mental Health" - Public Meeting under
the auspices of the Cincinnati Chuter, AHA. 
Panel discussion comprised of Dr Karl Heiser, 
Professor Read Bain, Dr William Moore, Dr 
John A. Ordway, and Dr Charles Francis 
Potter,
30. Dr Hermann J. Muller, President, AHA, presiding. Dr
Robert Risk speaks on "Humanism's Interpretive 
Task"; Dr Edwin H. Wilson gives "A Definition 
of Rumaniat Advance."
Workshop: "Humanist Advance Through Education" -
Dr John Kirk, Dr Leo Koch. John W. Meyers, 
Priscilla Robertson.
31. Workshop: "Humanist Advance Through the Arts" -
Professor Van Meter Ames. Dr Corliss Lamont, 
Professor Keith McGary.
31. Dr George Geiger - Antioch College - gives a philo-
sopher*s view of "Humanism, Scientific Method 
and Values."
32. Workshop: "Humanist Advance Through Social Action"
- Ernest Morgan. Dr. J. J. Kessler. Vashti 
McCollum, Adelaide Winston.
32. Workshop: "Humanist Advance Through Intergroup Coop­
eration" - Dr Joseph Sanders. Dr Gardner 
Williams.
33* Humanist Awards: Honoring - Dr Charles Francis Potter
as "Humanist Pioneer." Honoring - Mrs 
Margaret Sanger as "Humanist of the Year"; 
response by her son. Dr Grant Sanger.
33* Dr Hermann J. Muller, Annual Presidential Address: 
"Freedom from Ignorance."
33* Dr Chauncey Leake - "Science, Humanism and Ethics."
This is the last of the Cincinnati tapes.
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34. Paul Biftwfihftrd - "Literary Censorship and Bookbum-
ing." Mr Blanshard deals here with the cen­
sorship problem in this country. Presented 
at the AHA Conference, March 1956.
35. Dr Rudolf Driekurs - Workshop on Problems of Chapters.
Presented at the Chicago Conference, March
1956.
36. "Religion and the Presidency" - a discussion presen­
ted on NBC-TV, June 1, 1958. Panel consist­
ing of John A MacKay, President of Princeton 
Theological Seminary, Representative Eugene 
J McCarthy, the Very Rev. Francis Sayre, Jr, 
Dean of Washington Cathedral, Washington,
D. C., and Glenn L Archer, Executive Director 
of POAU.
37. The Rev. David K. Fison - "The Trumbull Park Integra-
tion Problem." The brave program of the 
pastor of the South Deering Methodist Church 
to integrate all members of his congregation 
lead to eviction from his apartment.
38. Glenn L. Archer. Executive Director of POAU, speaks
on **The Ramparts We Watch." Dr Archer tells 
what lies behind the ban on Martin Luther TV 
film in Chicago, and the attacks on Billy 
Graham. He also discusses the drive on state 
legislatures to provide funds for parochial 
school buses.
39. Paul Blansh^d - "An Imaginary Cross-Examination of
Cardinal Spellman." A dramatic presentation 
upholding religious liberty as it was origin­
ally recorded at National City Christian 
Church during the 8th national conference of 
POAU on Church and State in Washington, D. C.
40. Edwin H. Wilson. Executive Director of AHA talks on
^Naturalistic Humanism." This talk was pre­
sented over radio station WILL, University 
of Illinois, in the summer of 1957.
41. Side #1 Anatol Eapoport - "Semantics as Related to
Ethics, or A Contemporary Man's Search for an 
Affirmative Way of Life." Presented to the 
San Francisco Chapter of AHA.
42. Segregation-Integration - Some psychological reali­
ties. Panel discussion. Presented to the 
American Othopsychiatric Association, March
1957.
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43. The Hev. Leslie Pennington and Douglas B. Anderson -
'•Mysticism and Uni tari anism," a discussion at 
an orientation meeting of the First Unitarian 
Church of Chicago, March 13, 1958.
44. "Which Way to Peace" - Panel discussion on various
methods of achieving a long-lasting peace. 
Panelists: Bohert Nicholson, Professor of
History, University of Illinois (Atlantic 
Union approach); The Rev. Paul G. Macy. 
Executive Director, P. 0. R. (Fellowship of 
Reconciliation approach); William R. Hoalfe, 
Professor of Law and Librarian, Northwestern 
University School of Law (American Associa­
tion for the United Nations approach);
Lawrence Scott, Director of Peace Education, 
Friends Service Committee (Friends Service 
Committee approach); Theodore Lentz, Director 
Attitude Research Laboratory, St. Louis, 
Missouri (Attitude Research approach. Moder­
ator: The Rev. David H. Cole, Pastor, First
Unlversalist Church of Chicago.
45. Harold R. Rafton - "The Challenge of Humanism."
Paper read by the Adult Study Group of The 
Society and Church of the Unity (Unitarian) 
Church of Winchendon, Massachusetts. '
Tapes 46 through 49 are from the Ann Arbor Conference of the 
American Humanist Association held on December 6-7, 1957. 
Conference theme: "Approaches to World Peace."
46. Wilfrid Knapp - "The Outlook for Peace." 20 minutes. 
John Stoessinger - "The Non-Military Work for Peace of
the United Nations."
47. Douglas Anderson - "God and Man in Europe," a report
to the Chicago Chapter, AHA, in November 1957.
48. "Communications as a Key to Understanding and Peace"
- Panel discussion. Chairman - Ralph Gerard. 
Participants - Anatol Rapoport, Kenneth 
Boulding, Morris Tanowitz.
49. Stuart C. Dodd - "Can We Be Scientific About Human-
ism?"
Hermann J. Muller - "Radiation Damage and the Avoid- 
ance oflTar."
50. Dr Brock ChishnTm - "Humanism Today," presented to the
Humanist Fellowship of Victoria, British 
Columbia, on June 8, 1958.
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51« "Esperanto." This is a short recording made by the 
Humanist Center of St. Louis to demonstrate 
what Esperanto is and to give you an idea of 
how easy it is to learn this international 
language.
52. Dr George Axtelle - "Moral Values in Education."
An interview, in the NBC "Faith in Action" 
series, by Dr Edwin H. Wilson, Executive 
Director, AHA, of the Chairman of the Depart­
ment of History and Philosophy of Education, 
School of Education, New York University. 
Interview broadcast August 17, 1958.
53* Bernard J. Diggs - "Contemporary Trends in Philoscpby."
54. Leo F. Koch - "Sins of Orthodoxy." Discussion of the 
harm done by orthodox religious belief.
Tapes 55 through 57 are from the program of the Cleveland
Conference of the AHA held in November 1958.
55* Dr Robert W. Tufts - "Economics and Peace."
Samuel Jacobs - "niearmament in Relation to Unemploy­
ment . "
Professor Theodore W. Schultz - "Human Wealth and
Economic Growth Implications for Rich and Poor 
Countries."
56. "Unsettled Issues of Humanism" - A discussion by 
Professor Oliver L. Reiser and Professor 
Garner Williams; Professor John R. Kirk.GViaI rmanT
57* Dr. Hermann J. Muller - "The Search for Ways to Peace" 
AHA Presidential address.
Dr Rudolf Dreikurs - "Family Communication." Demon­
stration of family communication problems and 
their solutions.
58. "Can Modem Man Live Without Supematuralism?" - A 
discussion-debate between William Hawk. Jr. 
and an Episcopalian minister.
1-1. Armin Elmendorf - "One World or No World."
59* "The Emotional Aspects of Humanism" - Panel discussion 
by Dr Edwin T. Buehrer. Dr Alfret^ Rmft-rgnw. and 
Dr A. Eustace Haydon.
Anatol Itopoport - "Signal Reactions to Religious Sym- 
bols." Read by J. E. Chambers.
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60. "Open Occupancy and Housing Discrimination." Radio
broadcaat over station WNMF, Evanston,Illinois. Discussed by Professor Joseph HacTnnftn and Dr Grace Jaffe.
Side #2 "Should Capital Punishment be Abolished?"
TV broadcas t - WTTW - Chi cago, Illinois. H ^ s  
Mattuck. Illinois Committee to Abolish Capital 
Punishment, discusses this with Lawrence 
Jennison. Assistant State's Attorney for Cook 
County,Illinois.
61. "Religion in an Age of Science" - Dr. Harlow Shapley.
62. "Threat of Nuclear Fallout— Hope at Geneva." Presented
to the Committee for SAME Nuclear Policy.
63» Dr Brock Chisholm - "Prescription for Survival."
64. "The 8 Steps to Peace" - Sound tracks of films pre­
sented by ABC TV August and September 1959» 
by the Pierce Butler, Jr. Foundation for Edu­
cation in World Law. 8 talks.
65. "John Dewey and Humanism." Two talks by George
Geiger and John Herman Randall presented on 
"Faith in Action" NBC radio series.
66. "The Fallacy of Fear" - Dr. Rudolf Dreikurs talks on
Our Anxiety Age.
